Nonabsolute/relativistic thinking: A common factor underlying models of postformal reasoning?

Strong empirical evidence was obtained in support of the proposition that nonabsolute/relativistic (N/R) thinking is a unifying commonality underlying four postformal models of higher-order thinking, namely, problem finding, dialectical reasoning, relativistic operations, and reflective judgment. Within the construct of N/R thinking, two dimensions—the basic form and the epistemic view—and two levels—the formal form and the postformal form—were differentiated as hypothesized. The findings clarify logical relationships among the models as well as provide a common link unifying their diversity. Implications and suggestions for future research are provided.     

Moral growth in medical students

Although students bring to medical school a fairly well established value system, the potential for moral growth through the medical school environment and experience is substantial. The educational environment poses a succession of developmental and adaptive tasks to be accomplished. Several of these tasks are discussed here, tasks that are value-laden and involve, directly or indirectly, the interplay of ethical theory and practice. During the past quarter century, the two influences that have had the greatest impact on the moral growth and moral reasoning capacity of medical students have been the incorporation into the medical school curriculum of courses in medical humanities and the admission to medical school of an increasing number of female students. The female students have brought to medical school a level or dimension of moral reasoning (morality as care or responsibility for others) to augment the male students' focus on rights and justice considerations.     

Towards a Rough Mereology-Based Logic for Approximate Solution Synthesis. Part 1

We are concerned with formal models of reasoning under uncertainty. Many approaches to this problem are known in the literature e.g. Dempster-Shafer theory [29], [42], bayesian-based reasoning [21], [29], belief networks [29], many-valued logics and fuzzy logics [6], non-monotonic logics [29], neural network logics [14]. We propose rough mereology developed by the last two authors [22-25] as a foundation for approximate reasoning about complex objects. Our notion of a complex object includes, among others, proofs understood as schemes constructed in order to support within our knowledge assertions/hypotheses about reality described by our knowledge incompletely.     

Reasoning to what is true in fiction

The paper discusses the principle by which we reason to what is true in fiction. The focus is David Lewis's article Truth in Fiction (1978) which proposes an analysis in terms of counterfactuals and possible worlds. It is argued thatLewis's account is inadequate in detail and also in principle in that it conflicts radically with basic and familiar tenets of literary criticism. Literary critical reasoning about fiction concerns not the discovery of facts in possible worlds but the recovery of meanings in interpretative frameworks. The model theoretic approach fails to account for common literary or rhetorical devices like unreliable narration, connotation and point of view. And in explaining indeterminacy of content in terms of truth-value gaps it gives too simplistic an account of critical reasoning about character motivation and thematic development. A more adequate account of content-indeterminacy can be provided through a comparison of the interpretation of fiction with the interpretation of human action. A broader motif in the paper is the underlying tension between what is required for the logic of fiction and what is required for the aesthetics of fiction.     

Creative reasoning in formal discussion

Systems of formal dialectics articulate methods of conflict resolution. To this end they provide norms to regulate verbal exchanges between the Proponent of a thesis and an Opponent. These regulated exchanges constitute what are known as formal discussions.One may ask what moves, if any, in formal discusions correspond to arguing for or against the thesis. It is claimed that certain moves of the Proponent's are properly designated as arguing for the thesis, and that certain moves of the Opponent purport to criticize the tenability or the relevance of the reasons advanced. Thus the usefulness of formal dialectic systems as models for reasonable argument is vindicated.It is then proposed to make these systems more realistic by incorporating in them a norm of Creative Reasoning that removes the severe restrictions to which the Proponent's arguing was hitherto subject. As a consequence, a certain type of irrelevant reason is no longer automatically excluded. Therefore, it is proposed to extend the Opponent's rights to exert relevance criticism. The new dialectic systems are shown to be strategically equivalent to the original ones. Finally, it is stressed that the Opponent's criticism should not be designated as arguing against the thesis. The Opponent criticizes, but does not argue.     

GENTILES AND HOMOSEXUALS: A Brief History of an Analogy

This paper examines the argument that moral approval of homosexuality is analogous to the early church's inclusion of gentiles. The analogy has a long but often overlooked history, dating back to the start of the modern gay‐rights movement. It has recently gained greater prominence because of its importance to the Episcopal Church's debate with the wider Anglican Communion. Beginning with the Episcopal Church argument, we see that there are five specific areas most in need of further clarification. In this essay I examine significant uses of the analogy from the prior 25 years to see how effectively they address these five areas. I conclude that the conversation surrounding the Gentile Analogy is the current, best hope for mutual understanding among Christians about homosexuality. However, if the analogy is to advance the Christian conversation, much greater care and precision is needed in its application from traditionalists and revisionists alike.