The Disgust Scale-R: A valid and reliable index to investigate separate disgust domains?

The Disgust Scale (DS; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994) is the most widely used instrument for assessing disgust propensity (i.e., individual tendency to experience disgust). Yet, psychometric evaluations of the DS are scarce while the literature shows that the reliability of its subscales are unacceptably low. Recently, it was suggested to reduce the number of subscales (Olatunji, Sawchuk, de Jong, & Lohr, 2007a). This study is a first exploration of this reduced three-factor solution in an independent sample. In study I, we examined whether a three-factor solution improves psychometric properties of the DS. Students from Maastricht University (N = 535) and the University of Groningen (N = 432) completed the DS. In study II, the DS was revised by dropping redundant items and revising its scoring format. The DS-R was administered to students from the University of Groningen (N = 472) and Ghent University (N = 41) to study its psychometric properties. The revisions improved the psychometric features of the DS, and showed that the DS-R is a valid and reliable index to establish core disgust, animal-reminder disgust, and contamination.     

Development and validation of the General Risk Propensity Scale (GRiPS)

Despite the widespread interest in understanding and identifying risk takers by psychologists, clinicians, and economists, the risk literature currently lacks consensus regarding the nature of risk taking and its measurement. Existing measures of risk taking are predominantly domain‐specific despite emerging support for risk taking as a domain‐general disposition. In the present paper, we examine the nature of risk taking as a domain‐general personality disposition and develop a concise measure: the General Risk Propensity Scale (GRiPS). Data from 1,523 participants across five studies provided evidence for its construct validity. The GRiPS converged with other self‐report measures of risk taking and provided incremental prediction of work, academic, and life outcomes over and above the five‐factor model of personality and the Domain‐Specific Risk Taking Scale.     

Effect propensity

In a choice between two options, decision makers can often be roughly divided into three groups: those who strongly prefer the first option, those who strongly prefer the second option, and those whose choices are most sensitive to the specific conditions (Switchers). In any reference state, such as the experimental control, Switchers’ choices are unlikely to be exactly equally divided between the options, which potentially creates a ceiling effect among those most susceptible to influence by the particular conditions or experimental manipulations. The limited growth potential of the option favored by Switchers in the reference state can produce “effect propensity,” whereby any condition or manipulation applied to the reference state is more likely to increase the share of the other option. We test this proposition in a series of studies in the context of choices between safe and risky options and between lower-price/quality and higher-price/quality options. The results indicate that a large majority of conceptually unrelated manipulations tend to increase the choice share of risky and higher-price/quality options. This effect propensity can be reversed when the risky and higher-price/quality options are the status quo alternatives or asymmetrically dominating in the reference state. Alternative explanations for effect propensity are examined. We discuss the implications of effect propensity for the interpretation of research findings, the selection of controls, and theory tests.     

Haybron on Mood Propensity and Happiness

Daniel Haybron has made an original contribution to philosophical discussions of happiness. He has put forward a theory that identifies happiness with moods and the propensity to experience moods. Haybron’s contribution deserves a critical examination. The first section of my paper is interpretive. I show how Haybron uses the concepts of ‘central affective states’ and ‘mood propensity’ to define happiness. The second and third sections of the paper are critical. They focus on the inclusion of mood propensity in Haybron’s theory. In the second section I argue that his theory fails because there is an example that shows a subject can be happy even when that subject does not have a positive mood propensity. In the third section of the paper, I consider Haybron’s objection that the case in question is ‘object-specific’ and that it is not ‘emotionally-based’. I discuss both of these technical terms in detail. Moreover, I argue that a modified version of the counter example accommodates these technical terms while retaining the persuasiveness of the original example.

Using the Implicit Association Test to Assess Risk Propensity Self‐concept: Analysis of its Predictive Validity on a Risk‐taking Behaviour in a Natural Setting

The present work analyses the predictive validity of measures provided by several available self‐report and indirect measurement instruments to assess risk propensity (RP) and proposes a measurement instrument using the Implicit Association Test: the IAT of Risk Propensity Self‐Concept (IAT‐RPSC), an adaptation of the prior IAT‐RP of Dislich et al. Study 1 analysed the relationship between IAT‐RPSC scores and several RP self‐report measures. Participants' risk‐taking behaviour in a natural setting was also assessed, analyzing the predictive validity of the IAT‐RPSC scores on risk‐taking behaviour compared with the self‐report measures. Study 2 analysed the predictive validity of the IAT‐RPSC scores in comparison with other indirect measures. Results of these studies showed that the IAT‐RPSC scores exhibited good reliability and were positively correlated to several self‐report and indirect measures, providing evidence for convergent validity. Most importantly, the IAT‐RPSC scores predicted risk‐taking behaviour in a natural setting with real consequences above and beyond all other self‐report and indirect measures analysed. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Editorial

This study examined the psychometric properties of the Outcome Questionnaire-30.2 (OQ-30.2; designed to measure patient progress throughout mental health treatment) in a sample of United States Air Force active duty basic military trainees who were evaluated for mental health concerns during the course of basic training. Findings indicate that the OQ-30.2 was internally consistent and Total scores decreased with more contact with mental health professionals. Previously reported 1- and 3-factor structures were not replicated; rather, results suggested the use of a broad 27-item general psychological distress subscale and a separate subscale of 3 critical items assessing substance use concerns. Present findings support the utility of the OQ-30.2 as a tool for repeated monitoring of patient progress in military mental health settings. Recommendations for future directions in the development of alternate calculations of the clinical cut score and reliable change index are discussed.     

Estimating the effect of gang membership on nonviolent and violent delinquency: a counterfactual analysis

This study reconsiders the well‐known link between gang membership and criminal involvement. Recently developed analytical techniques enabled the approximation of an experimental design to determine whether gang members, after being matched with similarly situated nongang members, exhibited greater involvement in nonviolent and violent delinquency. Findings indicated that while gang membership is a function of self‐selection, selection effects alone do not account for the greater involvement in delinquency exhibited by gang members. After propensity score matching was employed, gang members maintained a greater involvement in both nonviolent and violent delinquency when measured cross‐sectionally, but only violent delinquency when measured longitudinally. Additional analyses using inverse probability of treatment weights reaffirmed these conclusions. Aggr. Behav. 36:437–451, 2010. © 2010 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Entrepreneurial personality: The role of narcissism

Research has established a number of personality features and behaviours associated with business creation and success. The similarities between these traits and narcissism, a concept with roots in clinical psychology and psychiatry, led the authors to conduct this study, which proposes to measure whether entrepreneurs score higher on a narcissism scale than other vocational groups. The second goal of this study is to measure the role of narcissism on intention to start a business. Student entrepreneurs have been compared with non-entrepreneur students, city workers, and employees and managers from a branch of a large financial institution. Then, students filled out measures of general self-efficacy, locus of control and risk propensity as well as a narcissism scale. Results indicate that student entrepreneurs score significantly higher than all other vocational groups on a measure of narcissism. Results also indicate that narcissism is positively correlated with general self-efficacy, locus of control and risk propensity. Moreover, narcissism plays a significant role in explaining entrepreneurial intentions, even after controlling for self-efficacy, locus of control and risk propensity. Overall, these findings shed new light on the underlying personality traits of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial intentions and suggest new directions in the study of entrepreneurs’ personality profile.     

When does measurement error in covariates impact causal effect estimates? Analytic derivations of different scenarios and an empirical illustration

The average causal treatment effect (ATE) can be estimated from observational data based on covariate adjustment. Even if all confounding covariates are observed, they might not necessarily be reliably measured and may fail to obtain an unbiased ATE estimate. Instead of fallible covariates, the respective latent covariates can be used for covariate adjustment. But is it always necessary to use latent covariates? How well do analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) or propensity score (PS) methods estimate the ATE when latent covariates are used? We first analytically delineate the conditions under which latent instead of fallible covariates are necessary to obtain the ATE. Then we empirically examine the difference between ATE estimates when adjusting for fallible or latent covariates in an applied example. We discuss the issue of fallible covariates within a stochastic theory of causal effects and analyse data of a within-study comparison with recently developed ANCOVA and PS procedures that allow for latent covariates. We show that fallible covariates do not necessarily bias ATE estimates, but point out different scenarios in which adjusting for latent covariates is required. In our empirical application, we demonstrate how latent covariates can be incorporated for ATE estimation in ANCOVA and in PS analysis.     

The causal role of self-awareness in blushing-anxious,socially-anxious and social phobics individuals

This study examined the effect of attentional focus on social anxiety in three groups of subjects: high versus low blushing-anxious participants (n=48); high versus low socially anxious participants (n=60); and social phobic patients compared to patients with other anxiety disorders (n=48). Participants were asked to imagine two series of social situations, in which the hero was in the centre of others' attention. In the first series of stories, the type of feedback from the audience (positive, negative and neutral) and the direction of attention of the hero (self- versus task-focused) were manipulated, and in the second series of stories, the presence or absence of blushing and the direction of attention of the hero were manipulated. In line with the expectations, self-focused attention (SFA) led to more social anxiety than task-focused attention (TFA) in all the three experiments, and high blushing-anxious, socially anxious, and social phobic groups reported higher levels of self-awareness than their low-anxious comparison groups. No evidence was found for the idea that self-focusing is specifically detrimental for participants who are already socially anxious, blushing-anxious, or socially phobic. Also, attentional focus did not interact with the valence of social feedback. Finally, results provided some support for the hypothesis that fear of blushing is mediated by self-focusing. The results suggest that irrespective of trait social anxiety, and irrespective of the outcome of a social situation (positive, neutral or negative), SFA increases state social anxiety, or TFA decreases state social anxiety.