Comparing in-the-moment skill coaching effects from tailored versus non-tailored acceptance and commitment therapy mobile apps in a non-clinical sample

Mobile apps are promising for teaching how to practice psychological skills in high-risk and in vivo momentary situations, but there has been minimal research on the immediate effects of app-based skill coaching on mental health in-the-moment. This study analyzed the mobile app data in a non-clinical sample of 39 adults participating in a larger randomized controlled trial, with participants randomized to an acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) mobile app that tailors skill coaching based on in-the-moment variables (n = 17) or an app that provides randomly selected skill coaching (n = 22). Data were collected before and after each ACT skill coaching session on proximal outcome (depression, anxiety, and engagement in meaningful activity) and ACT process variables. Multilevel models indicated significant immediate improvements on average following ACT skill coaching sessions on all proximal outcome and ACT process variables, although with relatively small effects ranging between 0.17 and 0.27 SD units change. Larger immediate pre-to-post effects from ACT coaching sessions were found for anxiety, experiential avoidance, and cognitive fusion in the tailored app versus random app condition. Overall, results suggest that an ACT app can have immediate, in-the-moment effects on psychological functioning, which may be enhanced by tailoring skills to current context.     

Believe What I Believe: Correspondence Between the Beliefs of Young Adults and the Perceived Beliefs of Their Caregivers

Little research has examined the mechanisms through which adult children adopt beliefs across a range of contexts. Through an online survey, the authors examined belief transmission via the correspondence between beliefs of 837 young adults and the perceived ideological beliefs of their caregivers as a function of attachment, parental behavior, and religious beliefs in four domains: moral, political, religious, and lifestyle. The strongest predictor of belief transmission across domains was the geographic location in which the participants were sampled, with individuals currently residing in the Southern region of the United States indicating greater belief transmission compared with those residing in the Midwestern region of the United States. Women also exhibited greater belief transmission compared with men. Controlling for these predictors, we also found that insecurity was negatively related to belief transmission, whereas authority, autonomy, and religious attachment were positively related to belief transmission in some contexts. Taken together, these results suggest that the relationships that young adults remembered having had with their primary caregivers were associated with the transmission of their caregivers’ beliefs.     

Modest deontologism in epistemology

Deontologism in epistemology holds that epistemic justification may be understood in terms of “deontological” sentences about what one ought to believe or is permitted to believe, or what one deserves praise for believing, or in some similar way. If deonotologism is true, and people have justified beliefs, then the deontological sentences can be true. However, some say, these deontological sentences can be true only if people have a kind of freedom or control over their beliefs that they do not in fact have. Thus, deontologism in epistemology, combined with anti-skepticism, has implausible implications. I first describe one sort of control that people typically have over ordinary actions but do not have over typical beliefs. I then argue that there is a paradigmatic type of epistemic evaluation that does properly apply to beliefs even though we lack this sort of control over them. Finally, I argue that these paradigmatic epistemic evaluations are sufficient to make true some of the deontological sentences.     

Preference-based belief revision for rule-based agents

Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent’s beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, we consider belief revision for agents which reason in a simpler logic than full first-order logic, namely rule-based reasoners. We show that it is possible to define a contraction operation for rule-based reasoners, which we call McAllester contraction, which satisfies all the basic Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) postulates for contraction (apart from the recovery postulate) and at the same time can be computed in polynomial time. We prove a representation theorem for McAllester contraction with respect to the basic AGM postulates (minus recovery), and two additional postulates. We then show that our contraction operation removes a set of beliefs which is least preferred, with respect to a natural interpretation of preference. Finally, we show how McAllester contraction can be used to define a revision operation which is also polynomial time, and prove a representation theorem for the revision operation.     

Probabilistic dynamic belief revision

We investigate the discrete (finite) case of the Popper–Renyi theory of conditional probability, introducing discrete conditional probabilistic models for knowledge and conditional belief, and comparing them with the more standard plausibility models. We also consider a related notion, that of safe belief, which is a weak (non-negatively introspective) type of “knowledge”. We develop a probabilistic version of this concept (“degree of safety”) and we analyze its role in games. We completely axiomatize the logic of conditional belief, knowledge and safe belief over conditional probabilistic models. We develop a theory of probabilistic dynamic belief revision, introducing probabilistic “action models” and proposing a notion of probabilistic update product, that comes together with appropriate reduction laws.     

In a Fitter Direction: Moving Beyond the Direction of Fit Picture of Belief and Desire

Those working within the tradition of Humean psychology tend to mark a clear distinction between beliefs and desires. One prominent way of elucidating this distinction is to describe them as having different “directions of fit” with respect to the world. After first giving a brief overview of the various attempts to carry out this strategy along with their flaws, I argue that the direction of fit metaphor is misleading and ought to be abandoned. It fails to take into account the actual complexity of the roles played by belief and desire and forces us to look for a single, fundamental contrast between these two that is unlikely to be found.

The phenomenological role of affect in the Capgras delusion

This paper draws on studies of the Capgras delusion in order to illuminate the phenomenological role of affect in interpersonal recognition. People with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been replaced by impostors. It is generally agreed that the delusion involves an anomalous experience, arising due to loss of affect. However, quite what this experience consists of remains unclear. I argue that recent accounts of the Capgras delusion incorporate an impoverished conception of experience, which fails to accommodate the role played by ‘affective relatedness’ in constituting (a) a sense of who a particular person is and (b) a sense of others as people rather than impersonal objects. I draw on the phenomenological concept of horizon to offer an interpretation of the Capgras experience that shows how the content ‘this entity is not my spouse but an impostor’ can be part of the experience, rather than something that is inferred from a strange experience.

La représentation des causes de l’état de santé par les infirmiers et les points de vue envisagés des patients et des aidants naturels : une approche socionormative

This study examines the representation of the determining factors of patients’ states of health in therapeutic care situations. We describe the average representation of experienced hospital nurses (n=44) and the differences which they consider to exist between their own and their patients’ points of view. Taking as our starting point the purpose of the care provided and the asymmetry of the carer/patient relationship, we hypothesize, on the one hand, that nurses will have a representation of their patients’ state of health which is based on the care to be provided, with the factors determining the state of health being necessarily perceived as having a general impact on patients’ lives while still being remediable, i.e. capable of changing and being controlled by the provided care. On the other hand, we expect them to attribute a passive position and attitude to their patients, with the factors determining their state of health being necessarily perceived as being out of their own control. The results and the analysis of the representations reported as being those of the patients and their families seem to justify this perception and role of carer: the supposed representations of the latter would appear to be convergent but less focused on health problems and would tend to minimize the patient’s involvement, in particular when the state of health declines. The results are discussed with reference to the Health Belief Model and the social norm of internality as well as the professional practices observed in hospital environments.     

Multiple Kernel Contraction

This paper focuses on the extension of AGM that allows change for a belief base by a set of sentences instead of a single sentence. In [FH94], Fuhrmann and Hansson presented an axiomatic for Multiple Contraction and a construction based on the AGM Partial Meet Contraction. We propose for their model another way to construct functions: Multiple Kernel Contraction, that is a modification of Kernel Contraction, proposed by Hansson [Han94] to construct classical AGM contractions and belief base contractions. This construction works out the unsolved problem pointed out by Hansson in [Han99, pp. 369]. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Local Change

An agent can usually hold a very large number of beliefs. However, only a small part of these beliefs is used at a time. Efficient operations for belief change should affect the beliefs of the agent locally, that is, the changes should be performed only in the relevant part of the belief state. In this paper we define a local consequence operator that only considers the relevant part of a belief base. This operator is used to define local versions of the operations for belief change. Representation theorems are given for the local operators.