Greed is good? Assessing the relationship between entrepreneurship and subclinical psychopathy

Despite the stereotype of entrepreneurs as corporate psychopaths, there has been little research on the overlap between individual differences in entrepreneurship and subclinical psychopathy. In line with this issue, the current study investigated whether primary and secondary psychopathy are linked to a measure of entrepreneurial tendencies and abilities, as well as entrepreneurial activities and achievements. Participants were 435 working adults. Structural equation models revealed that individual differences in entrepreneurial tendencies and abilities were positively related to primary psychopathy, but unrelated to secondary psychopathy. Secondary psychopathy did not predict entrepreneurial activity; primary psychopathy predicted some entrepreneurial outcomes, albeit modestly, providing partial support for the ‘corporate psychopath’ stereotype. Implications for entrepreneurship research and practice are discussed.     

Threats to Democratic Rationality

This article examines trends that are impacting democratic rationality. It is found that the trends are almost uniformly negative. Viewed from within the legislative branch, trends are negatively impacting legislators’ time, complexifying problems, constraining options, and limiting the evaluation of options. Trends external to the legislative branch are reducing citizen participation and knowledge about public affairs, skewing the balance of power among the branches and states, and decreasing accountability of public officials. In combination, democratic rationality, the process of making good, efficient, and timely decisions to promote higher quality of life and the public good, is seriously threatened. Recommendations include public financing of campaigns, more structured legislative decision-making processes, simplification tests for all new legislation and regulations, and a major new initiative to foster public involvement in public decision making.     

Effects of approach and withdrawal motivation on interactive economic decisions

Although recent economic models of human decision making have recognised the role of emotion as an important biasing factor, the impact of incidental emotion on decisions has remained poorly explored. To address this question, we jointly explored the role of emotional valence (i.e., positive vs. negative) and motivational direction (i.e., approach vs. avoidance) on performance in a well-known economic task, the Ultimatum Game. Participants had to either accept or reject monetary offers from other players, offers that vary in their degree of unfairness. A main effect of motivational direction, but not valence, was observed, with withdrawal-based emotion (disgust and serenity) prompting more rejections relative to approach-based emotion (anger and amusement) and a neutral state. These results further confirm that subtle incidental moods can bias decision making, and suggest that motivational state may be a useful framework to study such decisions. Implications with regard to emotion, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical psychology are discussed.     

Cognitive-behavioral therapy and decision science

In recent decades cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) and decision science (DS) have emerged within the field of psychological science. Though these are two vastly different areas of study, they are similar in that they address human information processing, cognition, behavior, and the link between them. In this article, we provide brief summaries of CBT and decision science, discuss their similarities and differences, and discuss how future research can identify ways in which these fields can inform each other. Several CBT techniques that might be of use to the efforts of the decision science field to prevent cognitive biases are suggested. Research that integrates these two fields may lead to the improvement of both.     

Task conflict,information processing,and decision-making: The damaging effect of relationship conflict

A popular theoretical assumption holds that task-related disagreements stimulate critical thinking, and thus may improve group decision making. Two recent meta-analyses showed, however, that task conflict can have a positive effect, a negative effect, or no effect at all on decision-making quality (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; De Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012). In two studies, we built upon the suggestion of both meta-analyses that the presence of relationship conflict determines whether a task conflict is positively or negatively related to decision making. We hypothesized and found that the level of perceived relationship conflict during task conflict (Study 1), and the actual presence (vs. absence) of relationship conflict during task conflict (Study 2), increased group members’ rigidity in holding onto suboptimal initial preferences during decision making and thus led to poor decisions. In both studies the effect of relationship conflict on decision making was mediated by biased use of information.     

Separating the confident from the correct: Leveraging member knowledge in groups to improve decision making and performance

Groups often struggle to distinguish expert members from others who stand out for various reasons but may not be particularly knowledgeable (Littlepage & Mueller, 1997). We examined an intervention designed to improve group decision making and performance through instructing group members to search for information they already possessed that was relevant to a problem. Participants estimated values and expressed their confidence in their estimates individually and then a second time either individually or in a group. This was done with or without the intervention. Results indicated that: (1) groups were more confident than, and out-performed, individuals, (2) group decision making was best captured by models predicting more influence for more accurate members when the intervention was used and more influence for more confident members in its absence, and (3) groups that received the intervention out-performed groups that did not.     

Functional versus dysfunctional team change: Problem diagnosis and structural feedback for self-managed teams

We describe and examine three changes (personnel, process, and structure) that self-managed teams can make to remedy performance problems. We also discuss why self-managed teams may over-emphasize process and (to a lesser extent) personnel changes over structural changes. Furthermore, we describe and test two specific diagnostic feedback interventions aimed at helping teams make functional structural change. Seventy-eight 4-person teams of undergraduate students participated in two trials of a networked laboratory simulation task. All teams were initially structurally misaligned and subsequently received (a) no feedback, (b) one type of feedback only, or (c) both types of feedback. Results confirmed that structurally misaligned teams demonstrated dysfunctional change by changing process more frequently than structure, with detrimental effects for subsequent performance. When teams received the feedback interventions, however, they were more likely to change their structure and thereby improve their performance.     

The Consequences and Correction of Inflation in Personal Savings Estimates in Specific Future Time Frames

We examined the consequences of personal savings estimate inflation that occurs when decision makers provide savings estimates for specific future months when compared with the next month or the next year time frames, along with a method to attenuate this bias. The results of three experiments showed that the savings estimate inflation leads to significantly larger estimates of desired nest egg size (Experiment 1) and preference for riskier choices in other financial domains such as investment and employment decisions (Experiment 2). An attempt to attenuate this bias revealed that it is corrected when individuals provide a budgeting estimate prior to giving a savings estimate (Experiment 3). The theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decision Strategies and the Confidence–Accuracy Relationship in Face Recognition

The decision strategy used to select a choice set from an array of alternative options is known to affect the composition of the final choice set. Specifically, individuals incorporate more answers into their choice set when it is created by eliminating implausible items than when the set is created through the inclusion of plausible options. This difference is accounted for in a decision framework that posits a general reluctance to change the status quo (i.e., actively include or exclude an item). We extended this work to investigate, not only the decisions themselves, but also metacognitive judgments (i.e., confidence in the accuracy of the choice set). In two face recognition experiments, we tested the impact of decision strategy (Experiment 1) and confidence judgment strategy (Experiment 2) on the confidence–accuracy relationship. In Experiment 1, participants completed two blocks of recognition trials, one under inclusion (marking previously seen faces) and one under elimination (marking previously unseen faces) instructions. We observed superior resolution (i.e., discrimination between correct and incorrect) for inclusion trials, but only when they were completed prior to use of the elimination strategy. In Experiment 2, all participants completed face recognition trials under inclusion instructions, but we manipulated the strategy used to assess confidence. Again, we observed a significant impact of strategy on confidence–accuracy resolution. Thus, we observed that both the strategy employed to reach a decision and that employed to assess confidence affected the confidence–accuracy relationship. We discuss theoretical and applied (particularly for eyewitness identification and multiple‐choice testing) implications. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind

Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real‐life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome, it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post‐outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not because of individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: changing one's mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favorable outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.