Theory‐of‐Mind development and early sibling relationships after the birth of a sibling: Parental discipline matters

This study investigated relations among children's Theory‐of‐Mind (ToM) development, early sibling interactions, and parental discipline strategies during the transition to siblinghood. Using a sample of firstborn children and their parents (N = 208), we assessed children's ToM before the birth of a sibling and 12 months after the birth, and sibling interactions (i.e., positive engagement and antagonism) and parental discipline strategies (i.e., child‐centred and parent‐centred discipline) at 4 and 8 months in the first year of siblinghood. Structural equation modelling analyses revealed that children's ToM before the birth of the sibling predicted children's positive engagement with the infant sibling, whereas children's antagonistic behaviours towards the infant sibling negatively predicted children's ToM at 12 months, but only when mothers used low levels of child‐centred discipline. These findings emphasize the role of parents in the development of young children's social‐cognitive understanding in the context of early sibling interactions.

Highlights

• This study investigated relations among firstborns' Theory‐of‐Mind (ToM), early sibling relationships, and parental discipline during the first year of siblinghood.
• Multigroup analyses showed that ToM predicted higher sibling positive engagement, and early sibling antagonism predicted poorer ToM when mothers used low child‐centred discipline.
• Parental discipline plays an important role in the development of young children's social understanding and sibling relationships as early as the first year of siblinghood.

     

Letting Go: Conceptualizing Intervention De‐implementation in Public Health and Social Service Settings

The discontinuation of interventions that should be stopped, or de‐implementation, has emerged as a novel line of inquiry within dissemination and implementation science. As this area grows in human services research, like public health and social work, theory is needed to help guide scientific endeavors. Given the infancy of de‐implementation, this conceptual narrative provides a definition and criteria for determining if an intervention should be de‐implemented. We identify three criteria for identifying interventions appropriate for de‐implementation: (a) interventions that are not effective or harmful, (b) interventions that are not the most effective or efficient to provide, and (c) interventions that are no longer necessary. Detailed, well‐documented examples illustrate each of the criteria. We describe de‐implementation frameworks, but also demonstrate how other existing implementation frameworks might be applied to de‐implementation research as a supplement. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of de‐implementation in the context of other stages of implementation, like sustainability and adoption; next steps for de‐implementation research, especially identifying interventions appropriate for de‐implementation in a systematic manner; and highlight special ethical considerations to advance the field of de‐implementation research.     

How the Eyes Tell Lies: Social Gaze During a Preference Task

Social attention is thought to require detecting the eyes of others and following their gaze. To be effective, observers must also be able to infer the person's thoughts and feelings about what he or she is looking at, but this has only rarely been investigated in laboratory studies. In this study, participants' eye movements were recorded while they chose which of four patterns they preferred. New observers were subsequently able to reliably guess the preference response by watching a replay of the fixations. Moreover, when asked to mislead the person guessing, participants changed their looking behavior and guessing success was reduced. In a second experiment, naïve participants could also guess the preference of the original observers but were unable to identify trials which were lies. These results confirm that people can spontaneously use the gaze of others to infer their judgments, but also that these inferences are open to deception.     

On Direct Social Perception

Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can non-inferentially perceive others’ mental states. In this paper, I argue that the standard way of framing DSP leaves the debate at an impasse. I suggest two alternative interpretations of the idea that we see others’ mental states: others’ mental states are represented in the content of our perception, and we have basic perceptual beliefs about others’ mental states. I argue that the latter interpretation of DSP is more promising and examine the kinds of mental states that plausibly could satisfy this version of DSP.     

A Duet for one

This paper considers communication in terms of inference about the behaviour of others (and our own behaviour). It is based on the premise that our sensations are largely generated by other agents like ourselves. This means, we are trying to infer how our sensations are caused by others, while they are trying to infer our behaviour: for example, in the dialogue between two speakers. We suggest that the infinite regress induced by modelling another agent – who is modelling you – can be finessed if you both possess the same model. In other words, the sensations caused by others and oneself are generated by the same process. This leads to a view of communication based upon a narrative that is shared by agents who are exchanging sensory signals. Crucially, this narrative transcends agency – and simply involves intermittently attending to and attenuating sensory input. Attending to sensations enables the shared narrative to predict the sensations generated by another (i.e. to listen), while attenuating sensory input enables one to articulate the narrative (i.e. to speak). This produces a reciprocal exchange of sensory signals that, formally, induces a generalised synchrony between internal (neuronal) brain states generating predictions in both agents. We develop the arguments behind this perspective, using an active (Bayesian) inference framework and offer some simulations (of birdsong) as proof of principle.     

Measuring work styles: Towards an understanding of the dynamic components of the theory of work adjustment

Work styles are an important yet largely unexplored component of the theory of work adjustment (TWA), describing a dynamic component of how individuals maintain and adjust fit with their work environment. The active work style (AWS) scale is the first attempt to develop a specific self-report measure of work styles suitable for longitudinal research. Results from three studies support Dawis and Lofquist's (1984) proposed four factor structure, but these factors are related through a second-order factor describing a person's generalised level of work activity and effort across time. The AWS scale demonstrated good evidence for reliability and validity, and strong measurement invariance across time signifying its suitability for longitudinal research. In line with expectations, overall work style was positively related to conscientiousness and work engagement yet unrelated to stress. When controlling for these variables, AWS was positively related to demands–abilities fit, but not needs–supplies fit. Limitations and possibilities for future research are also discussed.     

不同铆测验设计下多维IRT等值方法的比较

实际应用中测验往往具有多维结构, 如果仍采用单维IRT方法进行等值, 会得到不准确的结果。因此对于多维结构的测验, 需要使用多维IRT等值方法来实现参数的转换。基于共同题设计, 文章通过模拟研究的方法, 考察了不同铆测验设计下几种多维IRT等值方法的表现, 同时考虑了测验长度、两个维度题目数量的比例、铆测验长度、铆测验的选择策略、两个维度之间的相关和等值群体的能力水平差异六个因素的影响。所比较的多维IRT等值方法有：均值/均值(MM)方法, 均值/标准差(MS)方法, Stoking-Lord (SL)方法, Haebara (HB)方法, 最小平方(LS)方法。结果显示：(1) SL, HB和LS方法得到的等值误差均方根最小, 且在各条件下表现较为稳定。(2) MM和MS方法在非等组条件下呈现出很大的误差均方根。(3)铆测验设计对SL, HB和LS方法的等值结果没有显著影响。(4)在两个维度之间的相关较高, 测验长度和铆测验长度较长, 等值群体的能力水平没有差异的条件下, SL, HB和LS方法得到的等值误差均方根最小。     

We,Heirs of Enlightenment: Critical Theory,Democracy and Social Science

Abstract

My goal here is to come to terms with the Enlightenment as the horizon of critical social science. First, I consider in more detail the understanding of the Enlightenment in Critical Theory, particularly in its conception of the sociality of reason. Second, I develop an account of freedom in terms of human powers, along the lines of recent capability conceptions that link freedom to the development of human powers, including the power to interpret and create norms. Finally, I show the ways in which the social sciences can be moral sciences in the Enlightenment sense. This account provides us with a coherent Enlightenment standard by which to judge institutions as promoting development, understood in terms of the capabilities necessary for freedom. The relevant social science in this area might include the robust generalization that there has never been a famine in a democratic society.     

Using a metaperspective to clarify the structural-narrative debate in family therapy

The debate in family therapy between structural and narrative therapists often seems irreconcilable. Drawing from work in theoretical sociology that identifies the basic structure of existing social theory, a metaperspective is introduced to clarify a discussion between leading figures in the debate. Disparate views of family interactions are examined in terms of more fundamental disagreements about the center of attention in therapy. Narrative and structural modes of presentation are examined as separate traditions that could not be further apart conceptually. Efforts to identify common ground are discussed in terms of more significant differences that are minimized by drawing out similarities. This analysis provides a framework for standing outside entrenched arguments to see more clearly the unique contributions of each approach.     

Two Theories of Just War

As it is traditionally conceived, Just War Theory is not well suited for dealing with nation vs non-nation wars. It thus makes sense to create a second Just War Theory to deal with these wars. This article explores the differences and similarities between the two theories.