The fit between emotion regulation choice and individual resources is associated with adaptive functioning among young children

Being able to resist temptation at a young age is crucial for successful functioning yet it can be challenging. According to the Selection, Optimization, and Compensation with Emotion Regulation (SOC-ER) framework, one central element of successful functioning is selection which involves choosing among regulatory options whose resource requirements fits with the amount of available resources an individual possesses. Although conceptually important, direct empirical evidence is lacking. Accordingly, the present study utilised performance based measures to examine the interactive effect of regulatory selection to resist temptation, and individual differences in executive resources, on functioning in young children. Specifically, 39 first grade children that varied in executive resources (working memory capacity, WMC), selected between two major regulatory strategies (reappraisal and distraction) to resist temptation, that varied in their resource demands, and were evaluated on successful functioning (via questionnaires completed by parents, that assess daily-life behaviours requiring executive functioning). Supporting SOC-ER predictions, we found that among children with low (but not high) WMC, choosing the less effortful distraction regulatory strategy was associated with adaptive functioning. Additionally, regulatory choice preferences previously obtained with adults were extended to children. Broad implications are discussed.     

The gap between medical and monetary choices under risk persists in decisions for others

Decisions under risk in the medical domain have been found to systematically diverge from decisions in the monetary domain. When making choices between monetary options, people commonly rely on a decision strategy that trades off outcomes with their probabilities; when making choices between medical options, people tend to neglect probability information. In two experimental studies, we tested to what extent differences between medical and monetary decisions also emerge when the decision outcomes affect another person. Using a risky choice paradigm for medical and monetary decisions, we compared hypothetical decisions that participants made for themselves to decisions for a socially distant other (Study 1) and to recommendations as financial advisor or doctor (Study 2). In addition, we examined people's information search in a condition in which information about payoff distributions had to be learned from experiential sampling. Formal modeling and analyses of search behavior revealed a similarly pronounced gap between medical and monetary decisions in decisions for others as in decisions for oneself. Our results suggest that when making medical decisions, people try to avoid the worst outcome while neglecting its probability—even when the outcomes affect others rather than themselves.     

Effects of preference on performing a self-care skill among children with autism spectrum disorder

In this study, four children with autism were assessed to determine their preference choices for toothbrushes and toothpastes included during self-care skills teaching sessions. For two of the children, the presence of high-preference (HP) materials was associated with improved independent tooth brushing when compared to the presence of low-preference (LP) materials. There was no difference in independent tooth brushing between HP/LP conditions for the other two children. These findings suggest that preference and choice of materials alone can be a helpful instructional strategy for care providers serving children who have neurodevelopmental disorders and skill deficits.     

Forward inference in risky choice: Mapping gaze and decision processes

The study of cognitive processes is built on a close mapping between three components: overt gaze behavior, overt choice, and covert processes. To validate this overt–covert mapping in the domain of decision‐making, we collected eye‐movement data during decisions between risky gamble problems. Applying a forward inference paradigm, participants were instructed to use specific decision strategies to solve those gamble problems (maximizing expected values or applying different choice heuristics) during which gaze behavior was recorded. We revealed differences between overt behavior, as indicated by eye movements, and covert decision processes, instructed by the experimenter. However, our results show that the overt–covert mapping is for some eye‐movement measures not as close as expected by current decision theory, and hence question reverse inference as being prone to fallacies due to a violation of its prerequisite, that is, a close overt–covert mapping. We propose a framework to rehabilitate reverse inference.     

环境条件和兴趣对大学生妥协决策的影响

研究旨在考察个体在选择职业时是否会为了更好的环境条件(组织、城市)而降低对兴趣的要求。对63名大学生被试开展了两个实验,采用在环境条件和兴趣水平上有不同程度差异的职位配对来模拟两难决策。结果发现:(1)对不同组织声望和兴趣水平的职位的选择无性别差异;(2)组织声望差距、组织声望差距与兴趣差距的交互作用能显著预测职位的选择;(3)对不同城市级别和兴趣水平的职位的选择有性别差异,男生比女生更少放弃兴趣;(4)兴趣差距、城市级别差距与兴趣差距的交互作用能预测男生的选择,只有兴趣差距能预测女生的选择。结论:个体会为了更好的环境而或多或少在兴趣方面妥协。     

Compared to Dematerialized Money,Cash Increases Impatience in Intertemporal Choice

When it comes to trading time for money (or vice versa), people tend to be impatient and myopic. Often dramatically so. For illustration, half of people would rather collect $15 now than $30 in 3 months. This willingness to forego 50% of the reward to skip a 3‐month wait corresponds to an annual discount rate of 277%. This article investigates how money's physical form biases intertemporal choice. We ask, what happens to (im)patience (i.e., discount rates) when time is traded against cash rather than against an equivalent sum of dematerialized money? We find that intertemporal decisions pitting time against cash (rather than against dematerialized money) increase impatience. The underlying mechanism relates to the pain of parting from money. Letting go of cash (dematerialized money) we can have now is psychologically more (less) painful, which in turn reduces (increases) our willingness to wait for larger‐later payoffs. Importantly, heightening prevention focus (i.e., concerns for safety and security) moderates this bias. The article concludes by discussing the implications of the research, particularly for the psychology of saving behavior.     

The effects of physical contact and decision type on moral decision making: A study of harm to save moral behavior

This study examined the relationship between physical contact and decision type in predicting “harm to save” behavior. Participants were assigned to making either a judgment or a choice involving moral dilemmas. All participants were presented with dilemmas that either required or did not require having physical contact with potential victims. Participants were asked to decide whether to sacrifice fewer people to save more (utilitarian responses) or not to do so and thus more people would die (deontological responses). The study sample included 345 participants who completed a set of self‐report measures. Results indicated an interaction between physical contact and decision type. In the choice condition only, participants reported significantly less utilitarian responses to the dilemmas that required having physical contact with the person to be harmed than to dilemmas that did not require physical contact. This difference was not found in the judgment condition. These results contribute to a greater understanding of the nature and potential malleability of human morality.     

权力对延迟选择的影响

本研究旨在考察权力对延迟选择的影响, 并探讨决策难度在其中的调节作用以及决策过程的中介作用。两个实验均先操纵个体的权力状态, 然后再请被试完成随后的延迟选择任务。结果发现, 决策难度可调节权力对延迟选择的影响, 当决策困难时, 高权力者具有更低的延迟倾向, 当决策容易时, 权力的影响消失。决策过程的加工变异性可中介权力对延迟选择的影响。结果表明, 低权力者比高权力者具有更高的延迟倾向(尤其当决策困难时), 不同权力水平者在决策过程上的差异或可部分解释此种现象。     

Flashing the Yellow Traffic Light: Choices Forced Upon Us by Gene Editing Technologies

The 2018 birth of two designer babies in China has sparked an immediate global controversy over the ethics of gene editing. For the longer range future, however, we must assess how CRISPR/Cas9, like so many other new bio-technologies, is forcing choice—moral choice—on a large scale. Gene editing for purposes of medical therapy, human enhancement, engineering of future children, and even creating a posthuman species, confront our society with the inescapable necessity of making moral choices. The task for churches in partnership with universities is not to decide in advance what is right or wrong. Rather, it is to prepare our people to make responsible choices.