Stability and Change in Cognitive Behavior Therapy: Considering the Implications of ACT and RFT

Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) and Relational Frame Theory (RFT) are part of the new wave of treatments and analyses that seem to be emerging in cognitive behavior therapy. In this article, data in support of these new approaches are provided, and evidence that ACT works through different processes than traditional CBT are presented. The integrative proposals of Ciarrochi and Robb, and Ciarrochi, Robb, and Godsell are then considered. In the long run, whether such integrations are useful is an empirical matter, but concerns are raised about the effects of focusing on the content of beliefs, and the role of logical–empirical challenges to belief. Address correspondence to Steven C. Hayes, Department of Psychology/298, University of Nevada, Reno, NV 89557-0062, USA.     

Linking Work Events,Affective States,and Attitudes: An Empirical Study of Managers' Emotions

The aim of the paper is to contribute to knowledge on the causes and consequences of affective states at work by identifying several job-related events likely to produce affective states and then studying the impact of the latter on work attitudes. Affective Events Theory was the theoretical framework used for the study and two main hypotheses were stated: experiencing certain work events leads to affective reactions, which in turn influence work attitudes. An empirical study based on 203 questionnaires was performed on a sample of French managers. The results support both research hypotheses, although the impact of affective states on work attitudes appeared larger than the impact of work events on affective states. The mediating effect of affective events with respect to the impact of work events was also tested, but only partially supported.     

Likert量表分析中不同IRT模型的有效性

5级Likert量表可直接分析,也可以转化为3级评分,或转化为2级评分。前二者可以采用等级IRT模型,后者可以采用2级IRT模型。研究表明2级IRT模型中的2参数模型是最适合的模型。多级评分模型与数据拟合也很好,而且等级越多测量精度越大。     

Children's understanding of teaching: the role of knowledge and belief

The relation between preschoolers’ concept of teaching and theory of mind was explored to determine if there is a developmental change in understanding how teaching depends on knowledge and belief. The study tested whether 3- to 6-year-olds thought the awareness of a knowledge difference is necessary for teaching. The 3- and 4-year-olds understood teaching stories with clear knowledge differences and could correctly use that information to specify the teacher and learner. The 5- and 6-year-olds, who performed well on a standard false belief task, further understood that it was the teacher's belief about the knowledge difference that would actually govern teaching. The conceptual link to teaching suggests that theory of mind is critical for understanding other forms of knowledge acquisition besides perceptual access.     

Separation/divorce sexual assault: The current state of social scientific knowledge

Many contend that the logical solution to woman abuse in marriage/cohabitation is for women to exit through legal separation, divorce, or other means. However, a growing body of empirical work shows that separation or divorce does not necessarily solve the problem of woman abuse. For example, in addition to experiencing lethal or nonlethal forms of physical violence and psychological abuse, many women who try to leave, or who have left their male partners, are sexually assaulted. The main objective of this paper is to critically review the extant empirical and theoretical work on separation/divorce sexual assault. Suggestions for future research and theorizing are also provided.     

Can unpredicted outcomes be intended? The role of outcome-beliefs in children's judgments of intention

An adult-like concept of intention includes a deliberate action to achieve a goal and a belief that one's action (if successful) will cause the desired outcome. For example, good outcomes caused by accident or by chance are not believed to be caused intentionally. In two experiments, we asked whether children understand this connection between intentions and outcomes. Children played two games in which actions could produce unintended outcomes (i.e., causes were unplanned). Children sometimes received a desirable reward independent of intention. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds mistakenly claimed they had intended the desirable outcome even when it was unexpected. Four-year-olds judged that they had not intended a deliberate action if it did not yield a rewarding outcome. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 6-year-olds seldom make these errors. The results suggest that 4- and 5-year-old children have not yet attained an adult-like concept of intention. Their inaccurate judgments regarding their intentions, given a rewarding yet unexpected outcome, can be explained by a positivity bias.     

Moral judgment in adults with autism spectrum disorders

The ability of a group of adults with high functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger Syndrome (AS) to distinguish moral, conventional and disgust transgressions was investigated using a set of six transgression scenarios, each of which was followed by questions about permissibility, seriousness, authority contingency and justification. The results showed that although individuals with HFA or AS (HFA/AS) were able to distinguish affect-backed norms from conventional affect-neutral norms along the dimensions of permissibility, seriousness and authority-dependence, they failed to distinguish moral and disgust transgressions along the seriousness dimension and were unable to provide appropriate welfare-based moral justifications. Moreover, they judged conventional and disgust transgressions to be more serious than did the comparison group, and the correlation analysis revealed that the seriousness rating was related to their ToM impairment. We concluded that difficulties providing appropriate moral justifications and evaluating the seriousness of transgressions in individuals with HFA/AS may be explained by an impaired cognitive appraisal system that, while responsive to rule violations, fails to use relevant information about the agent’s intentions and the affective impact of the action outcome in conscious moral reasoning.     

The accidental transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.     

Where science starts: spontaneous experiments in preschoolers' exploratory play

Probabilistic models of expected information gain require integrating prior knowledge about causal hypotheses with knowledge about possible actions that might generate data relevant to those hypotheses. Here we looked at whether preschoolers (mean: 54 months) recognize “action possibilities” (affordances) in the environment that allow them to isolate variables when there is information to be gained. By manipulating the physical properties of the stimuli, we were able to affect the degree to which candidate variables could be isolated; by manipulating the base rate of candidate causes, we were able to affect the potential for information gain. Children’s exploratory play was sensitive to both manipulations: given unambiguous evidence children played indiscriminately and rarely tried to isolate candidate causes; given ambiguous evidence, children both selected (Experiment 1) and designed (Experiment 2) informative interventions.     

Thinking about representations: the case of opaque contexts

To address the question of whether young children are differentially sensitive to referential opacity, an advanced Theory of Mind skill, we assessed 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds on three types of opaque contexts: epistemic, quotational, and intentional. Children’s performance improved as a function of age and varied significantly by opacity type. Performance was best for epistemic opacity (using the verb “know”) and poorest for intentional opacity (using “mean to”), with quotational opacity (using “said”) falling in-between. Importantly, the current results suggest that children’s sensitivity to referential opacity is not an all-or-nothing competence but rather one that varies across the contexts examined. Possible reasons for this variability are discussed.