Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgment

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory (e.g., exercising, becoming thirsty, drinking water) led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks (e.g., having sex, becoming pregnant, becoming nauseous) led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links ((Experiments 1–3). Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments (Experiments 4 and 5).     

Visual perception of complex shape-transforming processes

Morphogenesis—or the origin of complex natural form—has long fascinated researchers from practically every branch of science. However, we know practically nothing about how we perceive and understand such processes. Here, we measured how observers visually infer shape-transforming processes. Participants viewed pairs of objects (‘before’ and ‘after’ a transformation) and identified points that corresponded across the transformation. This allowed us to map out in spatial detail how perceived shape and space were affected by the transformations. Participants’ responses were strikingly accurate and mutually consistent for a wide range of non-rigid transformations including complex growth-like processes. A zero-free-parameter model based on matching and interpolating/extrapolating the positions of high-salience contour features predicts the data surprisingly well, suggesting observers infer spatial correspondences relative to key landmarks. Together, our findings reveal the operation of specific perceptual organization processes that make us remarkably adept at identifying correspondences across complex shape-transforming processes by using salient object features. We suggest that these abilities, which allow us to parse and interpret the causally significant features of shapes, are invaluable for many tasks that involve ‘making sense’ of shape.     

Online measurement of mental representations of complex spatial decision problems: Comparison of CNET and hard laddering

This paper introduces the online Causal Network Elicitation Technique (CNET), as a technique for measuring components of mental representations of choice tasks and compares it with the more common technique of online ‘hard’ laddering (HL). While CNET works in basically two phases, one in open question format and one as guided linking of attributes and benefits, HL works completely structured with revealed attributes and benefits. Mental representations of two activity travel tasks were collected with both techniques among members of a nationwide Dutch household panel. The results confirm the hypothesis that the revealed format of variables in HL has an effect on the indication of variables as the elicited mental representations are almost twice as big for HL than for CNET. Furthermore, it turned out that CNET is more sensitive in measuring shifts among attributes in the mental representations for situational changes of the activity-travel task.     

Causal judgments about empirical information in an interrupted time series design

Empirical information available for causal judgment in everyday life tends to take the form of quasi-experimental designs, lacking control groups, more than the form of contingency information that is usually presented in experiments. Stimuli were presented in which values of an outcome variable for a single individual were recorded over six time periods, and an intervention was introduced between the fifth and sixth time periods. Participants judged whether and how much the intervention affected the outcome. With numerical stimulus information, judgments were higher for a pre-intervention profile in which all values were the same than for pre-intervention profiles with any other kind of trend. With graphical stimulus information, judgments were more sensitive to trends, tending to be higher when an increase after the intervention was preceded by a decreasing series than when it was preceded by an increasing series ending on the same value at the fifth time period. It is suggested that a feature-analytic model, in which the salience of different features of information varies between presentation formats, may provide the best prospect of explaining the results.     

Contiguity and the causal theory of memory

In Memory: A Philosophical Study, Bernecker argues for an account of contiguity. This Contiguity View is meant to solve relearning and prompting, wayward causation problems plaguing the causal theory of memory. I argue that Bernecker’s Contiguity View fails in this task. Contiguity is too weak to prevent relearning and too strong to allow prompting. These failures illustrate a problem inherent in accounts of memory causation. Relearning and prompting are both causal relations, wayward only with respect to our interest in specifying remembering’s requirements. Solving them requires saying more about remembering, not causation. I conclude by sketching such an account.     

Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization

Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental properties are realized by physical properties. The realization relation is typically taken to be a metaphysical necessitation relation. Here, I explore how the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization can be explained by what is known as ‘the subset view’ of realization. The subset view holds that the causal powers that are associated with a realized property are a proper subset of the causal powers that are associated with the realizer property. I argue that the said explanation of the metaphysical necessitation feature requires a careful treatment of the relationship between properties and causal powers.     

Processing speed, intelligence, creativity, and school performance: Testing of causal hypotheses using structural equation models

According to mental speed theory of intelligence, the speed of information processing constitutes an important basis for cognitive abilities. However, the question, how mental speed relates to real world criteria, like school, academic, or job performance, is still unanswered. The aim of the study is to test an indirect speed-factor model in comparison to rivaling models explaining the relationships between different mental abilities and performance. In this speed-factor model, basic cognitive processing is assumed to influence higher mental abilities (IQ and creativity). Intelligence and creativity themselves should be valid predictors of school performance. We computed bivariate correlations and structural equation models to test this hypothesis, using indicators of processing speed [Zahlen-Verbindungs-Test (ZVT) and Coding Test], psychometric intelligence [Kognitiver Fähigkeits-Test (KFT) and Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM)], creativity [Verbaler Kreativitäts-Test (VKT) and Verwendungs-Test (VWT)] and school performance (grades). In a sample of 271 students from German gymnasiums (Class Levels 9 to 11) the speed-factor model can reproduce at best the empirical relationships between processing speed, intelligence, creativity, and school performance: It assumes that processing speed influences higher mental abilities (intelligence and creativity), which, in the sequel, influence school performance. Therefore, processing speed seems to have no direct effect on school performance; the effect is indirect as it operates via mediation through higher cognitive abilities.     

Can unpredicted outcomes be intended? The role of outcome-beliefs in children's judgments of intention

An adult-like concept of intention includes a deliberate action to achieve a goal and a belief that one's action (if successful) will cause the desired outcome. For example, good outcomes caused by accident or by chance are not believed to be caused intentionally. In two experiments, we asked whether children understand this connection between intentions and outcomes. Children played two games in which actions could produce unintended outcomes (i.e., causes were unplanned). Children sometimes received a desirable reward independent of intention. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds mistakenly claimed they had intended the desirable outcome even when it was unexpected. Four-year-olds judged that they had not intended a deliberate action if it did not yield a rewarding outcome. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 6-year-olds seldom make these errors. The results suggest that 4- and 5-year-old children have not yet attained an adult-like concept of intention. Their inaccurate judgments regarding their intentions, given a rewarding yet unexpected outcome, can be explained by a positivity bias.     

Event completion: event based inferences distort memory in a matter of seconds

We present novel evidence that implicit causal inferences distort memory for events only seconds after viewing. Adults watched videos of someone launching (or throwing) an object. However, the videos omitted the moment of contact (or release). Subjects falsely reported seeing the moment of contact when it was implied by subsequent footage but did not do so when the contact was not implied. Causal implications were disrupted either by replacing the resulting flight of the ball with irrelevant video or by scrambling event segments. Subjects in the different causal implication conditions did not differ on false alarms for other moments of the event, nor did they differ in general recognition accuracy. These results suggest that as people perceive events, they generate rapid conceptual interpretations that can have a powerful effect on how events are remembered.