Zero‐sum thinking as mediator of the relationship of national attitudes with (un)willingness to host refugees in own country

This study examines factors related to willingness to host refugees. We examined the role of national attitudes (patriotism, nationalism), out‐group attitudes (classic and modern prejudice), and zero‐sum thinking: Belief in a Zero‐Sum Game and psychological entitlement in attitudes towards hosting refugees. We proposed including zero‐sum thinking as possible mediator between national attitudes and attitudes towards refugees based on assumption that nationalism is a competitive attitude towards out‐groups, while patriotism does not. Structural equation modelling based on a Polish national sample (N = 1092) revealed that patriotism is positively associated with willingness to host refugees, through its negative association with prejudice via decreasing zero‐sum thinking. Nationalism was negatively associated with willingness to host refugees, through prejudice via increasing zero‐sum thinking. Findings are discussed in the context of current refugee policies.     

Rigidity of the far‐right? Motivated social cognition in a nationally representative sample of Hungarians on the eve of the far‐right breakthrough in the 2010 elections

We investigated the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis in the context of the far‐right breakthrough in the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary elections. This hypothesis suggests that psychological characteristics having to do with need for security and certainty attract people to a broad‐based right‐wing ideology. A nationally representative sample (N = 1000) in terms of age, gender and place of residence was collected by means of the random walking method and face‐to‐face interviews. Voters of JOBBIK (n = 124), the radically nationalist conservative far‐right party, scored lower on System Justifying Belief, Belief in a Just World (Global) and higher on Need for Cognition than other voters. Our results contradict the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis: JOBBIK voters scored, on many measures, opposite to what the hypothesis would predict.     

Episodic development in preschool children's play-prompted and direct-elicited narratives

This study investigated the premise that action, manifested here through pretend play, is a semiotic arena that can enhance narrative development. It was hypothesized that children would produce structurally more complex narratives in play-prompted elicitation than in direct elicitation conditions, and that this competence would increase with age. Thirty Turkish 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, with 10 children per age group, participated in the study. Children's narratives were analyzed according to a story grammar framework that differentiated between pre-episodic and episodic structures. A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant effect between age and type of elicitation condition. Narratives displaying an episodic structure with temporal–causally integrated components were observed in the play-prompt elicitation condition by 4-year-olds and in the direct elicitation condition by 5-year-olds, supporting the hypothesis that action helps enhance narrative development. It is concluded that the emerging competence of children to construct narratives with episodic structures can best be observed in play contexts where action and objects scaffold both the conceptual organization and its expression.     

Gricean Belief Change

One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal fashion to assimilate exactly the new information. In this form of belief change, when the reasoner revises by new information p ∨ q their belief corpus is modified so that p∨q is believed but stronger propositions like p∧q are not, no matter what beliefs are in the reasoner's initial corpus. We term this conservative belief change since the revised belief corpus is a conservative extension of the original belief corpus given the new information.     

The Refined Extension Principle for Semantics of Dynamic Logic Programming

Over recent years, various semantics have been proposed for dealing with updates in the setting of logic programs. The availability of different semantics naturally raises the question of which are most adequate to model updates. A systematic approach to face this question is to identify general principles against which such semantics could be evaluated. In this paper we motivate and introduce a new such principle the refined extension principle. Such principle is complied with by the stable model semantics for (single) logic programs. It turns out that none of the existing semantics for logic program updates, even though generalisations of the stable model semantics, comply with this principle. For this reason, we define a refinement of the dynamic stable model semantics for Dynamic Logic Programs that complies with the principle.     

A Closer Look at the Yardstick: A New Discount Rate Measure with Precision and Range

In intertemporal choice research, choice tasks (i.e., choosing between $80 today and $100 in a year) are often used to elicit a discount rate. The discount rate derived from a choice task, however, is largely restricted by the granularities and ranges of the questions asked. We examined this restriction in three popular discount rate measurements using simulations and experiments, and we propose an alternative procedure (Three‐option Adaptive Discount rate measure (ToAD)), which is capable of measuring a wide range of discount rates (from approximately .035% to 350 000% annual percentage rate) with high precision using 10 questions, in under a minute. ToAD can be easily implemented in online surveys (i.e., Qualtrics). Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Two Facets of Belief

Abstract

I begin by contrasting two facets of belief: that belief is a response to a sufficiency of evidence and that belief plays a role in one’s representation of reality. I claim that these conceptions of belief are in tension because whilst the latter – Representationalism – requires Logical Coherence of belief the former – Thresholdism – conflicts with Logical Coherence. Thus we need to choose between conceptions. Many have argued that the Preface Paradox supports Thresholdism. In contrast I argue that Representationalism has a more plausible response to the paradox.     

The effects of strong belief structures on information-processing evaluations and choice

This study examined the influence of the strength of belief structures on selected aspects of the decision-making process. To examine these issues, a business-acquisition decision scenario was studied in an experiment. Subjects played the role of a CEO of an electronics firm and were asked to evaluate the attractiveness of six potential acquisition candidates and to rate various aspects of the associated decision process. We presented half the subjects with information that the belief structure of their organization was extreme, agreed upon, and clear. The other half was presented with information that there was disagreement about the belief structure and that it was more ambiguous and less extreme. The results clearly showed that the decision process is different for people who were presented with an agreed-upon, extreme, and tightly constructed belief structure when compared to those who received information reflecting a weak and loosely constructed belief structure. A strong belief structure resulted in less positive evaluations, information requested, and money allocated to explore incompatible acquisition candidates (and vice versa for a highly compatible candidate) when compared to subjects using a weak belief structure. In addition, subjects in the strong-belief condition reported that their decision process would be characterized by less doubt, less time, less difficulty, and less conflict compared to subjects in the weak-belief structure condition. Implications for both decision theory and practical decision processes are discussed.     

Non‐Scientific Criteria for Belief Sustain Counter‐Scientific Beliefs

Why is evolutionary theory controversial among members of the American public? We propose a novel explanation: allegiance to different criteria for belief. In one interview study, two online surveys, and one nationally representative phone poll, we found that evolutionists and creationists take different justifications for belief as legitimate. Those who accept evolution emphasize empirical evidence and scientific consensus. Creationists emphasize not only the Bible and religious authority, but also knowledge of the heart. These criteria for belief remain predictive of views about evolution even when taking into account other related factors like religion, political affiliation, and education. Each view is supported by its own internally specified criteria for what constitutes a justified belief. Changing minds may thus require changing epistemic norms.