How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway

People acquire new beliefs in various ways. One of the most important of these is that new beliefs are acquired as a response to experiencing events that one did not expect. This involves a form of inference distinct from both deductive and inductive inference: abductive inference. The concept of abduction is due to the American pragmatist philosopher C. S. Peirce. Davies and Coltheart (in press) elucidated what Peirce meant by abduction, and identified two problems in his otherwise promising account requiring solution if that account were to become fully workable. Here we propose solutions to these problems and offer an explicit cognitive model of how people derive new beliefs from observations of unexpected events, based on Peirce’s work and Sokolov’s ideas about prediction error triggering new beliefs. We consider that this model casts light not only upon normal processes of belief formation but also upon the formation of delusional beliefs.     

Persistence and accommodation in short‐term priming and other perceptual paradigms: temporal segregation through synaptic depression

Perceptual input changes constantly in an unpredictable fashion, often changing before our somewhat sluggish perceptual systems have adequately processed this input. This can give rise to source confusion—how do we know whether a given perceptual activation is due to the current input, or a previous input that had yet to be completely processed? We propose that activity‐dependent neural accommodation naturally limits this source confusion by suppressing items once they have been identified. We review behavioral paradigms from different literatures that measure the correlates of persistence and accommodation. Of the various accommodative mechanisms, we focus on synaptic depression, deriving a rate‐coded expression that can be used to produce accommodating dynamics in any neural network with real valued activation. We implement this expression in a hierarchical model of perception termed, “a neural mechanism for responding optimally with unknown sources of evidence” (nROUSE). This model can be viewed as a more detailed version of the more abstract ROUSE model of Huber, Shiffrin, Lyle, and Ruys (2001), which produces accommodated levels of feature evidence through an optimal calculation. We apply nROUSE to three short‐term priming experiments that manipulated prime duration.     

The weirdness of belief in free will

It has been argued that belief in free will is socially consequential and psychologically universal. In this paper we look at the folk concept of free will and its critical assessment in the context of recent psychological research. Is there a widespread consensus about the conceptual content of free will? We compared English “free will” with its lexical equivalents in Lithuanian, Hindi, Chinese and Mongolian languages and found that unlike Lithuanian, Chinese, Hindi and Mongolian lexical expressions of “free will” do not refer to the same concept free will. What kind people have been studied so far? A review of papers indicate that, overall, 91% of participants in studies on belief in free will were WEIRD. Thus, given that free will has no cross-culturally universal conceptual content and that most of the reviewed studies were based on WEIRD samples, belief in free will is not a psychological universal.     

The sound-board account of reasoning: A one-system alternative to dual-process theory

In order to explain the effects found in the heuristics and biases literature, dual-process theories of reasoning claim that human reasoning is of two kinds: Type-1 processing is fast, automatic, and associative, while Type-2 reasoning is slow, controlled, and rule based. If human reasoning is so divided, it would have important consequences for morality, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Although dual-process theorists have typically argued for their position by way of an inference to the best explanation, they have generally failed to consider alternative hypotheses. Worse still, it is unclear how we might test dual-process theories. In this article, I offer a one-system theory, which I call the Sound-Board Account of Reasoning, according to which there is one reasoning system which is flexible, allowing the properties used to distinguished Type-1 and Type-2 reasoning to cross-cut one another. I empirically distinguish my theory from the two dominant versions of dual-process theory (parallel-competitive and default-interventionist dual-process theory) and argue that my theory’s predictions are confirmed over both of these versions of dual-process theory.     

The Influence of Activation Level on Belief Bias in Relational Reasoning

A novel explanation of belief bias in relational reasoning is presented based on the role of working memory and retrieval in deductive reasoning, and the influence of prior knowledge on this process. It is proposed that belief bias is caused by the believability of a conclusion in working memory which influences its activation level, determining its likelihood of retrieval and therefore its effect on the reasoning process. This theory explores two main influences of belief on the activation levels of these conclusions. First, believable conclusions have higher activation levels and so are more likely to be recalled during the evaluation of reasoning problems than unbelievable conclusions, and therefore, they have a greater influence on the reasoning process. Secondly, prior beliefs about the conclusion have a base level of activation and may be retrieved when logically irrelevant, influencing the evaluation of the problem. The theory of activation and memory is derived from the Atomic Components of Thought‐Rational (ACT‐R) cognitive architecture and so this account is formalized in an ACT‐R cognitive model. Two experiments were conducted to test predictions of this model. Experiment 1 tested strength of belief and Experiment 2 tested the impact of a concurrent working memory load. Both of these manipulations increased the main effect of belief overall and in particular raised belief‐based responding in indeterminately invalid problems. These effects support the idea that the activation level of conclusions formed during reasoning influences belief bias. This theory adds to current explanations of belief bias by providing a detailed specification of the role of working memory and how it is influenced by prior knowledge.     

Reasoning about highly emotional topics: Syllogistic reasoning in a group of war veterans

Previous studies have generally found that emotion impairs logical reasoning. However, laboratory experiments have typically involved relatively mild levels of emotion where affect is not linked to personal experience. In this study we examined how army veterans reasoned about syllogisms of three types: neutral, generally emotional, and combat-related emotional. We also measured intensity of combat experience. Veterans were more likely to provide logically accurate answers when reasoning about combat-related compared to neutral problems. Participants with more intense combat experiences showed a reduced advantage in reasoning about combat-related emotional problems.     

Belief in luck and luckiness: Conceptual clarification and new measure validation

Research on the dimensionality and measurement of luck beliefs has yet to produce a clear conceptual and metrical consensus. This research theorizes a bidimensional model of luck beliefs that is tested through a series of studies (total n = 1205) validating the new Belief in Luck and Luckiness Scale. Unlike existing conceptualizations and measures, this new model is applicable to both believers and non-believers in luck, and reveals belief in luck and personal luckiness to be discrete, uncorrelated, and respectively unidimensional constructs.     

The Idea of Different Folk Psychologies

The idea of different folk psychologies is the idea that among the world's cultures there are those whose folk, or commonsense, psychologies differ in theoretically significant ways from each other and from western folk psychology. This challenges the claim that folk psychology is a 'cultural universal'. The paper looks first of all at what are called 'opulent' accounts of folk psychology, which employ a wide-ranging and more complex set of psychological concepts, and 'core' accounts, which employ a much more restricted set of such concepts. With respect to both kinds of account it is argued that field studies of the folk-psychological concepts of a number of ethnic groups indicate significant differences between the concepts used by those groups and those of western folk psychology; and hence do not support the view that folk psychology is a cultural universal.     

Learning from examples does not prevent order effects in belief revision

A common finding is that information order influences belief revision (e.g., Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992 Hogarth, R. M. and Einhorn, H. J. 1992. Order effects in belief updating: The belief-adjustment model. Cognitive Psychology, 24: 1–55. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). We tested personal experience as a possible mitigator. In three experiments participants experienced the probabilistic relationship between pieces of information and object category through a series of trials where they assigned objects (planes) into one of two possible categories (hostile or commercial), given two sequentially presented pieces of probabilistic information (route and ID), and then they had to indicate their belief about the object category before feedback. The results generally confirm the predictions from the Hogarth and Einhorn model. Participants showed a recency effect in their belief revision. Extending previous model evaluations the results indicate that the model predictions also hold for classification decisions, and for pieces of information that vary in their diagnostic values. Personal experience does not appear to prevent order effects in classification decisions based on sequentially presented pieces of information and in belief revision.     

Qualitative elicitation of affective beliefs related to physical activity

ObjectivesBased on previous research that has identified affective attitude as a distinct predictor of physical activity (PA) behavior, the purpose of this pilot study was to elicit affective beliefs toward physical activity using qualitative data generated through specific open-ended questions.MethodsA sample of 126 undergraduate students participated in this study. Four open-ended questions based on the theory of planned behavior were posed to elicit affective beliefs. A content analysis was used to categorize and code data by theme based on common responses that emerged in the elicitation. A frequency count of the responses falling into each category was then conducted to establish which affective beliefs were the most common. The themes were established by two researchers and reviewed for internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity by a third party.ResultsThe results highlight key beliefs related to affective attitude. In descending rank order; Social Involvement, Pleasant Body States, Esteem, Improved Psychological Outcome, and General Enjoyment were the most common affective beliefs for PA involvement. Feelings arising from Time Issues/Conflict, Physical Unpleasantness, PA Environment, and Necessity/Obligation were the most common negative affective beliefs.ConclusionsThe results suggest that promoting enjoyment rather than necessity of PA and encouraging variety in PA may be effective. Addressing the importance of aesthetically pleasing environments and highlighting social interaction as a strategy rather than merely a norm or a form of support in behavioral research may be important.