Ethical theory, “common morality,” and professional obligations

We have two aims in this paper. The first is negative: to demonstrate the problems in Bernard Gert’s account of common morality, in particular as it applies to professional morality. The second is positive: to suggest a more satisfactory explanation of the moral basis of professional role morality, albeit one that is broadly consistent with Gert’s notion of common morality, but corrects and supplements Gert’s theory. The paper is in three sections. In the first, we sketch the main features of Gert’s account of common morality in general. In the second, we outline Gert’s explanation of the source of professional moral rules and demonstrate its inadequacy. In the third section, we provide an account of our own collectivist needs-based view of the source of the role-moral obligations of many professional roles, including those of health care professionals.

THEOLOGY,EVOLUTION, AND THE HUMAN MIND: HOW MUCH CAN BIOLOGY EXPLAIN?

Evolutionary biology contributes much to our present understanding of life, and it promises also to deepen our understanding of human intelligence, ethics, and even religion. For some scientific thinkers, however, Darwin's science seems so impressive that it now supplants theology altogether by providing the ultimate explanation of all manifestations of life, not only biologically but also metaphysically. By focusing on human intelligence as an emergent aspect of nature this essay examines the question of whether theology can still have an explanatory role to play alongside biology in attempts to understand mind.     

The perception of emotionally toned sentences by right hemisphere-damaged and aphasic subjects

The perception of 60 emotionally toned sentences, divided into meaningful and meaningless utterances, by high- and low-verbal aphasics and right hemisphere-damaged subjects who were not aphasic was investigated. The intended moods were happiness, sadness, and anger. Results indicated (a) significant differences between the aphasic groups in identifying the intended emotion but none between groups in identifying the intended emotion but none between either of these groups and the right hemispheric dysfunction subjects; (b) sentence meaningfulness only affected the responses of high-verbal aphasics; and (c) while the happy mood seemed to be the least frequently selected among the three moods, closer inspection indicated that the subjects in absence of response bias were distinguishing among the three moods with equal success.     

HOW EMPIRICAL IS WIEMAN'S THEOLOGY?

Abstract. The essay is a response to the papers written by Nancy Frankenberry and Charley Hardwick in the March 1987 issue of Zygon. Questions are raised about whether Wieman's theology is functionalist in the way described by Frankenberry and whether Hardwick's proposal to establish the logical possibility of naturalism as a framework for an existential interpretation of the Christian message is satisfactory. The most basic question raised by both papers is whether Wieman's theology is fully empirical when viewed from the point of view of the radical empiricist.     

Situating Rhetorical Politics in Heidegger's Protopractical Ontology 1923–25: The French Occupy the Ruhr

Abstract

¹ 1 I am grateful to audiences at the University of California, Riverside, the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association at the University of East Anglia, and at Dalhousie University for helpful questions. Sincere thanks go to two anonymous referees and the editors of this Journal. For written comments, detailed discussion and encouragement, I am particularly grateful to Duncan MacIntosh, Susan Sherwin, Richmond Campbell, Lorraine Code, Steven Burns, Guy Longworth, Gary Watson, Margaret Chapman and Guy Blanchard. This paper makes a preliminary case for a central and radical claim. I begin with Bernard Williams’ seldom-faced argument that integrity cannot be a moral virtue because it lacks two key ingredients of moral virtues, namely a characteristic thought and motivation. Whereas, for example, generosity involves the thought that another could use assistance, and the motivation to actually give assistance, integrity lacks these two things essential to morally excellent responses. I show that several maneuvers aimed at avoiding Williams’ challenge fail and that others are likely to remain unpersuasive. The paper concludes by offering an argument to the best explanation: Williams’ important insight is best explained by the supposition that integrity is an epistemic virtue, and an epistemic virtue of a practical sort.     

Believing at Will is Possible

There are convincing counter-examples to the widely accepted thesis that we cannot believe at will. For it seems possible that the truth of a proposition depend on whether or not one believes it. I call such scenarios cases of Truth Depends on Belief (TDB) and I argue that they meet the main criteria for believing at will that we find in the literature. I reply to five objections that one might level against the thesis that TDB cases show that believing at will is possible, namely that (1) mind-reading is impossible, (2) in TDB cases, one's belief is caused by one's desire, (3) in TDB scenarios, one chooses not a belief but something else, (4) TDB cases are reducible to Feldman cases, and that (5) if truth depends on belief, we are on the road to a regress. Of course, TDB scenarios hardly, if ever, occur in real life. For three reasons, they are nonetheless important. First, they show that the thesis that it is conceptually impossible to believe at will is simply false. Second, they provide us with an important constraint on any version of the thesis that it is psychologically impossible to believe at will. Third, they show us that, contrary to what several philosophers claim or imply, believing at will should not be identified with believing irrespective of—what one considers to be—the truth, nor should believing irrespective of the truth be considered a necessary condition for believing at will.     

Religious Naturalism and the Religion-Science Dialogue: A Minimalist View

Although its roots go back at least to Spinoza, religious naturalism is once again becoming a self–conscious option in religious thinking. This article seeks to (1) provide a generic notion of religious naturalism, (2) sketch my own "minimalist" variety of religious naturalism, and (3) view the science–religion dialogue from both of these perspectives. This last will include reflection on the nature of scientific practices, the contributions of religious traditions to moral reflection, and Ursula Goodenough's "religiopoiesis."     

Albert Einstein and Bernard Lonergan on Empirical Method

In the science–and–theology dialogue, it becomes imperative that theologians develop sophistication in empirical method. Albert Einstein stated that to understand what physicists do we should not listen to what they say but watch what they do. Still, he wrote incisively about method in physics. Theologian and philosopher Bernard Lonergan developed a methodical approach to theology that was influenced by the natural sciences. I present Einstein's thought on epistemology and the relationship between sense experience and theory. I then turn to Lonergan's understanding of empirical method in the natural sciences, generalized empirical method, and his treatment of Einstein's work.     

Integrity and Demandingness

I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’ moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis. However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’