Feeling skeptical: Worry,dread, and support for environmental policy among climate change skeptics

Emotions about climate change are the subject of a growing area of interdisciplinary scholarship. But so far scholars have not studied the emotions expressed by self-declared climate change skeptics; nor have social scientists turned to affect studies to develop nuanced understandings of the constellation of emotions related to fear. Our team conducted 33 interviews and 1000 surveys with self-identified skeptics living in the U.S. Pacific Northwest. The data demonstrates the variability in perspectives, ideologies, and behaviors among skeptics themselves in new and unique ways, including tracking skeptics’ emotions about climate change. This article focuses on worry and dread. We find that those who believe climate change is a hoax, and skeptics who are politically conservative, tend to express less of these two emotions, as do men who identify as skeptics. Religiosity, as measured by frequency of religious attendance, does not significantly correlate with worry and dread; however, specific religious beliefs related to climate change (e.g. “Climate change is punishment for our sins”) do seem to increase those two feelings. Negative firsthand environmental experiences are also associated with higher degrees of worry and dread. Perhaps most significantly, our data suggests that worry and dread correlate strongly with environmental concern and policy support.Our interdisciplinary approach has several methodological advantages. First, affect studies encourages more nuance in emotion language, including more detailed definitions of emotions like worry and dread, which simmer over time, as opposed to discrete emotions like fear, which are shorter-lived. Second, sociological approaches remind us that emotions function within particular political, historical, and cultural contexts, which are fundamentally shaped by power structures. Finally, humanities scholars can provide useful input both in research design and the interpretation of results by helping craft survey questions and data codes, and by providing close attention to the language of the survey and interview responses. Combined with quantitative data, this multi-pronged methodology brings together forms of knowledge from the humanities and social sciences. Our approach serves as a model for new work in the growing field of empirical ecocriticism and expands the boundaries of the environmental humanities.     

The New Stage of the Turkish Counseling System: Explosive Growth (2000 to the Present)

The Turkish counseling system has been developing since the 1950s. Over the past 15 years, rapid and substantial changes have started to affect counseling and counselor education in Turkey. These changes have both positive and negative ramifications. Overall, the changes appear to represent a new stage of counseling that the authors refer to as explosive growth (2000 to the present). In this article, the authors describe this new stage and discuss positive and negative trends associated with it. El sistema turco de consejería se ha estado desarrollando desde los años 50. En los últimos 15 años, cambios rápidos y sustanciales han comenzado a afectar a la consejería y la formación de consejeros en Turquía. Estos cambios tienen ramificaciones tanto positivas como negativas. En general, los cambios parecen representar una nueva etapa en la consejería a la que nosotros los autores nos referimos como de crecimiento explosivo (desde el año 2000 hasta el presente). En este artículo, los autores describen esta nueva etapa y discuten las tendencias positivas y negativas asociadas con la misma.     

Identification from CCTV: Assessing police super‐recogniser ability to spot faces in a crowd and susceptibility to change blindness

Police worldwide regularly review closed‐circuit television (CCTV) evidence in investigations. This research found that London police experts who work in a full‐time “Super‐Recogniser Unit” and front line police identifiers regularly making suspect identifications from CCTV possessed superior unfamiliar face recognition ability and, with higher levels of confidence, outperformed controls at locating actors in a bespoke Spot the Face in a Crowd Test. Police were also less susceptible to change blindness errors and possessed higher levels of conscientiousness and lower levels of neuroticism and openness. Controls who took part in Spot the Face in a Crowd Test actor familiarisation training outperformed untrained controls, suggesting this exercise might enhance identification of persons of interest in real investigations. This research supports an accumulating body of evidence demonstrating that international police forces may benefit from deploying officers with superior face recognition ability to roles such as CCTV review, as these officers may be the most likely to identify persons of interest.     

Perceptual load affects change blindness in a real‐world interaction

Change blindness is the striking inability to detect seemingly obvious changes that occur between views of a scene. The current study assessed perceptual load as a factor that may affect change blindness for human faces. The study had participants (n = 103) interact with a researcher in a testing room that imposed low or high perceptual load. Midway through the conversation, the researcher was replaced by another person. Thirty‐nine percent of participants failed to detect the change. There was a significant effect of perceptual load, with greater change detection under low load (71%) than high load (52%). This research suggests that the perceptual load imposed by a task may have a significant effect on the likelihood of change blindness and ought to be considered in future research.     

More than 50% or Less than 70% Chance: Pragmatic Implications of Single‐Bound Probability Estimates

Probability estimates can be given as ranges or uncertainty intervals, where often only one of the interval bounds (lower or upper) is specified. For instance, a climate forecast can describe La Niña as having “more than 70% chance” or “less than 90% chance” of occurring. In three experiments, we studied how research participants perceived climate‐related forecasts expressed with lower‐bound (“over X% chance”) or upper‐bound (“under Y% chance”) probability statements. Results indicate that such single‐bound statements give pragmatic information in addition to the numeric probabilities they convey. First, the studies show that these statements are directional, leading the listeners' attention in opposite directions. “Over” statements guide attention towards the possible occurrence of the event and are explained by reasons for why it might happen, while “under” statements direct attention to its possible non‐occurrence and are more often explained by reasons for why the target event might not appear, corresponding to positive (it is possible) versus negative (it is uncertain) verbal probabilities. Second, boundaries were found to reveal the forecaster's beliefs and could be perceived as indicative of an increasing or a decreasing trend. Single‐bound probability estimates are therefore not neutral communications of probability level but might “leak” information about the speaker's expectations and about past and future developments of the forecast. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can false memories prime alternative solutions to ambiguous problems?

Research has demonstrated that false memories are capable of priming and facilitating insight-based problem-solving tasks by increasing solution rates and decreasing solution times. The present research extended this finding by investigating whether false memories could be used to bias ambiguous insight-based problem-solving tasks in a similar manner. Compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems with two possible correct answers, a dominant and a non-dominant solution, were created and normed (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, participants were asked to solve these CRAT problems after they were given Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists whose critical lures were also the non-dominant solution to half of the corresponding CRATs. As predicted, when false memories served as primes, solution rates were higher and solution times were faster for non-dominant than dominant CRAT solutions. This biasing effect was only found when participants falsely recalled the critical lure, and was not found when participants did not falsely recall the critical lure, or when they were not primed. Results are discussed with regard to spreading activation models of solution competition in problem-solving tasks and current theories of false memory priming effects.     

Representing,Running, and Revising Mental Models: A Computational Model

People use commonsense science knowledge to flexibly explain, predict, and manipulate the world around them, yet we lack computational models of how this commonsense science knowledge is represented, acquired, utilized, and revised. This is an important challenge for cognitive science: Building higher order computational models in this area will help characterize one of the hallmarks of human reasoning, and it will allow us to build more robust reasoning systems. This paper presents a novel assembled coherence (AC) theory of human conceptual change, whereby people revise beliefs and mental models by constructing and evaluating explanations using fragmentary, globally inconsistent knowledge. We implement AC theory with Timber , a computational model of conceptual change that revises its beliefs and generates human‐like explanations in commonsense science. Timber represents domain knowledge using predicate calculus and qualitative model fragments, and uses an abductive model formulation algorithm to construct competing explanations for phenomena. Timber then (a) scores competing explanations with respect to previously accepted beliefs, using a cost function based on simplicity and credibility, (b) identifies a low‐cost, preferred explanation and accepts its constituent beliefs, and then (c) greedily alters previous explanation preferences to reduce global cost and thereby revise beliefs. Consistency is a soft constraint in Timber ; it is biased to select explanations that share consistent beliefs, assumptions, and causal structure with its other, preferred explanations. In this paper, we use Timber to simulate the belief changes of students during clinical interviews about how the seasons change. We show that Timber produces and revises a sequence of explanations similar to those of the students, which supports the psychological plausibility of AC theory.     

LIVING WITH THE WICKED PROBLEM OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Outlining the characteristics of “wicked” and “super‐wicked” problems, climate change is considered as a global super‐wicked problem that is primarily about the future. Being global‐ and future‐oriented makes climate change something we have to learn to live with but cannot expect to solve. Because the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science (IRAS) is a multidisciplinary society that yokes the natural and social sciences with values, it is in a position to explore strategies for living with climate change—exemplified by the articles in this section. Finally, asking “who/what is in charge,” it is suggested that in a dynamically interrelated and evolving world no one is. It is important to distinguish between good that is already created and the creative interactions that give rise to new good. In order to live with climate change, our primary orientation should be to live with the creativity that has created and continues to create our life on Planet Earth—since we are not able to know what the future holds.     

Look at them and they will notice you: Distractor-independent attentional capture by direct gaze in change blindness

Humans have shown a detection advantage of direct vs. averted gaze stimuli in visual search tasks. However, instead of attentional capture by direct gaze, the detection advantage in visual search may depend on attention-grabbing potential of the distractor stimuli to which the target needs to be compared. We investigated attentional capture by direct gaze using the change blindness paradigm, in which successful detection does not require comparison between the target and the distractor items. Participants detected a masked gaze direction change in one of four simultaneously presented schematic faces. The distractor gaze directions were systematically varied across three experiments. Changes resulting in direct gaze were detected more efficiently than those resulting in averted gaze, independently of distractor gaze directions. This finding suggests that the detection advantage is specifically due to attentional capture by direct gaze, not properties of distractor items.