Are there Reasons to Challenge a Symbolic Computationalist Approach in Explaining Deductive Reasoning?

The majority of the existing theories explaining deductive reasoning could be included in a classic computationalist approach of the cognitive processes. In fact, deductive reasoning could be seen to be the pinnacle of the symbolic computationalism, its last fortress to be defended in the face of new, dynamic, and ecological perspectives over cognition. But are there weak points in that position regarding deductive reasoning? What would be the reasons for which new perspectives could gain in credibility? What could be their most important tenets? The answers given to those questions in the paper include two main points. The first one is that the present empirical data could not sustain unambiguously one view over the other, that they are obtained in artificial experimental conditions, and that there are data that are not easily explainable using the traditional computationalist paradigm. The second one is that approaching the deductive reasoning from dynamic and ecological perspectives could have significant advantages. The most obvious one is the possibility to integrate more easily the research regarding the deductive reasoning with the results obtained in other domains of the psychology (especially in what respects the lower cognitive processes), in artificial intelligence or in neurophysiology. The reasons for that would be that such perspectives, as they are sketched in the paper, would imply, essentially, processes of second-order pattern formation and recognition (as it is the case for perception), embodied cognition, and dynamic processes as the brain ones are.     

Everyday Life Reasoning, Possible Worlds and Cultural Processes

Discussing Faiciuc’s paper, I first tackle the problem of fallacies in deductive reasoning showing how, in a possible world theory, non correct forms of reasoning can be useful strategies for discovery, providing these strategies remain at a hypothesis level. Secondly, everyday reasoning and its specificity in comparison to logical-normative one are analyzed. This topic stresses the notion of interpretation and, in this context, the role of the community and of cultural canons shared by the subject. From this point of view, reasoning does not occur, only, in the brain of a person but in everyday exchanges occurring between individuals and the history of their community.

Description of Exemplar Cases in the Intensive Mental Health Program: Illustrations of Application of the Therapeutic Model

We describe cases from the clinical records in the Intensive Mental Health Program to illustrate the diverse presenting problems, intervention strategies, therapeutic process, and outcomes for children receiving services in this school-based, community-oriented treatment model. Cases reflect varying degrees of treatment response and potential factors that influence the fluctuating levels of emotional disturbance and impaired functioning in the home, school, and community.     

从知觉分心任务看儿童类比推理能力的发展

采用四类图片类比映射任务,考察了知觉分心对90名4岁、5岁、6岁儿童类比推理能力发展的影响,并进一步阐释影响儿童类比推理能力发展的可能机制。四类图片类比映射任务分别为一种关系无分心任务、一种关系有分心任务、两种关系无分心任务和两种关系有分心任务。结果表明：（1）在具备相应知识经验的前提下,知觉分心对儿童类比推理成绩有显著影响,儿童在无分心任务中的表现明显好于知觉分心任务的表现。在无分心条件下,4岁儿童已经开始能够选择关系匹配来正确完成类比推理。错误分析发现知觉分心任务中儿童所犯错误主要是分心错误,而且分心错误随年龄增长呈下降趋势。这表明对知觉分心的抑制控制可能是儿童类比推理能力发展的一个重要影响因素。（2）随着年龄增长,儿童类比推理能力逐渐提高。总体表现为6岁组的成绩显著优于4岁、5岁组的成绩,而4岁组的成绩与5岁组的成绩没有显著差异。5岁可能是儿童能够抑制知觉分心进行类比推理的快速发展期     

Just Plain "Ought'

Is there any sense to the idea of an ``ought''that is not relative to any particularnormative framework? This ``ought'' would not bea moral, prudential, legal, aesthetic, orreligious ``ought,'' but rather an unqualified or just plain ``ought.'' Thispaper (i) argues for the existence andusefulness of just plain ``ought''; (ii) locatesthe concept of just plain ``ought'' within amajor strand in the history of ethics (namely,the perennial attempt to demonstrate thatmorality and prudence are in harmony); and(iii) challenges David Copp's recent attempt toshow that in fact there is no such thing asjust plain ``ought.'' A theory of just plain``ought'' emerges along the way.     

Moral Reasoning Effects on Political Participation

In this study, respondents who agreed to participate in a computer-administered interview were presented with information and questions about public interest groups, followed by the Defining Issues Test of moral reasoning (DIT). Respondents with high DIT scores stressed morally central over morally peripheral considerations in deciding whether to participate in public interest groups. Less sophisticated reasoners showed the opposite pattern. Morally central considerations also had a much greater impact on the probability that sophisticated respondents would attempt to participate in public interest groups after completing the interview. The analysis included controls for potential confounding variables such as cognitive ability, education, prior political participation, and gender. The findings imply motivational differences between advantaged and disadvantaged population groups. Such differences may help to account for the differing strategies and successes of political organizations mobilizing these groups.     

Culture and Causal Cognition

East Asian and American causal reasoning differs significantly. East Asians understand behavior in terms of complex interactions between dispositions of the person or other object and contextual factors, whereas Americans often view social behavior primarily as the direct unfolding of dispositions. These culturally differing causal theories seem to be rooted in more pervasive, culture-specific mentalities in East Asia and the West. The Western mentality is analytic, focusing attention on the object, categorizing it by reference to its attributes, and ascribing causality based on rules about it. The East Asian mentality is holistic, focusing attention on the field in which the object is located and ascribing causality by reference to the relationship between the object and the field.     

Intention and Responsibility in Double Effect Cases

I argue that the moral distinction in double effect cases rests on a difference not in intention as traditionally stated in the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), but in desire. The traditional DDE has difficulty ensuring that an agent intends the bad effect just in those cases where what he does is morally objectionable. I show firstly that the mental state of a rational agent who is certain that a side-effect will occur satisfies Bratman's criteria for intending that effect. I then clarify the nature of the moral distinction in double effect cases and how it can be used to evaluate the moral blameworthiness of agents rather than the moral status of acts. The agent's blameworthiness is reduced not by his lack of intention but by his desire not to bring about the side-effect, and the 'counterfactual test' can be used to determine whether he desires the effect in acting. In my version, the DDE has its rationale in virtue ethics; it is not liable to abuse as the traditional version is; and it makes more plausible distinctions when applied to standard examples.     

目击辨认研究概览

目击辨认的结果作为证据对于法庭判决具有重要意义。DNA证据显示辨认似乎不可靠,心理学家试图了解影响辨认准确性的因素。文章介绍了西方目击辨认研究的范式,估计变量和系统变量对辨认的影响,并分析目击辨认研究存在的理论缺乏和外部效度问题,从而为今后研究提供参考