Measuring merit in animal research

Merit review of scientific projects involving laboratory animals is a central issue in the current debate over the ethics of animal experimentation. In this essay, I examine several conceptual, regulatory, and practical problems inherent in the merit review process. Contemporary challenges to the existing merit review system and suggestions for reform are also discussed. The essay concludes with comments on legal and political questions relevant to the future of merit assessment.     

Cerebral asymmetry for American Sign Language: The effects of moving stimuli

Previous studies of cerebral asymmetry for the perception of American Sign Language (ASL) have used only static representations of signs; in this study we present moving signs. Congenitally deaf, native ASL signers identified moving signs, static representations of signs, and English words. The stimuli were presented rapidly by motion picture to each visual hemifield. Normally hearing English speakers also identified the English words. Consistent with previous findings, both the deaf and the hearing subjects showed a left-hemisphere advantage to the English words; likewise, the deaf subjects showed a right hemisphere advantage to the statically presented signs. With the moving signs, the deaf showed no lateral asymmetry. The shift from right dominance to a more balanced hemispheric involvement with the change from static to moving signs is consistent with Kimura's position that the left hemisphere predominates in the analysis of skilled motor sequencing (Kimura 1976). The results also indicate that ASL may be more bilaterally represented than is English and that the spatial component of language stimuli can greatly influence lateral asymmetries.     

Increasing and decreasing intrinsic interest with contingent rewards: A test of cognitive evaluation theory

The study examined Deci's (Deci, E. L. Intrinsic motivation. New York: Plenum Press, 1975) hypotheses regarding the effects of contingent rewards on intrinsic task interest. Seventy-two male university students worked on a series of puzzles and were given either a high value reward ($1.50) or a low value reward ($.45). The money was given either contingent upon the simple execution of the task (task-contingent), contingent upon the ostensible attainment of a performance criterion level (criterion-contingent), or noncontingent and unexpected (control). Compared to the high payment control subjects, subjects who received the task-contingent high reward rated the task as less interesting, while subjects who received the criterion-contingent high reward rated it as more interesting. Also, subjects expressed less interest in the task after receiving the high task-contingent reward than the low task-contingent reward, but indicated greater interest after receiving the high criterion-contingent reward than the low criterion-contingent reward. It was concluded that substantial support was obtained for Deci's (1975) cognitive evaluation theory.     

Reasonable Partiality to Domestic Animals

The paper deals with partiality flowing from special relationships. Two main problems are discussed. The first concerns the relationship between partiality and genuine moral obligations. If partiality can bring about such obligations only if it is reasonable, what requirements should it meet in order to be reasonable? The second problem is one of animal ethics. Can the concept of reasonable partiality help us articulate what is morally at stake in a current discussion about the treatment of domestic animals, viz. the European discussion about the castration of pigs?     

A Christian Rationale for Vegetarianism

Abstract :  This article lays out an argument for vegetarianism based on a Christian theological rationale, specifically on a new articulation of a Christian anthropology for the 21^st century. What I suggest is that an exploration of what it means to be human in a contemporary first world context leads to the conclusion that vegetarianism is a logical expression of one's understanding of oneself as a Christian, and one's exercise of one's Christian faith and discipleship.     

The influence of perceptual and semantic categorization on inhibitory processing as measured by the N2–P3 response

In daily activities, humans must attend and respond to a range of important items and inhibit and not respond to unimportant distractions. Our current understanding of these processes is largely based on perceptually simple stimuli. This study investigates the interaction of conceptual-semantic categorization and inhibitory processing using Event Related Potentials (ERPs). Participants completed three Go–NoGo tasks that increased systematically in the degree of conceptual-semantic information necessary to respond correctly (from single items to categories of objects and animals). Findings indicate that the N2 response reflects inhibitory processing but does not change significantly with task difficulty. The P3 NoGo amplitude, on the other hand, is attenuated by task difficulty. Further, the latency of the peak of the P3 NoGo response elicited by the most difficult task is significantly later than are the peaks detected during performance of the other two tasks. Thus, the level of complexity of conceptual-semantic representations influences inhibitory processing in a systematic way. This inhibition paradigm may be a key for investigating inhibitory dysfunction in patient populations.     

Animal Minds,Cognitive Ethology,and Ethics

Our goal in this paper is to provide enough of an account of the origins of cognitive ethology and the controversy surrounding it to help ethicists to gauge for themselves how to balance skepticism and credulity about animal minds when communicating with scientists. We believe that ethicists’ arguments would benefit from better understanding of the historical roots of ongoing controversies. It is not appropriate to treat some widely reported results in animal cognition as if their interpretations are a matter of scientific consensus. It is especially important to understand why loose references to “cognitive ethology” by philosophers can signal ignorance of the field to scientists who are more deeply immersed in the relevant literature. Understanding the variety of approaches to cognitive phenomena in animals is essential if such capacities are to form the foundation of scientifically-informed ethical reasoning about animals.