Response demands and the recruitment of heuristic strategies in syllogistic reasoning

Two experiments investigated whether dealing with a homogeneous subset of syllogisms with time-constrained responses encouraged participants to develop and use heuristics for abstract (Experiment 1) and thematic (Experiment 2) syllogisms. An atmosphere-based heuristic accounted for most responses with both abstract and thematic syllogisms. With thematic syllogisms, a weaker effect of a belief heuristic was also observed, mainly where the correct response was inconsistent with the atmosphere of the premises. Analytic processes appear to have played little role in the time-constrained condition, whereas their involvement increased in a self-paced, unconstrained condition. From a dual-process perspective, the results further specify how task demands affect the recruitment of heuristic and analytic systems of reasoning. Because the syllogisms and experimental procedure were the same as those used in a previous neuroimaging study by Goel, Buchel, Frith, and Dolan (2000), the result also deepen our understanding of the cognitive processes investigated by that study.     

Survival from the Brain's Perspective

The concern about man's harmful impact on the environment focuses attention on the external environment, i.e., the real world out there, which may not survive in a form to support life. But supporting life of an individual is in the hands of that individual's brain, which is primarily concerned with various needs of the internal environment, also referred to as the self. Confronted with diverse and often competing needs, the brain has evolved a complexity in man, which makes it doubtful that any one collective strategy may be effective in preserving the external environment.     

Why we can still believe the error theory

The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible to fully believe the error theory. Surprisingly, he claims that this is not a problem for the error theorist: even if we can’t fully believe the error theory, the good news is that we can still come close to believing the error theory. In this paper I show that Streumer’s arguments fail. First, I lay out Streumer’s argument for why we can’t believe the error theory. Then, I argue against the unbelievability of the error theory. Finally, I show that Streumer’s positive proposal that we can come close to believing the error theory is actually undermined by his own argument for why we can’t believe the error theory.     

Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription

It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought.     

Judging the implications of a concession: Conversational distance and belief bias effects

An arguer's position at a given point in an argument can be characterized as a set of commitments. The present study considers the perceptions of ordinary language users about the implications of making a concession for the contents of the conceder's commitment set. In particular, we examine two sources of influence on such lay perceptions—conversational distance (i.e., the number of turns separating the concession from commitments incurred earlier in the argument) and an individual's prior beliefs regarding the content of the argument. Across two studies, college students were administered an argument task assessing the extent to which a concession by the protagonist of an argument on the last move indicated changes to other commitments incurred earlier in the argument. Results indicated that participants were more likely to judge a concession as indicating a change in prior commitments if (a) the commitment was incurred later in the argument than earlier, and (b) the participant disagreed with the protagonists’ thesis in the argument. In addition, performance on deductive reasoning tasks predicted individual differences in the conversational distance effect, but not the belief bias effect.     

Measurement invariance of the Belief in a Zero‐Sum Game scale across 36 countries

In this paper, we examined the psychometric properties of cross‐cultural validation and replicability (i.e. measurement invariance) of the Belief in a Zero‐Sum Game (BZSG) scale, measuring antagonistic belief about interpersonal relations over scarce resources. The factorial structure of the BZSG scale was investigated in student samples from 36 countries (N = 9907), using separate confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) for each country. The cross‐cultural validation of the scale was based on multigroup confirmatory factor analyses (MGCFA). The results confirmed that the scale had a one‐factor structure in all countries, in which configural and metric invariance between countries was confirmed. As a zero‐sum belief about social relations perceived as antagonistic, BZSG is an important factor related to, for example, social and international relations, attitudes toward immigrants, or well‐being. The paper proposes different uses of the BZSG scale for cross‐cultural studies in different fields of psychology: social, political, or economic.     

Self-Doubt Effects Depend on Beliefs about Ability: Experimental Evidence

Past research has shown negative effects of chronic self-doubt on psychological and performance outcomes. Recent correlational evidence suggests that incremental beliefs about ability ameliorate certain self-doubt effects. The current research examines whether these correlational findings are robust when subjected to experimental testing. In Experiment 1, we manipulated beliefs about ability (incremental vs. entity) and demonstrated that changing beliefs about ability altered responses to self-doubt. For individuals primed with entity beliefs, higher self-doubt was associated with greater nervousness and poorer anagram performance; for individuals primed with incremental beliefs, self-doubt had no significant effects. Experiment 2 was a 2 (manipulated belief: incremental vs. entity) × 2 (self-doubt: doubt induction vs. control) factorial design. The result showed that self-doubt induction lowered self-esteem relative to control when people were primed with entity beliefs but did not affect self-esteem when incremental beliefs were primed. However, Experiment 1 results on affect and performance were not replicated in Experiment 2. Thus, although we provide some causal evidence that inducing individuals to adopt an ability-is-malleable mindset reduces the negative effects of self-doubt, further experimental work is required to study the moderating role of mindsets for self-doubt effects.     

The hand of God or the hand of Maradona? Believing in free will increases perceived intentionality of others’ behavior

The question of whether free will actually exists has been debated in philosophy for centuries. However, how belief in free will shapes the perception of our social environment still remains open. Here we investigate whether belief in free will affects how much intentionality we attribute to other people. Study 1a and 1b demonstrate a weak positive relation between the strength of belief in free will and the perceived intentionality of soccer players committing handball. This pattern even holds for behavior that is objectively not intentional (i.e., when the player touches the ball accidentally). Going one step further, in Study 2 we find a weak correlation between belief in free will and perceiving intentions in very abstract geometrical shapes. These findings suggest that whether individuals believe in free will or not changes the way they interpret others’ behavior, which may have important societal consequences.     

Towards mouse models of perseveration: a heritable component in extinction of operant behavior in fourteen standard and recombinant inbred mouse lines

Extinction of instrumental responses is an essential skill for adaptive behavior such as foraging. So far, only few studies have focused on extinction following appetitive conditioning in mice. We studied extinction of appetitive operant lever-press behavior in six standard inbred mouse strains (A/J, C3H/HeJ, C57BL/6J, DBA/2J, BALB/cByJ and NOD/Ltj) and eight recombinant inbred mouse lines. From the response rates at the end of operant and extinction training we computed an extinction index, with higher values indicating better capability to omit behavioral responding in absence of reward. This index varied highly across the mouse lines tested, and the variability was partially due to a significant heritable component of 12.6%.To further characterize the relationship between operant learning and extinction, we calculated the slope of the time course of extinction across sessions. While many strains showed a considerable capacity to omit responding when lever pressing was no longer rewarded, we found a few lines showing an abnormally high perseveration in lever press behavior, showing no decay in response scores over extinction sessions.No correlation was found between operant and extinction response scores, suggesting that appetitive operant learning and extinction learning are dissociable, a finding in line with previous studies indicating that these forms of learning are dependent on different brain areas. These data shed light on the heritable basis of extinction learning and may help develop animal models of addictive habits and other perseverative disorders, such as compulsive food seeking and eating.