The logic sense: exploring the role of executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgments

Abstract

The Default Interventionist account suggests that by default, we often generate belief-based responses when reasoning and find it difficult to draw the logical inference. Recent research, however, shows that in some instances belief judgments take longer, are more prone to error and are more affected by cognitive load. One interpretation is that some logical inferences are available automatically and require intervention in order to respond according to beliefs. In two experiments, we investigate the effortful nature of belief judgments and the automaticity of logical inferences by increasing the inhibitory demands of the task. Participants were instructed to judge conclusion validity, believability and either font colour or font style, to increase the number of competing responses. Results showed that conflict more strongly affects judgments of believability than validity and when inhibitory demands are increased, the validity of an argument impacts more on belief judgments. These findings align with the new Parallel Processing model of belief bias.     

Do infants bind mental states to agents?

Recent findings suggest that infants understand others’ preferential choice and can use the perspectives and beliefs of others to interpret their actions. The standard interpretation in the field is that infants understand preferential choice as a dispositional state of the agent. It is possible, however, that these social situations trigger the acquisition of more general, not person-specific knowledge. In a looking-time study we showed an Agent A demonstrating a choice, that only could have been interpreted as preferential based on the perspective (and thus the belief) of the agent, not the observer. Then we introduced a new agent (Agent B), who chose consistently or inconsistently with Agent A; also varying whether Agent B was an adult or a child. Results show that infants expected Agent B (both the adult and the child) to choose as Agent A, but only in the condition where according to Agent A’s knowledge two objects were present in familiarization(confirming previous evidence on the importance of contrastive choice). We interpret these results in the following way: (1) infants do not encode the perspectives of other agents as person-specific sources of knowledge and (2) they learn about the object, rather than the agent’s disposition towards that object. We propose that early theory of mind processes lack the binding of belief content to the belief holder. However, such limitation may in fact serve an important function, allowing infants to acquire information through the perspectives of others in the form of universal access to general information.     

Lifespan aging and belief reasoning: Influences of executive function and social cue decoding

Older adults often perform poorly on Theory of Mind (ToM) tests that require understanding of others’ beliefs and intentions. The course and specificity of age changes in belief reasoning across the adult lifespan is unclear, as is the cause of the age effects. Cognitive and neuropsychological models predict that two types of processing might influence age differences in belief reasoning: executive functioning and social cue detection. In the current study we assessed 129 adults aged between 18 and 86 on novel measures of ToM (video clips and verbal vignettes), which manipulated whether true or false belief reasoning was required. On both video and verbal tasks, older adults (aged 65–88) had specific impairments in false belief reasoning, but showed no such problem in performing true belief tasks. Middle-aged adults (aged 40–64) generally performed as well as the younger adults (aged 18–39). Difficulties in updating information in working memory (but not inhibitory problems) partially mediated the age differences in false belief reasoning. Also, the ability to decode biological motion, indexing social cue detection, partially mediated age-related variance in the ability to interpret false beliefs. These results indicate that age differences in decoding social cues and updating information in memory may be important influences on the specific problems encountered when reasoning about false beliefs in old age.     

No good deed goes unquestioned: Cynical reconstruals maintain belief in the power of self-interest

In four studies, we examined how people maintain beliefs that self-interest is a strong determinant of behavior, even in the face of disconfirming evidence. People reflecting on selfless behavior tend to reconstrue it in terms of self-interested motives, but do not similarly scrutinize selfish behaviors for selfless motives. Study 1 found that people react to new information that selfless behavior is common by interpreting it as more reflective of self-interest. Studies 2a and 2b, applying a Bayesian analysis, demonstrated that people see “too much” self-interest in seemingly selfless actions, given their prior beliefs, but see the predicted amount of self-interest in seemingly selfish actions. This demonstrates that people do not possess internally consistent belief systems, but rather undue cynicism. In Study 3, participants read about real philanthropists whose acts of generosity had been heralded by major news outlets. As participants spent more time considering why such philanthropy was performed, they formed more cynical impressions of the philanthropists' motives. Beyond offering insight into why belief in the norm of self-interest persists, these studies introduce a novel route by which beliefs resist disconfirmation.     

Physiological, psychological and behavioral consequences of activating autobiographical memories

Activating an autobiographical memory for a specific childhood event can have immediate and robust physiological, psychological, and behavioral consequences. The target behavior was public speaking, a vital skill about which many people are socially anxious. In this study, it was suggested to subjects that they had a positive public speaking experience in early childhood; they then thought about and retrieved details of this true childhood memory. Compared to a control condition in which a different suggestion was made, subjects in the treatment group exhibited superior public speaking performance on the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST). Further, physiological measures of cortisol and a self-report measure of anxiety (STAI-S) reflected a significantly smaller increase in anxiety from before to after the TSST in the treatment than control condition. Activating autobiographical memory for an event increases the accessibility of that memory and consequently affects performance on related behaviors.     

Knowledge Attributions and Behavioral Predictions

Recent work has shown that knowledge attributions affect how people think others should behave, more so than belief attributions do. This paper reports two experiments providing evidence that (a) knowledge attributions also affect behavioral predictions more strongly than belief attributions do, and (b) knowledge attributions facilitate faster behavioral predictions than belief attributions do. Thus, knowledge attributions play multiple critical roles in social cognition, guiding judgments about how people should and will behave.     

Analyzing behavior implied by EWA learning: An emphasis on distinguishing reinforcement from belief learning

An important issue in the field of learning is to what extent one can distinguish between behavior resulting from either belief or reinforcement learning. Previous research suggests that it is difficult or even impossible to distinguish belief from reinforcement learning: belief and reinforcement models often fit the empirical data equally well. However, previous research has been confined to specific games in specific settings. In the present study we derive predictions for behavior in games using the EWA learning model (e.g., Camerer & Ho, 1999), a model that includes belief learning and a specific type of reinforcement learning as special cases. We conclude that belief and reinforcement learning can be distinguished, even in 2×2 games. Maximum differentiation in behavior resulting from either belief or reinforcement learning is obtained in games with pure Nash equilibria with negative payoffs and at least one other strategy combination with only positive payoffs. Our results help researchers to identify games in which belief and reinforcement learning can be discerned easily.     

詹姆士真理观中的休谟因素

与常识的和传统的符合论真理观相比,由詹姆士第一次明确阐述的实用主义真理观有着诸多不同的特点,以及体现在这些特点中的不同的哲学内涵。这些特点和内涵都是怎样产生的呢?在认识论发展的历史进程中有无其根源?该文拟通过联系休谟的经验主义,尤其是他的因果理论,来追溯实用主义真理观的认识论根源。     

毛泽东与现代中国的完备型革命模式

世界文明史上有可能存在着这样一种革命,一种独特的革命方式,即以精神建构的方式来实现突变、做成政治的演替和社会的变革。而这种精神建构的革命模式,同样采用了暴力革命的方式。二十世纪现代中国的革命,实际上就是这样一种革命的模式。它以传统汤武革命为基础,整合了来自西方政治革命的理念,并给予当代中国以十分深刻的影响,几乎左右了中国人和中国社会生活的所有领域,构成了当代中国改革开放的潜在主题。