Belief in a just world and social dominance orientation: Evidence for a mediational pathway predicting negative attitudes and discrimination against individuals with mental illness

Prejudice against individuals with mental illness stems from multiple factors, including the personality traits of those harboring the prejudiced attitudes. However, little is known about the personality processes (as opposed to static correlates) leading to negative attitudes and discrimination toward individuals with mental illness. The present research tested a mediational model in which negative attitudes against such people and resulting intentions to discriminate are distally rooted in just-world beliefs, which predispose people toward higher social dominance orientation, a well-known proximal personality predictor of general prejudice. Participants completed measures of behavioral intentions, attitudes toward individuals with mental illness, social dominance orientation, and belief in a just world. The proposed mediational model was supported, and an alternative causal model was not. These results illuminate the personality-process antecedents of attitudes toward individuals with mental illness and provide a foundation for research targeting interventions intended to reduce prejudice and discrimination against this population.     

Reminders can enhance or impair episodic memory updating: a memory-for-change perspective

ABSTRACT

The Memory-for-Change framework proposes that retrieving episodic memories can facilitate new learning when changes between existing memories and new information are integrated during encoding and later recollected. Four experiments examined whether reminders could improve memory updating and enhance new learning. Participants studied two study lists of word pairs and were given a cued recall test on responses from both lists. Reminders of List 1 words pairs (A-B) appeared immediately before List 2 words pairs that included repeated cues and changed responses (A-D). Across experiments, we varied the types of reminders to determine whether differences in their effectiveness as retrieval cues would influence memory for the list membership of responses. We found that presenting intact reminders (cue-response) enhanced the memory benefits associated with recollection-based retrieval of changes relative to when no reminders appeared and when partial reminders (cue-only) appeared with and without feedback. Importantly, cue-response reminders benefitted memory when they were recognised in List 2 and when changes were later recollected. This suggests that integrative encoding can be facilitated when substantial environmental support is available to cue retrieval of existing memories. These findings have practical implications for understanding which reminders best aid the correction of memories for inaccurate information.     

From a fixation on sports to an exploration of mechanism: The past,present, and future of hot hand research

We review the literature on the hot hand fallacy by highlighting the positive and negative aspects of hot hand research over the past 20 years, and suggesting new avenues of research. Many researchers have focused on criticising Gilovich et al.'s claim that the hot hand fallacy exists in basketball and other sports, instead of exploring the general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human cognition and probabilistic reasoning. Noting that researchers have shown that people perceive hot streaks in a gambling domain in which systematic streaks cannot possibly exist, we suggest that researchers have paid too much attention to investigating the independence of outcomes in various sporting domains. Instead, we advocate a domain-general mechanistic approach to understanding the hot hand fallacy, and conclude by suggesting approaches that might refocus the literature on the important general implications of the hot hand fallacy for human probabilistic reasoning.     

The logic sense: exploring the role of executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgments

Abstract

The Default Interventionist account suggests that by default, we often generate belief-based responses when reasoning and find it difficult to draw the logical inference. Recent research, however, shows that in some instances belief judgments take longer, are more prone to error and are more affected by cognitive load. One interpretation is that some logical inferences are available automatically and require intervention in order to respond according to beliefs. In two experiments, we investigate the effortful nature of belief judgments and the automaticity of logical inferences by increasing the inhibitory demands of the task. Participants were instructed to judge conclusion validity, believability and either font colour or font style, to increase the number of competing responses. Results showed that conflict more strongly affects judgments of believability than validity and when inhibitory demands are increased, the validity of an argument impacts more on belief judgments. These findings align with the new Parallel Processing model of belief bias.     

Do infants bind mental states to agents?

Recent findings suggest that infants understand others’ preferential choice and can use the perspectives and beliefs of others to interpret their actions. The standard interpretation in the field is that infants understand preferential choice as a dispositional state of the agent. It is possible, however, that these social situations trigger the acquisition of more general, not person-specific knowledge. In a looking-time study we showed an Agent A demonstrating a choice, that only could have been interpreted as preferential based on the perspective (and thus the belief) of the agent, not the observer. Then we introduced a new agent (Agent B), who chose consistently or inconsistently with Agent A; also varying whether Agent B was an adult or a child. Results show that infants expected Agent B (both the adult and the child) to choose as Agent A, but only in the condition where according to Agent A’s knowledge two objects were present in familiarization(confirming previous evidence on the importance of contrastive choice). We interpret these results in the following way: (1) infants do not encode the perspectives of other agents as person-specific sources of knowledge and (2) they learn about the object, rather than the agent’s disposition towards that object. We propose that early theory of mind processes lack the binding of belief content to the belief holder. However, such limitation may in fact serve an important function, allowing infants to acquire information through the perspectives of others in the form of universal access to general information.     

Lifespan aging and belief reasoning: Influences of executive function and social cue decoding

Older adults often perform poorly on Theory of Mind (ToM) tests that require understanding of others’ beliefs and intentions. The course and specificity of age changes in belief reasoning across the adult lifespan is unclear, as is the cause of the age effects. Cognitive and neuropsychological models predict that two types of processing might influence age differences in belief reasoning: executive functioning and social cue detection. In the current study we assessed 129 adults aged between 18 and 86 on novel measures of ToM (video clips and verbal vignettes), which manipulated whether true or false belief reasoning was required. On both video and verbal tasks, older adults (aged 65–88) had specific impairments in false belief reasoning, but showed no such problem in performing true belief tasks. Middle-aged adults (aged 40–64) generally performed as well as the younger adults (aged 18–39). Difficulties in updating information in working memory (but not inhibitory problems) partially mediated the age differences in false belief reasoning. Also, the ability to decode biological motion, indexing social cue detection, partially mediated age-related variance in the ability to interpret false beliefs. These results indicate that age differences in decoding social cues and updating information in memory may be important influences on the specific problems encountered when reasoning about false beliefs in old age.     

No good deed goes unquestioned: Cynical reconstruals maintain belief in the power of self-interest

In four studies, we examined how people maintain beliefs that self-interest is a strong determinant of behavior, even in the face of disconfirming evidence. People reflecting on selfless behavior tend to reconstrue it in terms of self-interested motives, but do not similarly scrutinize selfish behaviors for selfless motives. Study 1 found that people react to new information that selfless behavior is common by interpreting it as more reflective of self-interest. Studies 2a and 2b, applying a Bayesian analysis, demonstrated that people see “too much” self-interest in seemingly selfless actions, given their prior beliefs, but see the predicted amount of self-interest in seemingly selfish actions. This demonstrates that people do not possess internally consistent belief systems, but rather undue cynicism. In Study 3, participants read about real philanthropists whose acts of generosity had been heralded by major news outlets. As participants spent more time considering why such philanthropy was performed, they formed more cynical impressions of the philanthropists' motives. Beyond offering insight into why belief in the norm of self-interest persists, these studies introduce a novel route by which beliefs resist disconfirmation.     

Physiological, psychological and behavioral consequences of activating autobiographical memories

Activating an autobiographical memory for a specific childhood event can have immediate and robust physiological, psychological, and behavioral consequences. The target behavior was public speaking, a vital skill about which many people are socially anxious. In this study, it was suggested to subjects that they had a positive public speaking experience in early childhood; they then thought about and retrieved details of this true childhood memory. Compared to a control condition in which a different suggestion was made, subjects in the treatment group exhibited superior public speaking performance on the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST). Further, physiological measures of cortisol and a self-report measure of anxiety (STAI-S) reflected a significantly smaller increase in anxiety from before to after the TSST in the treatment than control condition. Activating autobiographical memory for an event increases the accessibility of that memory and consequently affects performance on related behaviors.     

The two sides of adversity: the effect of distant versus recent adversity on updating emotional content in working memory

Previous research suggests that adversity can have both adaptive and maladaptive effects, yet the emotional and working memory processes that contribute to more or less adaptive outcomes are unclear. The present study sought to investigate how updating emotional content differs in adolescents who have experienced past, recent, or no adversity. Participants who had experienced distant adversity (N?=?53), no adversity (N?=?58), or recent adversity only (N?=?20) performed an emotion n-back task with emotional facial expressions. Results revealed that the distant adversity group exhibited significantly faster reaction times (RTs) than the no adversity and recent adversity only groups. In contrast, the recent adversity only group exhibited significantly slower RTs and more errors than the distant adversity and no adversity groups. These results suggest an emotion and executive control pathway by which both the benefits and negative effects of adversity may be conferred. Results also highlight the importance of time in assessing the impact of adversity.