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191.
Adam Pautz 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):335-347
I develop a problem for the Fregean Reference Shift analysis of that-clause reference. The problem is discussed by Stephen
Schiffer in his recent book The Things We Mean (2003). Either the defender of the Fregean Reference Shift analysis must count certain counterintuitive inferences as valid, or
else he must reject a plausible Exportation rule. I consider several responses. I find that the best response relies on a
Kaplan-inspired analysis of quantified belief reports. But I argue that this response faces some serious problems.
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Adam PautzEmail: |
192.
Robert Audi 《Synthese》2008,161(3):403-418
Most of the literature on doxastic voluntarism has concentrated on the question of the voluntariness of belief and the issue
of how our actual or possible control of our beliefs bears on our justification for holding them and on how, in the light
of this control, our intellectual character should be assessed. This paper largely concerns a related question on which less
philosophical work has been done: the voluntariness of the grounding of belief and the bearing of various views about this matter on justification, knowledge, and intellectual virtue. In part,
my concern is the nature and extent of our voluntary control over our responses to reasons for believing—or over what we take
to be such reasons. This paper provides a partial account of such control and, on the basis of the account, will clarify the
criteria for appraising intellectual virtue. 相似文献
193.
194.
Although the change of beliefs in the face of new information has been widely studied with some success, the revision of other
mental states has received little attention from the theoretical perspective. In particular, intentions are widely recognised as being a key attitude for rational agents, and while several formal theories of intention have been
proposed in the literature, the logic of intention revision has been hardly considered. There are several reasons for this: perhaps most importantly, intentions are very closely connected
with other mental states—in particular, beliefs about the future and the abilities of the agent. So, we cannot study them
in isolation. We must consider the interplay between intention revision and the revision of other mental states, which complicates
the picture considerably. In this paper, we present some first steps towards a theory of intention revision. We develop a
simple model of an agent’s mental states, and define intention revision operators. Using this model, we develop a logic of
intention dynamics, and then investigate some of its properties. 相似文献
195.
Simon J. Evnine 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(1):91-110
This paper offers two new arguments for a version of Reflection, the principle that says, roughly, that if one knew now what
one would believe in the future, one ought to believe it now. The most prominent existing argument for the principle is the
coherence-based Dutch Strategy argument advanced by Bas van Fraassen (and others). My two arguments are quite different. The
first is a truth-based argument. On the basis of two substantive premises, that people’s beliefs generally get better over
time and that being a person requires having knowledge of this fact, it concludes that it is rational to treat your future
selves as experts. The second argument is a transcendental one. Being a person requires being able to engage in plans and
projects. But these cannot be meaningfully undertaken unless one has Reflection-like expectations about one’s future beliefs.
Hence, satisfaction of Reflection is necessary for being a person. Together, the arguments show that satisfaction of Reflection
is both rational and necessary for persons.
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Simon J. EvnineEmail: |
196.
197.
Two experiments examined how 5- and 10-year-old children revise their category representations when exposed to exemplars that are congruent or incongruent with existing knowledge. During training children were presented with exemplars containing features that were congruent or incongruent with children's social stereotypes together with a stereotype-neutral feature. In the knowledge-subtyping condition this neutral feature predicted the stereotype-congruence of the other features. In the knowledge-standard condition the neutral feature was uncorrelated with stereotype-congruence. At test children made judgements about feature co-occurrence within the learned category. In each experiment these judgements were influenced by both stereotypical beliefs and exemplar observation. Stereotypical beliefs, however, had a greater influence on co-occurrence judgements in the knowledge-subtyping than in the standard conditions. In Experiment 2 these effects were shown to generalize to judgements about features that were not presented during training. These results challenge current models of knowledge-based categorization by showing that exemplar structure determines whether novel exemplar features are incorporated into category representations. 相似文献
198.
Belief-desire reasoning as a process of selection 总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7
Human learning may depend upon domain specialized mechanisms. A plausible example is rapid, early learning about the thoughts and feelings of other people. A major achievement in this domain, at about age four in the typically developing child, is the ability to solve problems in which the child attributes false beliefs to other people and predicts their actions. The main focus of theorizing has been why 3-year-olds fail, and only recently have there been any models of how success is achieved in false-belief tasks. Leslie and Polizzi (Inhibitory processing in the false-belief task: Two conjectures. Developmental Science, 1, 247-254, 1998) proposed two competing models of success, which are the focus of the current paper. The models assume that belief-desire reasoning is a process which selects a content for an agent's belief and an action for the agent's desire. In false belief tasks, the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) provides plausible candidate belief contents, among which will be a 'true-belief.' A second process reviews these candidates and by default will select the true-belief content for attribution. To succeed in a false-belief task, the default content must be inhibited so that attention shifts to another candidate belief. In traditional false-belief tasks, the protagonist's desire is to approach an object. Here we make use of tasks in which the protagonist has a desire to avoid an object, about which she has a false-belief. Children find such tasks much more difficult than traditional tasks. Our models explain the additional difficulty by assuming that predicting action from an avoidance desire also requires an inhibition. The two processing models differ in the way that belief and desire inhibitory processes combine to achieve successful action prediction. In six experiments we obtain evidence favoring one model, in which parallel inhibitory processes cancel out, over the other model, in which serial inhibitions force attention to a previously inhibited location. These results are discussed in terms of a set of simple proposals for the modus operandi of a domain specific learning mechanism. The learning mechanism is in part modular--the ToMM--and in part penetrable--the Selection Processor (SP). We show how ToMM-SP can account both for competence and for successful and unsuccessful performance on a wide range of belief-desire tasks across the preschool period. Together, ToMM and SP attend to and learn about mental states. 相似文献
199.
Sven Ove Hansson 《Studia Logica》2002,70(1):5-21
Analytical tools that give precision to the concept of "independence of syntax" are developed in the form of a series of substitutivity principles. These principles are applied in a study of the rôle of language in belief revision theory. It is shown that sets of sentences can be used in models of belief revision to convey more information than what is conveyed by the combined propositional contents of the respective sets. It is argued that it would be unwise to programmatically restrain the use of sets of sentences to that of representing propositional contents. Instead, the expressive power of language should be used as fully as possible. Therefore, syntax-independence should not be seen as a criterion of adequacy for language-based models of information-processing, but rather as a property that emerges from some but not all the idealization processes through which such models are constructed. 相似文献
200.
《Behavior Therapy》2023,54(5):719-733
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is purported to work via targeting six interrelated processes summarized as the Psychological Inflexibility/Psychological Flexibility (PI/PF) model. However, the theoretical structure and interconnections of this model have not been sufficiently explored. Lacking are examinations of the interrelations among its components. Network Analysis (NA) can model PI/PF as a system of interconnected variables. We aimed at exploring the role and associations of the PI/PF model’s components using NA in two different samples and sets of scales, and compare its structure across sub-samples. Sample 1 consisted of 501 individuals, who completed an online battery of questionnaires including the Multidimensional Psychological Flexibility Inventory, and Sample 2 consisted of 428 people, who completed an online set of six ACT measures, each assessing a component of the PI/PF model. NA could not verify the six ACT dimensions as distinct components. Values and Committed Action components were found to be strongly associated and combined in a group in both sets of measures and samples. Interestingly, Acceptance and Defusion were not the most central components as purported in some ACT conceptualizations, whereas Self-as-Context had a key role on both sets of measures and its items were often merged with Present Moment Awareness items. No significant differences were found in the comparison of networks across different subsamples and sets of scales. After combining different sets of scales, the six ACT components could not be completely verified as distinct entities, which might reflect problems with the theoretical model, or with the scales used. All components had critical roles in the model, particularly Self-as-Context, which reflects the need to redirect research towards this understudied construct. Findings point towards considerations of a triflex instead of a hexaflex ACT model. 相似文献