Outcomes from Multisystemic Therapy in a Statewide System of Care

We examined client outcomes from the implementation of Multisystemic Therapy (MST) in a statewide child and adolescent mental health system. Specifically, we examined (1) the validity of therapist-rated MST outcome measures by comparing them to ratings of functional impairment and level of service needs by CAMHD care coordinators, who provide case management and care coordination services, (2) potential client and service predictors of therapist-rated outcomes, and (3) improvement in youth functioning around the time of entry to and exit from MST compared with rates of improvement reported in randomized controlled trials (RCTs) by the developers of MST. Results suggested that therapist-rated MST outcomes were valid indicators of treatment success. Similar to other findings in the MST literature, few client or service characteristics predicted these outcomes. Finally, although MST entry–exit effect sizes were lower than the mean derived from RCTs published by the developers, they were within the 95% confidence interval. Together, these findings support the implementation of MST in complex systems of care with continued attention to quality assurance and ongoing use of data for evaluation.     

Combined reasoning by automated cooperation

Different reasoning systems have different strengths and weaknesses, and often it is useful to combine these systems to gain as much as possible from their strengths and retain as little as possible from their weaknesses. Of particular interest is the integration of first-order and higher-order techniques. First-order reasoning systems, on the one hand, have reached considerable strength in some niches, but in many areas of mathematics they still cannot reliably solve relatively simple problems, for example, when reasoning about sets, relations, or functions. Higher-order reasoning systems, on the other hand, can solve problems of this kind automatically. But the complexity inherent in their calculi prevents them from solving a whole range of problems. However, while many problems cannot be solved by any one system alone, they can be solved by a combination of these systems.We present a general agent-based methodology for integrating different reasoning systems. It provides a generic integration framework which facilitates the cooperation between diverse reasoners, but can also be refined to enable more efficient, specialist integrations. We empirically evaluate its usefulness, effectiveness and efficiency by case studies involving the integration of first-order and higher-order automated theorem provers, computer algebra systems, and model generators.     

Addressing moral problems through practical reasoning

In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally praiseworthy and morally excusable actions. We also describe an implementation which simulates this reasoning and discuss some issues arising from the simulation.     

归纳推理的抽样理论

作者提出归纳推理的抽样理论,认为归纳推理实质是根据与归纳特征有关的抽样样本情况来推断结论类别具有归纳特征的可能性,其中的抽样可分为类别抽样和特征抽样两种。以大学生为被试的两个实验结果一致支持抽样理论而不是别的归纳推理理论。对于归纳推理的主要现象,抽样理论比其它的相似性解释具有更大的解释范围,特别是能够解释其它理论严格不能解释的归纳推理非对称性现象     

3~4岁儿童规则因果推理能力的训练研究

学前期是儿童多种推理能力产生和发展的重要时期。本研究(以64名3岁儿童为被试,采用Frye和Zelazo等所设计的“二进二出”装置,通过对3岁儿童的规则因果推理能力进行训练,从而探索儿童规则因果推理的内在机制。在本研究条件下,结果发现:1.年龄与训练的交互效应不显著,各年龄组儿童经过训练后,成绩的提高没有显著差异;2.规则与训练的交互效应显著,竖直规则下,儿童通过训练后提高的成绩不显著,但在交叉规则下前测后测成绩差异极其显著;3.训练效应显著,暴露因果机制,给予及时反馈和阐述规则时附加手势这些信息能促进年幼儿童对高级规则的掌握。     

The morality of harm

In this article, we discuss the range of concerns people weigh when evaluating the acceptability of harmful actions and propose a new perspective on the relationship between harm and morality. With this aim, we examine Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng and Fessler’s [Kelly, D., Stich, S., Haley, K., Eng, S., & Fessler, D. (2007). Harm, affect, and the moral/conventional distinction. Mind and Language, 22, 117-131] recent claim that, contrary to Turiel and associates, people do not judge harm to be authority independent and general in scope in the context of complex harmful scenarios (e.g., prisoner interrogation, military training). In a modified replication of their study, we examined participants’ judgments of harmful actions in these contexts by taking into account their explanations for their judgments. We claim that both in terms of participants’ judgments and rationales, the results largely confirm our hypothesis that actions involving harm andinjustice or rights violation are judged to be authority independent and general in scope, which is a modification of Turiel’s traditional hypothesis.     

Information Distortion and Voting Choices: The Origins and Effects of Factual Beliefs in Initiative Elections

To account for voter decision making in initiative elections, we integrate theory and research on public opinion, misinformation, and motivated reasoning. Heuristic and motivated reasoning literatures suggest that voters' preexisting values interact with political sophistication such that politically knowledgeable voters develop systematically distorted empirical beliefs relevant to the initiatives on their ballots. These beliefs, in turn, can predict voting preferences even after controlling for underlying values, regardless of one's political sophistication. These hypotheses were tested using a 2003 voter survey conducted prior to a statewide initiative election that repealed a workplace safety regulation. Results showed that only those voters knowledgeable of key endorsements had initiative-specific beliefs that lined up with their underlying antiregulation values. Also, voters' empirical beliefs had an effect on initiative support even after controlling for prior values, and political sophistication did not moderate this effect.     

Children do not follow the rule "ignorance means getting it wrong"

Two experiments tested whether 4- and 5-year-olds follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.” Following this rule should lead children to infer that a character who is ignorant about some situation will also have a false belief about it. This rule should sometimes lead children into error because ignorance does not imply false belief. In Experiment 1, children and adults were told about a girl who is looking for her dog but does not know which of two boxes it is under. Most children predicted that the girl would look in the box with the dog and not in the empty box; adults chose both boxes equally. Experiment 2 used a similar story but varied whether the girl wants to approach or avoid her dog. Again, most children predicted that the girl would succeed. These findings suggest that children do not follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.”     

Motivated reasoning and verbal vs. numerical probability assessment: Evidence from an accounting context

A perplexing yet persistent empirical finding is that individuals assess probabilities in words and in numbers nearly equivalently, and theorists have called for future research to search for factors that cause differences. This study uses an accounting context in which individuals are commonly motivated to reach preferred (rather than accurate) conclusions. Within this context, I predict new differences between verbal and numerical probability assessments, as follows: first, individuals will justify an optimistic verbal assessment (e.g., somewhat possible) by retaining the option of re-defining it, in case of negative outcomes, as though the phrase really means something different, and, for that matter, means more things. This re-definition will maintain some connection to the original meaning of the phrase, but de-emphasized relative to the new meaning. Second, based on this behavior, I also predict individuals’ verbal probability assessments to be (1) more biased and yet (2) perceived as more justifiable than their numerical assessments. I find supportive evidence in an experiment designed to test the hypotheses. This study contributes to motivated reasoning and probability assessment theories (1) with new evidence of how individuals can word-smith in multiple attributes of a phrase to justify reaching a preferred conclusion, and (2) with new, reliable differences between verbal and numerical probability assessments. This study has important theoretical and practical implications relevant to organizational contexts in which people assess the likelihoods of uncertainties in words or numbers, and with motivations to reach a preferred conclusion.