Attention to eye contact opportunity and facial motion by three-month-old infants

Thirty-two 3-month-old infants participated in two experiments showing color videotapes of facial stimuli in a paired comparison format. In Experiment 1, the experimenter, serving as the stimulus, looked either directly at the infant or averted his gaze to the side; the face was presented either still or in motion. Eye contact opportunity had no effect while motion of the head was an effective attractor of visual fixation. In Experiment 2, the amount of available eye contact opportunity was parametrically varied by occluding the eyes with different patterns of blinking, each at the same rate. The no-motion 100% eye contact available condition received less attention than the three blinking stimuli, which were all equally attended to, though they varied with respect to the amount of eye contact opportunity they afforded. The contrast in effect of eye contact availability and rather subtle stimulus motion would imply that 3-month-old infants are comparatively insensitive to being the object of another's visual regard.     

John Scottus Eriugena on the Composition of Material Bodies

This paper examines John Scottus Eriugena's account of material bodies. Some scholars have argued that Eriugena's account prefigures Berkeleyan idealism. The interpretation offered in the paper rejects the Berkeleyan interpretation on the grounds that Eriugena, unlike Berkeley, did not propose a thoroughly immaterialist view of reality.     

Berkeley on the Activity of Spirits

This paper propounds a new reading of Berkeley's account of the activity of finite spirits. Against existing interpretations, the paper argues that Berkeley does not hold that we causally contribute to the movement of our bodies. In contrast, our volitions to move our bodies are but occasions for God to cause their movement. In answer to the question of wherein then consists our activity, the paper proposes that our activity consists in the dual powers to produce (1) our volitions – the acts of willing – and (2) our ideas of imagination.     

Berkeley's Missing Argument: The Sceptical Attack on Intentionality

Berkeley argues that our ideas cannot represent external objects, because only an idea can resemble an idea. But he does not offer any argument for the claim that an idea can represent only what it resembles - a premise essential to his argument. I argue that this gap can be both historically explained and filled by examining the debates between Cartesians and sceptics in the late seventeenth century. Descartes held that representation involves two relations between an idea and its object – resemblance and causation – and that these relations are very closely linked to each other. I look at variations upon this claim in later Cartesians, especially Desgabets and Régis. I also examine the critics who attacked this claim, especially Huet, Foucher, and Du Hamel, who developed arguments similar to Berkeley's but concluded that (Cartesian) representation is simply impossible. I also argue that Malebranche, although an adherent of the Cartesian theory of intentionality, used a modified version of this argument to argue for his claim that ideas do not exist in the mind at all. These thinkers, and especially Malebranche, provide the context in which we should understand Berkeley.     

Action,knowledge and embodiment in Berkeley and Locke

Embodiment is a fact of human existence which philosophers should not ignore. They may differ to a great extent in what they have to say about our bodies, but they have to take into account that for each of us our body has a special status, it is not merely one amongst the physical objects, but a physical object to which we have a unique relation. While Descartes approached the issue of embodiment through consideration of sensation and imagination, it is more directly reached by consideration of action and agency: whenever we act upon the world, we act by moving our bodies. So if we can understand what an immaterialist such as Berkeley thinks about agency, we will have gone a fair way to understanding what he thinks about embodiment. §1 discusses a recent flurry of articles on the subject of Berkeley’s account of action. I choose to present Berkeley as a causal-volitional theorist (realist) not because I think it is the uniquely correct interpretation of the texts, but because I find it more philosophically interesting as a version of immaterialism. In particular, it raises the possibility of a substantive account of human embodiment which is completely unavailable to the occasionalist. §2 articulates an apparent philosophical problem for Berkeley qua causal-volitional theorist and show that Locke was aware of a related problem and had a solution of which Berkeley would have known. §3 distinguishes two interpretations of Berkeley’s famous denial of blind agency – as the assertion of a weak representational condition or a strong epistemic one – and provide evidence that there was a well-established debate about blind powers in the seventeenth century which took the metaphor of blindness as indicating an epistemic rather than merely representational failing. What remains to do in §4 is to consider whether Berkeley, with his own peculiar commitments, could in fact accept this account of agency.     

Hutcheson,Perception, and the Sceptic's Challenge

Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy: Series Editors, Karl Ameriks and Desmond M. Clarke. René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies. Translated and edited by John Cottingham. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xlvi + 120. £25., £7.95 pb. ISBN 0–521–55252–4 (hb.). ISBN 0–521–55818–2 (pb.).

Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality with A Treatise of Freewill. Edited by Sarah Hutton. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xxxvi + 218. £37.50 hb., £13.95 pb., ISBN 0–521–47362–4 (hb.). ISBN 0–521–47918–5 (pb.).

Anne Conway: The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Translated and edited by Allison P. Coudert and Taylor Corse. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xxxix + 73. £35.00 hb., £12.95 pb. ISBN 0–521–47335–7 (hb.). ISBN 0–521–47904–5 (pb.).

Julien Offray de La Mettrie: Machine Man and Other Writings. Translated and edited by Ann Thomson. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. xxx + 179. £35.00 (hb.), £12.95. ISBN 0–521–47258‐X (hb.). ISBN 0–521–47849–9 (pb.).     

The eyes have it: Exposure times and saccadic movements in visual half-field experiments

Several tachistoscopic visual half-field experiments using exposure times in excess of 150 msec have been reported and arguments have been put forth justifying this procedure. An experiment was done investigating visual field accuracy under conditions where eye movement was allowed, following parafoveal exposure. Two control experiments were done to evaluate the viewing conditions. When eye movement is permitted, accuracy in both visual fields reaches 100%. It is concluded that visual field differences found with exposure times greater than 150 msec are due to the active cooperation of the subjects and not due to the justifications advanced by experimenters using long exposure times.