Dennett’s Rhetorical Strategies in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Consciousness Explained</Emphasis>

Dennett’s Consciousness Explained (1991) is an inspiring but also a highly frustrating book. The line of the argument seems to be clear, but then at second sight it fades away. It turns out that Dennett uses six of the seven strategies which I discuss in my “The Seven Strategies of the Sophisticated Pseudo-Scientist: A Look into Freud’s Rhetorical Tool Box” (J. Gen. Phil. Sci., 2001) Discussing important examples of these strategies I show why Consciousness Explained is such a frustrating book. As the examples used do not reflect minor problems but go to the heart of the matter and concern the book’s main areas of contention, it turns out that, in spite of the valuable and insightful details, Dennett’s materialistic view of consciousness is supported mainly by rhetorical sleights of hand.     

Cross‐cultural structures of concentric and diametric dualism in Lévi‐Strauss’ structural anthropology: structures of relation underlying the self and ego relation?

The parallels between Jung's and Lévi-Strauss' concentric cross-cultural structures of the unconscious are highlighted. Lévi-Strauss' basic contrasts between concentric and diametric dualisms are developed into psychologically relevant differences regarding symmetry, connection and separation, and interaction between foreground and background structures respectively. These contrasts between concentric and diametric structures are applied as a common structural framework for understanding Jungian conceptions of the self, the ego and their relations, Freudian views of compensation and repetition in obsessional neurosis, and Winnicott's conception of a child's transitional object. Developing the contrasts between concentric and diametric structures reveals a compensatory relation between both structures. This supports an argument that concentric structures express the self and diametric structures express the ego in their mutual compensatory interrelation. Contrasting concentric with diametric structures challenges traditional Western logic, including Fordham's view that it is contradictory to treat the self as both centre and totality. It also develops an understanding of Jung's transcendent function which seeks to go beyond the ego-shadow opposition.     

Physicalism Without Reductionism: Toward a Scientifically, Philosophically, and Theologically Sound Portrait of Human Nature

This essay addresses three problems facing a physicalist (as opposed to dualist) account of the person. First, how can such an account fail to be reductive if mental events are neurological events and such events are governed by natural laws? Answering this question requires a reexamination of the concept of supervenience. Second, what is the epistemological status of nonreductive physicalism? Recent philosophy of science can be used to argue that there is reasonable scientific evidence for physicalism. Third, the soul has traditionally been seen as that which enables human beings to relate to God. What accounts for this capacity in a physicalist theory of the person? This essay argues that the same faculties that enable higher cognitive and emotional experience also account for the capacity for religious experience.     

The Life and Works of a Bottom-Up Thinker

A brief account is given of the author's life as a physicist and then a priest. The twin foundations of the author's theological endeavors have been a respect for traditional Christian thinking, though not exempting it from revision where this is needed, and a style of argument termed bottom-up thinking, which seeks to proceed from experience to understanding. The diversity of the world faith traditions is perceived as a major source of perplexity. A revised and modest natural theology and the issue of divine action have been at the top of a science and theology agenda. A defense is sketched in realist terms of the metaphysical strategy of using an ontological interpretation of the unpredictabilities of chaos theory to support a notion of top-down causality through active information. The success of Christian theology as a resource of total explanation depends on a credible account of eschatological hope. Reference is made to practical experience of ethics in the public square.     

Mind-body dualism and the compatibility of medical methods

In this paper we analyse some misleading theses concerning the oldcontroversy over the relation between mind and body presented incontemporary medical literature. We undertake an epistemologicalclarification of the axiomatic structure of medical methods. Thisclarification, in turn, requires a precise philosophical explanation ofthe presupposed concepts. This analysis will establish two results: (1)that the mind-body dualism cannot be understood as a kind of biologicalvariation of the subject-object dichotomy in physics, and (2) that thethesis of the incompatibility between somatic and psychosomatic medicineheld by naturalists and others lacks solid epistemologicalfoundation.     

Hunger and love: Schiller and the origin of drive dualism in Freud's work1

The interpretation of dreams was the fi rst text in which Freud referred to the system of two drives (drive of self‐preservation and the sexual drive). In order to understand how this question was at work in Freud's mind, one has to go back to 1898, when Freud began to write the third chapter of The interpretation of dreams. One can then see, in contrast with Sulloway's assertions, how Freud was inspired by Schiller, whose shadow haunted his dreams between April and December 1898. The analysis of these dreams emphasizes how the references to Schiller's works and to the drive of self‐preservation cover sexual impulses, in particular, those connected with the relationship to the father. The food drive or drive of self‐preservation also enabled Freud to construct a heroic romance. He was thereby able to bury an internal criticism which was at odds with his persistence in describing the father as a seducer, and to conceal scenes in which he was defeated and sexually subdued by another boy.     

Intuitive Dualism and Afterlife Beliefs: A Cross-Cultural Study

It is widely held that intuitive dualism—an implicit default mode of thought that takes minds to be separable from bodies and capable of independent existence—is a human universal. Among the findings taken to support universal intuitive dualism is a pattern of evidence in which “psychological” traits (knowledge, desires) are judged more likely to continue after death than bodily or “biological” traits (perceptual, physiological, and bodily states). Here, we present cross-cultural evidence from six study populations, including non-Western societies with diverse belief systems, that shows that while this pattern exists, the overall pattern of responses nonetheless does not support intuitive dualism in afterlife beliefs. Most responses of most participants across all cultures tested were not dualist. While our sample is in no way intended to capture the full range of human societies and afterlife beliefs, it captures a far broader range of cultures than in any prior study, and thus puts the case for afterlife beliefs as evidence for universal intuitive dualism to a strong test. Based on these findings, we suggest that while dualist thinking is a possible mode of thought enabled by evolved human psychology, such thinking does not constitute a default mode of thought. Rather, our data support what we will call intuitive materialism—the view that the underlying intuitive systems for reasoning about minds and death produce as a default judgment that mental states cease to exist with bodily death.     

Epistemic buck-passing and the interpersonal view of testimony

Two ideas shape the epistemology of testimony. One is that testimony provides a unique kind of knowledge. The other is that testimonial knowledge is a social achievement. In traditional terms, those who affirm these ideas are anti-reductionists, and those who deny them are reductionists. There is increasing interest, however, in the possibility of affirming these ideas without embracing anti-reductionism. Thus, Sanford Goldberg uses the idea of epistemic buck-passing to argue that even reductionists can accept the uniqueness of testimonial knowledge, and Jennifer Lackey gives both speaker and hearer an essential role in testimonial justification, rejecting both reductionism and anti-reductionism in favor of what she calls dualism. After distinguishing a weaker and a stronger notion of buck-passing, we show how anti-reductionists can use the stronger notion to motivate their position, and to answer Goldberg’s and Lackey’s challenges.     

镜像神经元:认知具身性的神经生物学证据

传统认知心理学认为认知类似于计算机对抽象符号的加工和运算,这种观点支持了身心二元论。但是近年来兴起的具身认知运动却否定了这一观点的合理性。具身认知认为认知是身体与世界互动的结果,是身体的感觉-运动系统作用于世界而塑造出来的。认知是具身的,离不开身体的构造和感觉运动系统的作用。镜像神经元的发现支持了认知的具身特征,为认知的具身性提供了神经生物学的证据。     

Out of the body: embodiment and its vicissitudes

Body‐mind dualism and the consequent neglect of the body of the analyst can have important negative effects on the analytical process leading all too often to misinterpretations of the analysand's verbal and non‐verbal communications and to disturbances of analytical temporality. This is intensified when we are dealing with individuals where disembodiment and states of psychic deadness are central features. The paper explores the philosophical roots of the idea of a disembodied mind and the way in which this impacts our relationship with the world. While André Green's concept of the dead mother and disturbances in the sense of self‐agency have been held to play an important role in states of psychic deadness, I suggest that it is rather disturbances in the sense of body ownership and of the body image which are more central. The paper then discusses the particular kinds of countertransference that can be evoked in the analyst when we find ourselves dealing with this type of patient and suggests how we can use our embodied countertransference to become aware of and elaborate our own feelings of deadness in order to overcome the loss of temporality that is characteristic of such states. This is illustrated with reference to my work with a young man with a masochistic perversion and a severe disturbance of the body image with an accompanying profound sense of psychic deadness.