Changes in college students' socioeconomic status aspirations during the COVID-19 pandemic

Although university students tend to be optimistic about their future socioeconomic status (SES), little is known how their SES aspirations changed during the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Using latent growth curve modeling techniques, we examined changes in subjective SES aspirations for students who began college before the pandemic (cohort 1; Fall 2019) and students who began college during the pandemic (cohort 2; Fall 2020). Moreover, we assessed how SES indicators (i.e., subjective family SES; first-generation status; low-income status) and a contextual financial indicator (i.e., pandemic-related financial impacts) predicted changes in SES aspirations for both groups of students. Although SES aspirations were similar at the beginning of college for both groups of students, students who began college before the pandemic experienced a greater rate of downward change between the baseline assessment and the assessment shortly after the pandemic began. In both cohorts, students from higher-SES families had higher SES aspirations at the beginning of college and steeper rates of downward change. Furthermore, despite having similar SES aspirations at the beginning of college, first-generation students whose first year was interrupted by the pandemic experienced steeper downward changes in their SES aspirations. However, pandemic-related financial impacts did not predict this downward change for either cohort. Our findings suggest that uncertainty in the early stages of the pandemic may have led to cautiousness in students' aspirations for their future SES attainment, particularly for first-generation students.     

The psychological benefit of future vividness in goal persistence: An illustrative case of the class of 2020 before & during COVID-19

Graduating during COVID-19, the Class of 2020 had difficulty pursuing their future goals. This research examined the likelihood of academic and career goal change early in the pandemic, disparities in persistence by socioeconomic status (SES), and how psychological resources mitigated goal change during the early stages of the pandemic. This 4-year study surveyed students in the Class of 2020 eight times from their first week in college (Fall 2016) to their last semester before graduation (Spring 2020; N = 115; 20% below middle SES, 80% middle SES or above). Even in the first weeks of COVID-19, a quarter of students changed goals. Lower SES students were less likely to persist in their post-graduation plans. Nevertheless, students who entered college with a vivid image of their future were more likely to have secured a graduate school or job prospect prior to COVID-19, and, in turn, were less likely to change goals.     

“I'm Moderna,what are you?” Evidence that people favor those who received their same brand COVID-19 vaccine

In two studies, we investigated the extent to which people are biased toward people with the same COVID-19 vaccine brand using a monetary allocation task. Informed by theoretical approaches to intergroup bias and the minimal-groups paradigm, we expected that, when deciding how to allocate financial resources among three different people—each with an equal need for assistance but a different COVID-19 vaccine brand—people would allocate more money, on average, to those who received the same versus different vaccine brand than participants personally received. We found in Study 1 (N = 94) that people given a hypothetical $10.00 experimental endowment allocated an average of $2.00 more when a person was a member of their vaccine ingroup than to those from their vaccine brand outgroup. We replicated this effect in Study 2 (N = 219), finding that people continued to allocate more money ($1.42) to a person from their vaccine brand ingroup versus those from their vaccine brand outgroup. Taken together, this work suggests that, among vaccinated people, the brand of another person's vaccine meaningfully influences the allocation of monetary resources and that people are biased toward people with the same COVID-19 vaccine brand. Implications for social identity theories are discussed.     

Worth the risk? Fear of being single and willingness to make risky health decisions in sex and dating contexts

Does fear of being single (FOBS) predict risky health behaviors when such behavior could promote pursuit of a romantic connection? Study 1 tested general tendencies toward taking health risks associated with FOBS. Study 2 tested how those with stronger FOBS navigated romantic versus non-romantic risk behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic. Study 3 extended the test of risky behavior beyond the pandemic to test whether FOBS was associated with willingness to engage in risky sexual behavior. Despite nonsignificant associations with taking health risks more generally, FOBS was associated with greater willingness to engage in risky behaviors in dating contexts, particularly when considering their willingness to settle for less in relationships. This research provides novel insight into dating choices associated with stronger FOBS and how willingness to settle predicts risky health behavior when it could appeal to romantic prospects.     

From model minority to yellow peril: How threat perceptions and disgust predict anti-Asian prejudice during COVID-19

During the COVID-19 pandemic, hate crimes against Asians sharply increased in the United States. We investigated whether the threat of contracting COVID-19 and specific negative emotions (disgust, anxiety, fear, and anger) regarding COVID-19 predicted anti-Asian prejudice in a 3-wave longitudinal study of non-Asian American adults (N = 486) in the early days of the pandemic in 2020. In all 3 timepoints, participants who believed that they may have already contracted COVID and those who expressed greater disgust reported more anti-Asian attitudes, evaluated Asians as less than human, tolerated anti-Asian prejudice, and blamed Asians for spreading COVID-19. In a well-fitting longitudinal path model, we found longitudinal evidence for these associations, such that the belief that one had already contracted COVID-19 in March 2020 predicted greater disgust one month later, in April 2020, which in turn predicted greater anti-Asian prejudice in May 2020.     

Counterfactual thinking may attenuate polarization of COVID-19 prevention behavior

Data from two U.S. online samples (N = 613) indicated that conservatives consistently perceived face mask use as less important than did liberals. This difference was attenuated with high counterfactual engagement. Both studies provide correlational evidence of this robust moderation. Study 2 provides further insight into differences between liberals' and conservatives' emotional responses to COVID-19 information, and suggests that during on-going negative events, downward counterfactuals may not provide relief. Overall, these studies document the politicization of public health behavior, and find that emphasizing the causal links between behavior and COVID-19 prevention may improve conservatives' attitudes toward CDC guidelines.     

Women's social experiences before and during the COVID-19 pandemic: A 3-part measurement burst study among women in midlife with health risks

Women in midlife (ages 40–60) with elevated risk for cardiovascular disease (CVD) often rely on social networks during times of high stress. Precautions against the spread of COVID-19—particularly stay-at-home-orders—could have limited positive social experiences during a stressful time, but also could have reduced unwanted negative social experiences. This report presents findings from an ecological momentary assessment study that used 3 bursts of 5 surveys per day for 5 days, to test for changes in women's social experiences: prior to COVID-19 (2019), during stay-at-home-orders (April-May 2020), and during initial reopening (August-September 2020). Participants were women aged 40–60 with one or more CVD risk factors (e.g., hypertension; N = 35, M_Age = 51, M_BMI = 32.2 kg/m²). Momentary reports showed that the number of positive interactions experienced in daily life did not significantly change from before to during the pandemic; positive interactions were more variable during stay-at-home orders than pre-COVID, but rebounded by initial reopening (to pre-COVID levels). In contrast, the number of negative social interactions and social comparisons decreased from before COVID to stay-at-home orders, and remained lower during initial reopening; these experiences were also less variable during stay-at-home orders and initial reopening than before COVID-19. Thus, in a vulnerable group of women with health risks, there is little evidence that social experiences worsened during the first 6 months of the COVID-19 pandemic; decreases in (potentially) negative social experiences may be a small but beneficial side effect of short-term public health precautions.     

Both overwhelmed or in it together? Similarity in COVID-19-related stress and romantic relationship quality

Stress tends to be negatively associated with romantic relationship quality, but shared stress can bond romantic partners and may actually have a positive effect on relationships. Thus, are similar levels of pandemic-related stress during the COVID-19 pandemic—a time of high stress for many couples—associated with better or worse relationship quality? In this study, we investigated whether similarity in COVID-19-related stress was associated with romantic relationship outcomes in two dyadic samples (N = 300 couples). Generally, we found little evidence that similarity in COVID-19-related stress was associated with relationship outcomes. We did find that similarity in general worry about the pandemic was associated with lower overall relationship quality; however, it was also associated with lower levels of viewing the pandemic as a source of conflict. Therefore, more research is needed to understand the nuances of when and how stress similarity is associated with romantic relationship quality.     

Obedience to authorities is not unconditional: Differential effects of COVID-19 threat on three facets of RWA in Poland and Germany

Collective authoritarian responses to threat might differ depending on whether people trust collective authorities in reducing threat. Thus, we tested the differential effects of epidemic threat on three facets of right-wing authoritarianism, in Germany (a country with high authorities' efficacy in responses to COVID-19) and Poland (low authorities' efficacy context). Two representative sample longitudinal studies performed in Poland (N = 892) and Germany (N = 883) showed that in Germany feelings of COVID-19 threat explained increases in authoritarian submission and (to a lesser extent) authoritarian aggression, whereas in Poland such feelings of threat explained changes in authoritarian aggression and conventionalism after the pandemic, but did not alter authoritarian submission. These findings suggest that specific authoritarian reactions to threat (submissive vs. conventionalist) might depend on the general trust in authorities' ability to respond to crises.     

Does disseminating (mis)information restore social connection during a global pandemic?

The COVID-19 pandemic impeded social interaction, negatively affecting well-being worldwide. To slow virus spread, practices were enacted to minimize face-to-face contact, leading to increased social disconnection. As people turned increasingly to online environments (e.g., social media) to fulfill needs for inclusion and belonging, misinformation regarding COVID-19 simultaneously ran rampant. The purpose of the current study was to examine whether impeded social inclusion may have contributed to the spread of misinformation. We recruited a sample of adult social media users in the United States (N = 431) and randomly assigned them to be either included, ostracized (i.e., ignored), or rejected (i.e., to receive explicitly negative attention). Participants subsequently rated their willingness to share COVID-19 claims via social media (in fact, all claims were false). Participants learned that sharing some claims would likely lead to high expected engagement from others on social media (e.g., “likes”), whereas some claims would likely lead to little expected engagement. While information sharing was low in our sample, participants were more willing to share claims that they believed would lead to higher levels of engagement—consistent with the idea that sharing information is motivated not only by the desire to educate others but also to elicit social connection. However, this behavioral intention was no more common among participants who had been momentarily ostracized or rejected online than among participants who had been included. Future research should continue to explore the link between social exclusion and the motivation to disseminate (mis)information beyond a pandemic-related context.