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41.
Ronney Mourad 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,63(1-3):55-69
This article defends a regulative ethics of voluntary belief. In order to determine the occasion and the scope of such an
ethics, the article begins with an examination of the concept of belief in conversation with the view of J. L. Schellenberg.
Next, against the dominant position in contemporary epistemology, it argues that some beliefs can be voluntary, in the sense
that they are under the immediate control of the believer, and replies to William Alston’s influential objections to doxastic
voluntarism. If some beliefs are subject to the immediate control of the believer, then in these cases believers are ethically
responsible not only for how they investigate those beliefs, but also for the choice of whether or not to believe them. The
article concludes by formulating and defending two types of regulative ethical principles governing voluntary belief. 相似文献
42.
Christopher J. G. Meacham 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(2):245-269
This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David
Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account
does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not.
Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. The proposed
account also leads to counterintuitive consequences, but they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account, and no worse than
those of Lewis’ account.
相似文献
Christopher J. G. MeachamEmail: |
43.
Timothy Chan 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):395-414
In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually
contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the
functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA),
the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean
assertions are absurd, and that BAA explains why they are. I shall argue that ATB implies that some Moorean assertions are,
in some fairly ordinary contexts, well justified. Thus BAA and ATB are mutually inconsistent. In the concluding section I
explore three possible ways of responding to the dilemma, and what implications they have for the nature of the constitutive
relationships linking belief, assent and behavioural dispositions.
相似文献
Timothy ChanEmail: |
44.
In the political context of the reauthorization of federal welfare reform legislation, a nationally representative sample of 1,570 adults in the United States completed a survey examining the factors that affect attitudes and policy preferences with regard to aid for low-income individuals and families in the United States. This study utilized an innovative survey technique, the factorial survey methodology (Rossi & Nock, 1982), which allows for the simultaneous experimental manipulation of a large number of factors through the use of a vignette. This research demonstrates how the portrayal of difficulties faced by people in need and the ways in which they attempt to overcome these difficulties affect support for policies designed to aid low-income individuals and families. In addition, this study of public attitudes considers the role that psychological orientations of the evaluators play in judgments of families in need. In this case, we examined how the evaluators' belief that the world is a just place influences their evaluations of deservingness. Consistent with our expectations, we found that the more efforts the vignette subject engaged in improving her situation, the less deserving of government benefits she was judged to be by respondents with a strong belief in a just world. The reverse was found among respondents with a weaker belief: more efforts were associated with greater judgments of deservingness. 相似文献
45.
D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):419-437
I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception?
Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal”
or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections
to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action
in a way that exemplifies the motivational role of belief. Furthermore, by applying independent criteria of what it is for
a mental state to be a belief, I defend the more intuitive view that being self-deceived that p entails believing that p. Beliefs (i) are the default for action relative to other cognitive attitudes (such as imagining and hypothesis) and (ii)
have cognitive governance over the other cognitive attitudes. I explicate these two relations and argue that they obtain for
the product of self-deception.
相似文献
D. S. Neil Van LeeuwenEmail: |
46.
We develop a conceptual and formal clarification of notion of surprise as a belief-based phenomenon by exploring a rich typology. Each kind of surprise is associated with a particular phase of
cognitive processing and involves particular kinds of epistemic representations (representations and expectations under scrutiny,
implicit beliefs, presuppositions). We define two main kinds of surprise: mismatch-based surprise and astonishment. In the central part of the paper we suggest how a formal model of surprise can be integrated with a formal model of belief change. We investigate the role of surprise in triggering the process of belief reconsideration. There are a number of models of
surprise developed in the psychology of emotion. We provide several comparisons of our approach with those models.
相似文献
Cristiano Castelfranchi (Corresponding author)Email: |
47.
48.
Andrés Páez 《Synthese》2009,170(1):131-146
In this paper I critically examine the notion of explanation used in artificial intelligence in general, and in the theory of belief revision in particular. I focus on two of the best known accounts in the literature: Pagnucco’s abductive expansion functions and Gärdenfors’ counterfactual analysis. I argue that both accounts are at odds with the way in which this notion has historically been understood in philosophy. They are also at odds with the explanatory strategies used in actual scientific practice. At the end of the paper I outline a set of desiderata for an epistemologically motivated, scientifically informed belief revision model for explanation. 相似文献
49.
中世纪二元对立型社会治理模式与基督教信念伦理 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本文深入分析了欧洲中世纪二元对立型社会治理模式与基督教信念伦理的深层成因、基本特征、主要内容及其二者的内在关联性,指出了它们被近现代民主法治型社会治理模式和规范伦理取代的历史必然性。 相似文献
50.
In this article we strive to provide a detailed and principled analysis of the role of beliefs in goal processing—that is,
the cognitive transition that leads from a mere desire to a proper intention. The resulting model of belief-based goal processing has also relevant consequences for the analysis of intentions, and constitutes the necessary core of a constructive theory of intentions, i.e. a framework that not only analyzes what an intention is, but also explains how it becomes what it is. We discuss similarities
and differences between our approach and other standard accounts of intention, in particular Bratman’s planning theory. The
aim here is to question and refine the conceptual foundations of many theories of intentional action: as a consequence, although
our analysis is not formal in itself, it is ultimately meant to have deep consequences for formal models of intentional agency. 相似文献