ACTIONS AND AGENTS: NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL RECONSIDERED

Using a process‐oriented understanding of the relation between actions and agents, the author argues that an ontological agent is the ongoing effect or by‐product rather than the antecedent cause of actions. Applied to the relation between natural and supernatural in philosophical cosmology, this allows one to claim, first, that agents (whether natural or supernatural) are not sensibly perceived, but only inferred from the ongoing observation of empirical actions; second, that the distinction between the natural and the supernatural is then conceivably a distinction between interrelated processes rather than between independently existing agents; and third, that a higher order process of supernatural origin could be operative in a lower order empirical process without interference even though its existence and activity could only be established on the basis of a faith commitment, not empirical evidence. What Paul Ricoeur referred to as a “surplus of meaning” over and above the scientific explanation of an event would be in play with the claim of divine guidance for the cosmic process.     

Henri Bergson: Evolution,time and philosophy

Evolutionary theory is hindered by the conflict between the apparently antagonistic principles of its two founding figures, Darwin and Lamarck. Bergson's Creative Evolution outlines the means of transcending this impasse. If the evolutionary process is conceived as enduring then the atomistic model of static genetic states is never fully realisable. In the light of this, Bergson considers the germ‐plasm to be essentially “fluid.” If there is to be influence on the germ‐line it will be primarily in terms of the manner in which the genetic data is unfolded. In order to designate this influence Bergson introduces the concept of the “tendency.” The tendency will be explicated in relation to contemporary evolutionary biology. However, as the concept signifies that which is given only in the duration in which information is elaborated, it is precluded from representation. Bergson demonstrates that it is the evolutionary principle of continuous transformation which constitutes the limit to any scientific of view. For this reason, science needs to be complemented by a philosophical account of the duration of process.     

In defence of loose ends: Psychotherapy process research in the real world

Understanding what transpires in therapeutic conversations is as complex as the humans who are engaged in them. Inspired by the natural sciences, mainstream research in psychotherapy has taken up a positivist epistemology and strives for quantification and verification to produce evidence of the effectiveness of an approach. This paper explores an alternative foundation for therapeutic practices which has implications for how we do research. First, we present some ideas from process philosophy and dialogical perspectives.. In particular we return to the ideas of Henri Bergson who understood change as consisting of interpenetrated continuous and shifting states. In a next step we briefly look into how such ideas have influenced what is referred to as dialogical practices. Such dialogical practices operate through facilitating polyphonic, diverse perspectives that may mediate change in and through an intersubjective process of becoming. Based on this we take another step and make some suggestions for how we may develop research that enables ways of exploring therapeutic conversations as a multi-voiced, interactional and unfinalized process. We offer by way of example a method by which we attempt to integrate a linguistic theory (Systemic functional linguistics) with the dialogical framework and the ideas of Bergson. This paper considers how process philosophy may offer an alternative to the seeking of certainty that occurs in both psychotherapy research and practice, and ideas for making space for the ‘loose ends’ of the inconsistent and the unknown.     

Jung's psychoid concept and Bion's proto‐mental concept: a comparison

Jung and Bion both developed theoretical concepts propounding a deeply unknowable area of the psyche in which body and mind are undifferentiated and the individual has no distinct identity, from which a differentiated consciousness arises. In Jung's case, this is enshrined in his psychoid concept and the associated notion of synchronicity and, in Bion's case, in his proto‐mental concept and his ideas on group dynamics. It is by means of these two concepts that Jung and Bion approach and locate a combined body‐mind, a monism, in which body and mind are seen as different aspects of the same thing. This paper reviews the claim that although the two concepts are associated clinically with very different situations, their commonality may arise from a similar intellectual basis: both men appear to have been influenced by the same source of vitalist ideas in philosophy including Henri Bergson, and Jung's ideas also exerted a direct influence on Bion.     

Bergson and the holographic theory of mind

Bergson’s model of time (1889) is perhaps the proto-phenomenological theory. It is part of a larger model of mind (1896) which can be seen in modern light as describing the brain as supporting a modulated wave within a holographic field, specifying the external image of the world, and wherein subject and object are differentiated not in terms of space, but of time. Bergson’s very concrete model is developed and deepened with Gibson’s ecological model of perception. It is applied to the problems of consciousness, direct realism, qualia and illusions. The model implies an entirely different basis for memory and cognition, and a brief overview is given for the basis of direct memory, compositionality and systematicity.     

Nietzsche and l’élan technique: Technics,life, and the production of time

Abstract In this paper we examine Nietzsche’s relation to the life sciences of his time and to Darwinism in particular, arguing that his account of the will to power in terms of technics eschews three metaphysical prejudices, hylemorphism, utilitarianism, and teleological thinking. Telescoping some of Nietzsche’s pronouncements on the will to power with a Bergsonian lens, our reading of the will to power, as an operation productive of time, the future or life, offers an alternative to Heidegger’s. Rather than being reducible to a technics of domination or mastery, the will to power, we argue, is best interpreted as a technics of material forces that recasts all things past and future, near and far, moment by moment.     

Sense data and logical relations: Karin Costelloe-Stephen and Russell’s critique of Bergson

ABSTRACT

Though scholarship has explored Karin Costelloe-Stephen’s contributions to the history of psychoanalysis, as well as her relations to the Bloomsbury Group, her philosophical work has been almost completely ignored. This paper will examine her debate with Bertrand Russell over his criticism of Bergson. Costelloe-Stephen had employed the terminology of early analytic philosophy in presenting a number of arguments in defence of Bergson’s views. Costelloe-Stephen would object, among other things, to Russell’s use of an experiment which, as she points out, was first conducted by Carl Stumpf. Russell appeals to Stumpf's experiment in his attempt to prove that sense data are terms in logical relations, a thesis presupposed by the project of logical analysis outlined in Our Knowledge of the External World. A reformulated version of Costelloe-Stephen's argument put forth by this paper shows that Russell's argument fails to provide adequate proof for his thesis. Further modifications of the argument can also address a reconstruction (based on contemporary reports) of Russell's reply to Costelloe-Stephen. In his reply, Russell would use, already in 1914, the term ‘analytic philosophy’ in contrasting his and Moore’s approach to a continental one, exemplified by Bergson and Costelloe-Stephen.