MORAL APES, HUMAN UNIQUENESS, AND THE IMAGE OF GOD

Recent advances in evolutionary biology and ethology suggest that humans are not the only species capable of empathy and possibly morality. These findings are of no little consequence for theology, given that a nonhuman animal as a free moral agent would beg the question if human beings are indeed uniquely created in God's image. I argue that apes and some other mammals have moral agency and that a traditional interpretation of the imago Dei is incorrectly equating specialness with exclusivity. By framing the problem in terms of metaphor, following the work of Paul Ricoeur and Sallie McFague, I propose that the concept of the imago Dei could be extended to accommodate moral species other than our own.     

Religion as schedule-induced behavior

In this article, I argue that a class of religious behaviors exists that is induced, for prepared organisms, by specific stimuli that are experienced according to a response-independent schedule. Like other schedule-induced behaviors, the members of this class serve as minimal units out of which functional behavior may arise. In this way, there exist two classes of religious behavior: nonoperant schedule-induced behaviors and operant behaviors. This dichotomy is consistent with the distinction insisted upon by religious scholars and philosophers between "graceful" and "effortful" religious behaviors. Embracing the distinction allows an explanation of many aspects of religious experience and behavior that have been overlooked or disregarded by other scientific approaches to religion.     

The Nestor effect: Extending evolutionary developmental psychology to a lifespan perspective

We extend an evolutionary perspective of development to the lifespan, proposing that human longevity may be related to the experience, knowledge, and wisdom provided by older members of human groups. In addition to the assistance in childcare provided by grandmothers to their daughters, the experience of wise elders could have served to benefit kin as well as members of the immediate group, and thus been the target of natural selection. We refer to the fitness-enhancing effect of cumulative and integrative knowledge of some members of a group as the Nestor effect, after the oldest member of the group of Greek kings in the siege of Troy. Furthermore, we argue that the contributions of such Nestors resulted in cultural innovations that in turn may have promoted care and respect for the elderly. This bidirectional effect makes culture both the product and producer of longevity.     

进化伦理学及其向西方传统伦理学的挑战

在“进化伦理学”这个名称下,容纳了形形色色的具体构想。但是,各种进化伦理学纲领都以进化论来理解和把握人类道德现象。广义进化伦理学就是道德进化论。它侧重于对道德现象进行描述和说明（解释）,但也试图对已有的道德规范体系进行评价,并在评价的基础上对已有的道德规范进行限定或修正,因而并未完全丧失规范伦理学的性质。进化伦理学对西方传统伦理学的基础、学科性质和若干核心伦理观念提出了尖锐的挑战。     

Normische Gesetzeshypothesen und die wissenschaftsphilosophische Bedeutung des nichtmonotonen Schliessens

Normic Laws and the Significance of Nonmonotonic Reasoning for Philosophy of Science. Normic laws have the form ‘if A then normally B’. They have been discovered in the explanation debate, but were considered as empirically vacuous (§1). I argue that the prototypical (or ideal) normality of normic laws implies statistical normality (§2), whence normic laws have empirical content. In §3–4 I explain why reasoning from normic laws is nonmonotonic, and why the understanding of the individual case is so important here. After sketching some foundations of nonmonotonic reasoning as developed by AI-researchers (§5), Iargue that normic laws are also the best way to understand ceteris paribus laws (§6). §7 deals with the difference between physical and non-physical disciplines and §9 with the difference between normicity and approximation. In §8 it is shown how nonmonotonic reasoning provides a new understanding of the protection of theories against falsification by auxiliary hypotheses. §10, finally, gives a system- and evolution-theoretical explanation of the deeper reason for the omnipresence of normic laws in practice and science, and forthe connection between ideal and statistical normality. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Genesis of Mind and Spirit

Spiritual life is made possible by the evolution of a human neuropsychology that requires social interdependence for its development. Extensive neuroplasticity requires experiential shaping throughout life. The evolution of frontal cortex hypertrophy suggests that much of this shaping is produced by a socially constructed virtual reality, extending beyond immediate experience. Prefrontal colonization makes possible the social scaffolding of neuroregulation, including the emotional attachments necessary for moral life. Cognitive independence from immediate environments enables symbioses with external memory systems, producing novel forms of socially constituted experience and making possible the transformative effect of religious systems upon individual biologies and psychologies.     

Genetic Influence Helps Explain Variation in Human Fertility: Evidence From Recent Behavioral and Molecular Genetic Studies

To search for genetic influence on human fertility differentials appears inconsistent with past empirical research and prior interpretations of Fisher's fundamental theorem of natural selection. We discuss Fisher's theorem and give reasons why genetic influences may indeed account for individual differences in human fertility. We review recent empirical studies showing genetic influence on variance in fertility outcomes and precursors to fertility. Further, some of the genetic variance underlying fertility outcomes overlaps with that underlying fertility precursors. Findings from different cultures, different times, different levels of data, and both behavioral and molecular genetic designs lead to the same conclusion: Fertility differentials are genetically influenced, and at least part of the influence derives from behavioral precursors that are under volitional control, which are themselves genetically mediated.     

EVOLUTION AND SUBJECTIVITY

Evolutionary theory is becoming an all‐encompassing form of explanation in many branches of philosophy. However, emergence theory uses the concept of self‐organization to support yet alter traditional evolutionary explanation. Biologist Stuart Kauffman suggests that the new science will need to tell stories, not simply as a heuristic device but as part of its fundamental task. This claim is reminiscent of C. S. Peirce's criticism of the doctrine of necessity. Peirce's suggestions reference Hegel, and this essay draws out this Hegelian background, addressing the question of subjectivity and issuing some Hegelian reminders so that such evolutionary and emergent theories will consider the implication of this research program on philosophy of mind. The primary focus is on two post‐Kantian, neo‐Hegelian thinkers in contemporary philosophy who deal with this problem: John McDowell and Robert Brandom.