Concurrent fixed-interval variable-ratio schedules and the matching relation

Five rats responded under concurrent fixed-interval variable-ratio schedules of food reinforcement. Fixed-interval values ranged from 50-seconds to 300-seconds and variable-ratio values ranged from 30 to 360; a five-second changeover delay was in effect throughout the experiment. The relations between reinforcement ratios obtained from the two schedules and the ratios of responses and time spent on the schedules were described by Baum's (1974) generalized matching equation. All subjects undermatched both response and time ratios to reinforcement ratios, and all subjects displayed systematic bias in favor of the variable-ratio schedules. Response ratios undermatched reinforcement ratios less than did time ratios, but response ratios produced greater bias than did time ratios for every subject and for the group as a whole. Local rates of responding were generally higher on the variable-ratio than on the fixed-interval schedules. When responding was maintained by both schedules, a period of no responding on either schedule immediately after fixed-interval reinforcement typically was followed by high-rate responding on the variable-ratio schedule. At short fixed-interval values, when a changeover to the fixed-interval schedule was made, responding usually continued until fixed-interval reinforcement was obtained; at longer values, a changeover back to the variable-ratio schedule usually occurred when fixed-interval reinforcement was not forthcoming within a few seconds, and responding then alternated between the two schedules every few seconds until fixed-interval reinforcement finally was obtained.     

The interaction between stimulus and reinforcer control on remembering.

In a symbolic matching-to-sample task, 6 pigeons obtained food by pecking a red side key when the brighter of two white lights had been presented on the center key and by pecking a green side key when the dimmer of two white lights had been presented on the center key. Across Part 1 and Parts 6 to 10, the delay between sample-stimulus presentation and the availability of the choice keys was varied between 0 s and 25 s. Across Parts 1 to 5, the delay between the emission of a correct choice and the delivery of a reinforcer was varied between 0 s and 30 s. Although increasing both types of delay decreased stimulus discriminability, lengthening the stimulus-choice delay produced a greater decrement in choice accuracy than did lengthening the choice-reinforcer delay. Additionally, the relative reinforcer rate for correct choice was varied across both types of delay. The sensitivity of behavior to the distribution of reinforcers decreased as discriminability decreased under both procedures. These data are consistent with the view, based on the generalized matching law, that sample stimuli and reinforcers interact in their control over remembering.     

视觉观点采择中自我中心性偏差的抑制和归因之争

自我中心性偏差是社交失败的重要原因,但其产生机制还存在争议。以往研究存在抑制性选择模型与流利性错误归因两种理论观点:前者认为对自身观点的抑制失败会导致自我中心性偏差;后者则认为错误地选择自身更为流畅的信息会导致自我中心性偏差。为整合上述争论,提出抑制-归因协同作用模型,认为抑制和归因两种加工或可共同导致自我中心性偏差。未来研究应借助精巧的研究范式和特殊被试群体,进一步验证该模型。     

不同康复时相戒除者对海洛因相关线索的注意偏向

以84名生理脱瘾后处于不同康复时相的海洛因戒除者为被试,采用情绪Stroop范式,以海洛因相关线索为自变量,考察了海洛因戒除者的注意偏向特性及其动态变化。结果发现:(1)海洛因戒除者对相关线索存在着显著的注意偏向;(2)海洛因戒除者对相关线索的注意偏向随康复期的延长无显著改善。该研究支持了Franken关于药物成瘾的注意偏向模型。     

Are effect sizes in self-efficacy field changing over time? A meta–meta analysis

Theories relating to self-efficacy have developed rapidly since Bandura first proposed the concept in 1977. In the past two decades, psychologists have carried out numerous studies to research the cultural and psychological changes in social development. The research topic of this study is whether self-efficacy changes over time. This study uses a meta–meta analysis and includes 13 meta-analyses, including 536 effect sizes, with a total sample size of 421,880. We find that individual self-efficacy increases over time, which may be related to social development trends. However, the effects of interventions on self-efficacy remain similar (Q_model = 1.807, df = 1, p > .05), and a possible explanation is that time effects of self-efficacy confuse the effects of intervention, because both in the intervention group and control group, the average of self-efficacy increases over time. And we find that a general decline in the predictive effects of self-efficacy (Q_model = 5.117, df = 1, p = .024), especially the ability to predict relatively objective variables (e.g. job performance, teaching effectiveness, and transfer of training). A possible explanation is that as social development people tend to overestimate their self-efficacy. Another possible explanation is that the effect sizes in the original studies being overrated, may due to intentional selective reporting or unintentional statistical errors.     

Socially Situated Transmission: The Bias to Transmit Negative Information is Moderated by the Social Context

Cultural evolutionary theory has identified a range of cognitive biases that guide human social learning. Naturalistic and experimental studies indicate transmission biases favoring negative and positive information. To address these conflicting findings, the present study takes a socially situated view of information transmission, which predicts that bias expression will depend on the social context. We report a large-scale experiment (N = 425) that manipulated the social context and examined its effect on the transmission of the positive and negative information contained in a narrative text. In each social context, information was progressively lost as it was transmitted from person to person, but negative information survived better than positive information, supporting a negative transmission bias. Importantly, the negative transmission bias was moderated by the social context: Higher social connectivity weakened the bias to transmit negative information, supporting a socially situated account of information transmission. Our findings indicate that our evolved cognitive preferences can be moderated by our social goals.     

On the evaluation of one-sided evidence

We examine predictions and judgments of confidence based on one-sided evidence. Some subjects saw arguments for only one side of a legal dispute while other subjects (called ‘jurors’) saw arguments for both sides. Subjects predicted the number of jurors who favored the plaintiff in each case. Subjects who saw only one side made predictions that were biased in favor of that side. Furthermore, they were more confident but generally less accurate than subjects who saw both sides. The results indicate that people do not compensate sufficiently for missing information even when it is painfully obvious that the information available to them is incomplete. A simple manipulation that required subjects to evaluate the relative strength of the opponent's side greatly reduced the tendency to underweigh missing evidence.