The spread and impact of Cartesian philosophy in China: historical and comparative perspectives

Cartesian philosophy has had a profound influence on modern Chinese intellectuals since the mid 19^th century. After the May Fourth Movement, there have been many Chinese scholars who worked immensely on Cartesian philosophy and conducted fruitful research including translations, biographies, monographs, and a large number of papers. The examination of mind/body has been one of the most important philosophic issues and also a fundamental truth-searching of the various great thinkers, from Confucius and Socrates to many later Eastern and Western philosophers. There are certain similarities and distinctions between Confucian ‘mind/body’ and Cartesian ‘mind/body’. As a super country with the highest population in the world, the studies of Cartesian philosophy in China have been very inadequate; it should be more prosperous and successful.     

MAKING SENSE OF EMERGENCE: A CRITICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH LEIDENHAG,LEIDENHAG, AND YONG

A number of theologians engaged in the theology and science dialogue—particularly Pentecostal theologian Amos Yong—employ emergence as a framework to discuss special divine action as well as causation initiated by other spiritual realities, such as angels and demons. Mikael and Joanna Leidenhag, however, have issued concerns about its application. They argue that Yong employs supernaturalistic themes with implications that render the concept of emergence obsolete. Further, they claim that Yong's use of emergence theory is inconsistent because he highlights the ontological independence of various spirits in the world concurrently with his advocation of supervenience theory. In view of these concerns, Leidenhag and Leidenhag urge Yong to depart from his application of emergence theory. In what follows, we plan to address each of these criticisms and demonstrate that they are tenuous, if not unwarranted, especially in light of a kenotic‐relational pneumatology.     

Neuroscience in Pursuit of the Holy: Mysticism, the Brain, and Ultimate Reality

Eugene d'Aquili and Andrew B. Newberg's The Mystical Mind: Probing the Biology of Religious Experience presents a core theory regarding the neurophysical nature of mystical experience; extensions of this theory, focusing upon near-death experiences and the nature of religion itself; and buttressing arguments proposing that genetically based neurophysical "operators" within the brain compel human beings to think in certain ways. On the basis of this work, the authors pose a "metatheology," suggesting that certain brain operations may underlie all the religions of the world. The core theory, its extensions, and related arguments are discussed in turn, concluding with commentary on the authors' constructive theology.     

The problems of consciousness and content in theories of perception

The paper aims to show, first, that O’Regan’s and Noë’s Sensorimotor Theory of Vision and Visual Experiences suffers from circularity, and that evidence from empirical research within perception psychology unequivocally invalidates their theory. Secondly, to show that the circularity in O’Regan’s and Noë’s theory of vision and in other general causal and functional theories of perception (i.e. Gibson’s and Marr’s theories of perception) is the inevitable consequence of mutually conflicting assumption of Cartesian dualism underlying these theories. The paper concludes by outlining the consequences of this conflict of assumptions for psychological theories of perception.     

Dualisms,Dichotomies and Dead Ends: Limitations of Analytic Thinking about Sport

In this essay I attempt to show the limitations of analytic thinking and the kinds of dead ends into which such analyses may lead us in the philosophy of sport. As an alternative, I argue for a philosophy of complementation and compatibility in the face of what appear to be exclusive alternatives. This is a position that is sceptical of bifurcations and other simplified portrayals of reality but does not dismiss them entirely. A philosophy of complementation traffics in the realm of ambiguities, paradoxes, differences by degree, tendencies, mixtures, polarities, tensions, complexes, transitions and all other forms of messiness. I note that this position has been generated, in part, by work conducted in the empirical sciences and that complementation provides a paradigm that is useful across the academic disciplines.

To show the ways in which analytic thinking leads to dead ends, I analyse the epistemological debate over ‘broad internalism’ engaged in by Russell (1999 Russell, J. S. 1999. Are rules all an umpire has to work with?. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXVI: 27–49. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar], 2004 Russell, J. S. 2004. Moral realism in sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXXI: 142–160. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]), Dixon (2003 Dixon, Nicholas. 2003. Canadian figure skaters, French judges, and realism in sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXX: 103–116. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]), Simon (2000 Simon, Robert. 2000. Internalism and internal values in sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXVII: 1–16. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar], 2004 Simon, Robert. 2004. From ethnocentrism to realism: Can discourse ethics bridge the gap?. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXXI: 122–141. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]) and Morgan (2004 Morgan, William. 2004. Moral antirealism, internalism, and sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, XXXI: 61–83.  [Google Scholar]). Evidence for the claim that they reached a mostly unhelpful stalemate is based on the fact that they did not provide any third option and moreover that the analytic tools and ground rules they employ prevent its discovery. I suggest that all four authors are comfortable with the analytic tendency to bifurcate reality and require choices among exclusionary alternatives. I also claim that they treat reason as if it were generated by a ‘mind from nowhere’. Philosophical anthropology, I suggest, provides much-needed somatic grounding that would reign in excessively optimistic views of reason (Dixon, Simon and Russell) or excessively plastic interpretations of mind (Morgan). It can also provide evidence that could help us understand why hominids (even modern ones) are so attracted to dichotomies and why we have so much trouble in reconciling apparent incompatibilities.     

THE DUALISTIC,DISCARNATE PICTURE THAT HAUNTS THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

A dualistic, discarnate picture haunts contemporary cognitive science of religion (CSR). Cognitive scientists of religion generally assert or assume a reductive physicalism, primarily through unconscious mental mechanisms that detect supernatural agency where none exists and a larger purpose to life when none exists. Accompanying this focus is a downplaying of conscious reflection in religious belief and practice. Yet the mind side of dualism enters into CSR in interesting ways. Some cognitive scientists turn practitioners of religion into dualists who allegedly believe in disembodied spirits. By emphasizing supernatural agency, CSR neglects nonpersonal powers and meanings in religion, both in terms of magical thinking and practice and of nonpersonal conceptions of divinity. Additionally, some cognitive scientists of religion declare that all humans are innate dualists. They use this alleged dualism to explain beliefs about both an afterlife and transfers of consciousness. Finally, some call on this dualism to serve a salvific function, trying to salvage some meaning to human life.     

The Normative Source of Kantian Hypothetical Imperatives

Abstract

This paper offers a critique of Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kantian instrumental reason. Korsgaard understands Kantian hypothetical imperatives to share a common normative source with the categorical imperative – namely self-legislating, human rational agency. However, her reading of Kantian hypothetical imperatives is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, Korsgaard’s agent-centred approach renders incoherent Kant’s analytic-synthetic division. Secondly, by minimising the dualistic framework of Kant’s practical philosophy the dialectical character of practical rationality is lost: norms of instrumental reasoning therefore become confused with those of moral reasoning. Thirdly, this in turn curtails the distinct critical authority of pure practical rationality over instrumental choice. The paper argues that we need to understand the normativity of instrumental rationality through the lens of Kant’s dualisms. An alternative interpretation is offered which highlights how the norms of hypothetical imperatives appeal to standards of theoretical cognition and practical efficiency rather than the self-legislative demands of pure practical reason.     

On Failing to be Cartesian: Reconsidering the ‘Impurity’ of Descartes’s Meditation

Abstract

This paper begins from the observation that in the Meditations, Descartes never achieves the ‘pure’, thoroughly decontextualized kind of thinking he famously promoted. Some commentators have used this observation to promote pure inquiry more diligently and to criticize Descartes for failing to achieve it. Other commentators have simply called for greater historical fairness and urged that we renew our efforts to understand how Descartes’s inquiry actually does operate. This paper, although sympathetic with this second group of commentators, argues that in revisiting the tensions between what Descartes actually accomplished and what he said he was trying to accomplish, we should see a contemporary lesson, not just better historical understanding. It is argued that in spite of the strong presence in his writings of the imagery of the ‘Cartesian’ ideal of a perfectly presuppositionless philosophical standpoint, not only does Descartes himself never become a Cartesian, but his own practice provides perhaps the best evidence against the very possibility of the Cartesian ‘project of pure inquiry’ to which he aspired.