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41.
Todd Bernard Weber 《The Journal of Ethics》2000,4(3):191-209
My purpose in this paper is to argue that we are not vulnerableto inescapable wrongdoing occasioned by tragic dilemmas. I directmy argument to those who are most inclined to accept tragicdilemmas: those of broadly Nietzschean inclination who reject``modern moral philosophy' in favor of the ethical ideas of theclassical Greeks. Two important features of their project are todeny the usefulness of the ``moral/nonmoral distinction,' and todeny that what are usually classified as moral reasons always oreven characteristically ``trump' nonmoral reasons in anadmirable agent's deliberations.I show critics of modern moral philosophy such as BernardWilliams that their acceptance of tragic dilemmas underminestheir project of denying the moral/nonmoral distinction and thepriority of moral reasons. The possibility of tragic dilemmasrequires an account of practical deliberation in which moralreasons appear as already in-force obligations, with blame andguilt ready to be invoked, while nonmoral reasons appear as merereasons. This makes moral reasons importantly different fromnonmoral reasons in how they achieve their deliberative weight,and also makes them characteristically weightier. Thus,accommodating tragic dilemmas reinforces the moral/nonmoraldistinction and the priority of moral reasons, the very thingsthese critics want to deny. By accepting the possibility oftragic dilemmas, these critics are undermining their own project.The standard normative theories are dead set against tragicdilemmas, and the critics of modern moral philosophy shouldreject tragic dilemmas for the good of their project. Thus we allshould reject tragic dilemmas. 相似文献
42.
Else Marie Wiberg Pedersen 《Dialog》2011,50(1):15-25
Abstract : This article engages the understanding of love and grace in Bernard's and Luther's theologies. Taking as a point of departure Anders Nygren's dichotomy of love in agape and eros, Wiberg Pedersen outlines some of the issues raised by Nygren's thesis. Arguing against Nygren's caricature of Bernard's theology, Wiberg Pedersen shows the similarities between Bernard's and Luther's understandings of love and grace, which lead her to hypothesize that Luther was inspired by Bernard in a theologia caritatis that is simultaneously a theologia cordis (creation and inspiration) and a theologia crucis (incarnation and justification), all led by grace. 相似文献
43.
Paul L. Allen 《Zygon》2013,48(2):294-304
In claiming the independence of theology from science, Ernan McMullin nevertheless saw the danger of separating these disciplines on questions of mutual significance, as his accompanying article “Biology and the Theology of the Human” in this edition of Zygon shows. This paper analyzes McMullin's adoption of emergence as a qualified endorsement of a view that avoids the excesses of both dualism and materialism. I argue that McMullin's distinctive contribution is the conceptual clarification of emergence in the light of a precise understanding of matter, in light of Aristotelian metaphysics and Darwinian theory. As applied to human nature, McMullin retains an Augustinian outlook that sees spirit as emergent in the human body and which posits a credible biblical hermeneutic. I indicate briefly how McMullin's perspective could be fortified by a fuller natural theology. 相似文献
44.
Mark Glouberman 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(5):873-886
In Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Bernard Williams supplies an interpretation of Descartes's Meditations in which the meditator's clean sweep of initial beliefs is justified by a stance that abrogates all practical pressures: the stance of pure enquiry. Otherwise, Williams explains, it would not be reasonable to set many of the initial beliefs aside. Nowhere, however, does Descartes assert that his approach is in this sense ‘pure’. It would of course be preferable if the meditator's rejection of all the initial beliefs did not require an abrogation of the conditions that govern everyday belief-formation and assessment. I supply a reading that accomplishes this. The key to this reading is recognition that Descartes is a thinker of his time, a time when the pre-modern worldview was being systematically rejected. I show, in this regard, that when Descartes characterizes a belief as ‘uncertain’, this has the implication that the belief is false. And, certainly, the rational policy, without need for any special stance, is to reject falsehoods. 相似文献
45.
Donald W. Bruckner 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(5):623-644
Abstract In a well-known paper, Bernard Williams argues that an immortal life would not be worth living, for it would necessarily become boring. I examine the implications for the boredom thesis of three human traits that have received insufficient attention in the literature on Williams’ paper. First, human memory decays, so humans would be entertained and driven by things that they experienced long before but had forgotten. Second, even if memory does not decay to the extent necessary to ward off boredom, once-satisfied desires often return after a sufficient period of time. Eternity would always contain sufficient time for our desires to rejuvenate. Third, even if too many of our desires were satisfied but not yet rejuvenated, we can expect that human ingenuity would continue to invent new pursuits, pastimes, careers, and ways of life that would prevent us from becoming bored as we moved from one to another. Finally, I consider and respond to several objections, including the claims that as much variety as I propose to be put into an eternal life is inconsistent with having one character throughout one’s life and that the sort of character change and memory decay I postulate is inconsistent with personal identity. 相似文献
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48.
Elinor Mason 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》1999,2(3):243-261
In this paper I defend consequentialism against the objection that consequentialists are alienated from their personal relationships through having inappropriate motivational states. This objection is one interpretation of Williams' claim that consequentialists will have "one thought too many". Consequentialists should cultivate dispositions to act from their concern for others. I argue that having such a disposition is consistent with a belief in consequentialism and constitutes an appropriate attitude to personal relationships. If the consequentialist has stable beliefs that friendship is justifiable in consequentialist terms, that friendship requires acting from concern for others, and furthermore if the consequentialist finds that she is concerned for others, then she will be able to form a disposition which involves acting from her concern for others without having one thought too many. 相似文献
49.
R. Jay Wallace 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》1999,2(3):217-242
Rational agency may be thought of as intentional activity that is guided by the agent's conception of what they have reason to do. The paper identifies and assesses three approaches to this phenomenon, which I call internalism, meta-internalism, and volitionalism. Internalism accounts for rational motivation by appeal to substantive desires of the agent's that are conceived as merely given; I argue that it fails to do full justice to the phenomenon of guidance by one's conception of one's reasons. Meta-internalism explains this phenomenon by postulating higher-order dispositions, consitutive of (rational) agency itself, which causally interact with the agent's normative beliefs to produce corresponding motivations to action. I show that meta-internalism comes to grief over cases of akrasia, insofar as it leaves no room for the capacity for rational guidance when agents voluntarily act at variance with their judgments about what they have reason to do. Volitionalism, I contend, improves on both internalism and meta-internalism. Its distinctive feature is the postulation of a kind of motivation that is directly subject to the agent's control, and independent of the dispositions and desires to which the agent is passively subject. 相似文献
50.
Coalition preferences of 300 male and female subjects were ascertained under varying motivational conditions. Two of the experimental conditions repeated the typical three-person coalition paradigm, with a monetary reward (extrinsic motivation) offered for the winning of a luck-determined game. In a third condition, skill rather than luck influenced the outcome and no monetary reward was given for winning (intrinsic motivation). Two additional conditions examined coalition preferences in a mixed-motive situation, with either a small or a large monetary reward offered for winning a skill-related game. In the extrinsic motivation condition, the low and the medium resource persons typically desired to coalesce, contrary to the wishes of the excluded, high resource player. In contrast, the coalition between the low and the medium resource persons also was preferred by the high resource player in the intrinsic motivation condition. Coalition conflict was intermediate in the mixed-motive conditions. In sum, it was demonstrated that coalition formation and interpersonal conflict are dependent upon the motivational determinants of group activity. 相似文献