Joining and leaving a new religious movement: A study of ex-members’ mental health

The impact of membership in new, often socially contested, religious movements (NRMs) on mental health of members and ex-members is still a controversial question in the psychological literature. In the present study, we interviewed 20 ex-members of various NRMs who also completed questionnaires measuring several cognitive (need for closure, world assumptions) and affective-emotional (parental and adult attachment, social relationships, depression) constructs. Ex-members were then compared with current NRM members and with individuals not involved in NRMs. It appeared that NRM membership compensated for some previously existing vulnerabilities reported by members (insecure attachment in childhood, few social relationships, negative life events). However, this supportive effect did not persist after the destabilizing experience of disaffiliation. Yet, ex-members remained strong believers and were very inclined to spirituality.     

Self-Knowledge and the ‘Inner Eye’

Mutual perceptual knowledge is a prevalent feature of our everyday lives, yet appears to be exceptionally difficult to characterise in an acceptable way. This paper argues for a renewed understanding of Stephen Schiffer's iterative approach to mutual knowledge, according to which mutual knowledge requires an infinite number of overlapping, embedded mental states. It is argued that the charge of ‘psychological implausibility’ that normally accompanies discussion of this approach can be offset by identifying mutual knowledge, not with the infinite iterations themselves, but with the finite base which Schiffer proves is capable of generating those iterations. An understanding of this finite base as a primitive, relational property holding between two or more people, allows us to understand the iterations as an implicit and ‘harmless’ intrapersonal feature of what is an interpersonal phenomenon. The paper concludes by relating the account to joint attention in infant interaction.     

Teachers' Gender Stereotypes in South Africa: A Case Study

The study investigated Teachers' gender stereotypes in the Eastern Province of South Africa. Participants were 65 Junior Secondary school teachers (females= 40 and males = 25) who assembled together at a seminar organized by the Department of Education. They completed a ten-statement questionnaire on gender stereotypes that would apply to school boys and girls. Data were analysed by means for differences in proportions endorsing stereotypes in relation to school activities. Gender stereotypes were apparent in the pattern of activities endorsed for males and females.     

Frontal and parietal lobe involvement in the processing of pretence and intention

We assessed whether different processes might be at play during pretence understanding by examining breakdowns of performance in participants with acquired brain damage. In Experiment 1 patients with frontal or parietal lesions and neurologically intact adults were asked to categorize videos of pretend and real actions. In Experiment 2 participants saw three types of videos: real intentional actions, real accidental actions, and pretend actions. In one session they judged whether the actions they saw were intentional or accidental, and in a second session they judged whether the actions were real or pretend. Parietal patients had particular difficulties in the identification of pretend actions, and both parietal and frontal patients were more impaired than controls in understanding the intentional nature of pretence. Analyses of individual patients’ performance revealed that parietal lesions, and in particular lesions to the temporo-parietal junction, impaired the ability to discriminate pretend from real actions. However, this did not necessarily affect the discrimination of intentional from unintentional actions, which instead may be independently disrupted by damage to frontal areas. Moreover, spared ability to discriminate pretend actions from real actions, and intentional actions from accidental actions, did not grant a full conceptual understanding of the intentional nature of pretence. The implications for pretence understanding are discussed.     

Paradigms and possibilities

This paper is a excursus into a philosophy of science for deployment in the study of sport. It argues for the virtues of Thomas Kuhn's account of the philosophy of science, an argument conducted strategically by contrasting that account with one derived from views of Karl Popper. In particular, it stresses, first, that Kuhn's views have been widely misunderstood; second, that a rectified Kuhnianism can give due weight to truth in science, while recognising that social sciences differ in crucial ways from natural sciences. For, as Kuhn recognised, social sciences do not function in the paradigm-relative way characteristic of natural sciences. Yet there Kuhn's jargon, and especially misguided talk of ‘paradigms’, is almost ubiquitous.

These thoughts have relevance for three groups. First, as both sports scientists and exercise scientists come to grips with the claims to scientificity of their work, they will need increasingly to locate it within an epistemological framework provided by philosophy of science. So they must begin to take Kuhn's view seriously. Second, social scientists of sport – faced with the predominant scientism of colleagues in sport and exercise science – must also recognise alternatives to a postmodernist rejection of the concept of truth, where Kuhn's picture of natural science clarifies one such. Finally, philosophers writing on sport must not let antipathy to scientism close off the options they present or the terms in which they (we!) present them. And that may require debate among ourselves on abstract issues not immediately connected with sport.     

The Inner Game of Sport: is Everything in the Brain?

The article deals with the following: (1) Three brain imaging studies on athletes are evaluated. What do these neuroscientific studies tell us about the brain and mind of the athlete? (2) Empirical investigations will need a neuro-theory of mind if they are to make the leap from neural activity to the mental. The article looks at such a theory, Gerald Edelman's ‘Neural Darwinism’. What are the implications of such a theory for sport science and philosophy of sport? (3) The article appreciates some of the neurosciences applications, but questions the hope of giving a complete theory of mind.     

Strengthening Creative Problem-Solving within Upper-Elementary Science Education

This intervention study examined the effectiveness of instructional support tailored toward two techniques (i.e., random associations and constraint identification) to strengthen children's creative problem-solving skills within upper-elementary science education. Five inquiry-based science lessons with ample opportunity for creative problem-solving (i.e., divergent and convergent thinking) were provided. Children were assigned to a condition with instructional support (n = 107) or without (n = 134). Domain-general and specific measures of divergent and convergent thinking were included, and reading comprehension as well as mathematical ability were taken into account. Repeated measures multivariate analyses of covariance revealed how all children improved in terms of domain-general convergent thinking, with a larger increase for children who performed better in mathematics. This shows a promising premise for future research focusing on the domain generality of convergent thinking and for the potential of transfer across domains. No additional improvement based on instructional support was found and children did not improve in terms of divergent thinking. The constraint identification and random associations technique might not be suitable for elementary school children, yet future research is necessary to validate such claims. Meanwhile, teachers could possibly support convergent thinking by simply providing exercises for divergent and convergent thinking.     

What is the Philosophy of Information?

Computational and information-theoretic research in philosophy has become increasingly fertile and pervasive, giving rise to a wealth of interesting results. In consequence, a new and vitally important field has emerged, the philosophy of information (PI). This essay is the first attempt to analyse the nature of PI systematically. PI is defined as the philosophical field concerned with the critical investigation of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, utilisation, and sciences, and the elaboration and application of information-theoretic and computational methodologies to philosophical problems. I argue that PI is a mature discipline for three reasons: it represents an autonomous field of research; it provides an innovative approach to both traditional and new philosophical topics; and it can stand beside other branches of philosophy, offering a systematic treatment of the conceptual foundations of the world of information and the information society.