The effects of justice motivation on memory for self- and other-relevant events

We examined whether people might distort and selectively remember the past in ways that enable them to sustain a belief in a just world (BJW; Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum Press). In Study 1, recall of a lottery prize reflected participants’ justice concerns, such that the average lottery amount recalled was lowest when a “bad” versus “good” person won. In Study 2, an unrelated experience of just world threat (versus affirmation) enhanced biased recall of the lottery prize when the winner was undeserving. In Study 3, participants who experienced a fortuitous bad break selectively remembered more bad deeds from their recent past, whereas participants who experienced a good break selectively remembered more good deeds. Study 4 demonstrates that such selective memory biases specifically serve to portray chance outcomes as more fair. Taken together, these findings offer support for the notion that reconstructing and selectively recalling the past can serve to sustain a BJW.     

The inessential quasi-indexical

In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the “problem of the essential indexical” reveals is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account of belief which encompasses both explanatory roles and which still treats belief as a two-place relation between subjects and propositions.

心理定势现象的认知神经机制

问题解决活动中的心理定势,是指人们固执地沿用熟悉方案、忽略其他方案的反应倾向。它可能源于人们已经掌握的陈述性知识,也可能源于程序性知识,两类不同来源的心理定势的发生条件和影响效果都不尽相同。然而,过往的研究都没有做出严格区分。本文通过梳理相关研究,描述心理定势现象,解释心理定势是怎么发生的,分析心理定势是在什么条件下发生的、会对心理与行为活动造成什么样的影响,从而评述两种来源的心理定势的认知神经机制,指出尚未解决的科学问题。     

Fake feedback on pain tolerance impacts proactive versus reactive control strategies

It is well-known that beliefs about one’s own ability to execute a task influence task performance. Here, we tested the hypothesis that beliefs about a specific self-control capacity, namely pain tolerance, modulate basic cognitive control processes. Participants received fake comparative social feedback that their ability to tolerate painful stimulations was either very poor or outstanding after which they performed an unrelated go/no-go task. Participants receiving low-tolerance feedback, relative to high-tolerance feedback, were less successful at inhibiting their responses and more influenced by previous trial conditions, as indicated by an increased slowdown following errors and more failed inhibitions following go-trials. These observations demonstrate a shift from a more proactive to a more reactive control mode. This study shows that providing feedback about one’s own capacity to control impulsive reactions to painful stimulations directly influences low-level cognitive control dynamics.     

Assessing individual differences in the degree to which people are committed to following their beliefs

The authors developed a new dispositional measure of Commitment to Beliefs (CTB)—the degree to which people feel it is important to follow their value-expressive beliefs—across three phases of research. In Phases 1 and 2 (Studies 1-4), the CTB scale demonstrated strong internal consistency, and convergent and discriminant validity. Phase 3 demonstrated the scale’s predictive validity: high-CTB individuals were more likely to report engaging in activities during the past month and year that followed directly from their beliefs (Study 5), act on their beliefs when given the opportunity (Study 6), and show more polarized attitudes toward ideologically-relevant groups (Study 7). These findings illustrate the utility of a dispositional approach for examining the extent to which people follow their beliefs.     

Religion in the Twenty-First-Century World Society

This article presents the main theoretical approaches to the religious phenomenon: functionalism, constructivism, civil religion, invisible religion, diffused religion, rational choice, vicarious religion, and so on. It is difficult to accumulate empirical data that in general are considered too weak. The state of the art of sociology of religion seems promising because of the presence of new generations of sociologists who are deeply involved in their work. For the future a specific theory on migration mobility is necessary. Another necessity is a wider development of qualitative analysis for a better knowledge of religious dynamics.     

Handedness differences in information framing

Previous research has shown that strength of handedness predicts differences in sensory illusions, Stroop interference, episodic memory, and beliefs about body image. Recent evidence also suggests handedness differences in the susceptibility to common decision biases such as anchoring and sunk cost. The present paper extends this line of work to attribute framing effects. Sixty-three undergraduates were asked to advise a friend concerning the use of a safe allergy medication during pregnancy. A third of the participants received negatively-framed information concerning the fetal risk of the drug (1–3% chance of having a malformed child); another third received positively-framed information (97–99% chance of having a normal child); and the final third received no counseling information and served as the control. Results indicated that, as predicted, inconsistent (mixed)-handers were more responsive than consistent (strong)-handers to information changes and readily update their beliefs. Although not significant, the data also suggested that only inconsistent handers were affected by information framing. Theoretical implications as well as ongoing work in holistic versus analytic processing, contextual sensitivity, and brain asymmetry will be discussed.     

Is the spell really broken? Bio-psychological explanations of religion and theistic belief

Recent advances in the evolutionary and cognitive sciences of religion have raised questions about whether the assumptions and findings of these fields as applied to religion conflict with belief in gods. Specifically, three scientific approaches to religion (Neurotheology, Group Selection, and Cognitive Science of Religion) are sketched, and five arguments against theistic belief arising from these approaches are discussed and evaluated. None of the five arguments prove formidable challenges for belief in gods.     

The need to explain

How do reasoners deal with inconsistencies? James (1907) believed that the rational solution is to revise your beliefs and to do so in a minimal way. We propose an alternative: You explain the origins of an inconsistency, which has the side effect of a revision to your beliefs. This hypothesis predicts that individuals should spontaneously create explanations of inconsistencies rather than refute one of the assertions and that they should rate explanations as more probable than refutations. A pilot study showed that participants spontaneously explain inconsistencies when they are asked what follows from inconsistent premises. In three subsequent experiments, participants were asked to compare explanations of inconsistencies against minimal refutations of the inconsistent premises. In Experiment 1, participants chose which conclusion was most probable; in Experiment 2 they rank ordered the conclusions based on their probability; and in Experiment 3 they estimated the mean probability of the conclusions' occurrence. In all three studies, participants rated explanations as more probable than refutations. The results imply that individuals create explanations to resolve an inconsistency and that these explanations lead to changes in belief. Changes in belief are therefore of secondary importance to the primary goal of explanation.