It’s in your nature: a pluralistic folk psychology

I suggest a pluralistic account of folk psychology according to which not all predictions or explanations rely on the attribution of mental states, and not all intentional actions are explained by mental states. This view of folk psychology is supported by research in developmental and social psychology. It is well known that people use personality traits to predict behavior. I argue that trait attribution is not shorthand for mental state attributions, since traits are not identical to beliefs or desires, and an understanding of belief or desire is not necessary for using trait attributions. In addition, we sometimes predict and explain behavior through appeal to personality traits that the target wouldn’t endorse, and so could not serve as the target’s reasons. I conclude by suggesting that our folk psychology includes the notion that some behavior is explained by personality traits—who the person is—rather than by beliefs and desires—what the person thinks. Consequences of this view for the debate between simulation theory and theory theory, as well as the debate on chimpanzee theory of mind are discussed.     

On the belief in God: Towards an understanding of the emotional substrates of compensatory control

We suggest that beliefs in a controlling God originate, at least in part, from the desire to avoid the emotionally uncomfortable experience of perceiving the world as random and chaotic. Forty-seven participants engaged in an anxiety-provoking visualization procedure. For half, the procedure included a manipulation designed to temporarily lower beliefs in personal control. As predicted, it was only among those participants whose sense of personal control was threatened—i.e., participants in need of an alternate means for protecting their belief in a non-random world—that subjective anxiety led to increased subsequent beliefs in the existence of a controlling God. Wide-ranging implications are discussed.     

Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief

Evidentialism is the view that facts about whether or not an agent is justified in having a particular belief are entirely determined by facts about the agent’s evidence; the agent’s practical needs and interests are irrelevant. I examine an array of arguments against evidentialism (by Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath, David Owens, and others), and demonstrate how their force is affected when we take into account the relation between degrees of belief and outright belief. Once we are sensitive to one of the factors that secure thresholds for outright believing (namely, outright believing that p in a given circumstance requires, at the minimum, that one’s degree of belief that p is high enough for one to be willing to act as if p in the circumstances), we see how pragmatic considerations can be relevant to facts about whether or not an agent is justified in believing that p—but largely as a consequence of the pragmatic constraints on outright believing.

原型表征对创造性问题解决过程中的启发效应的影响

以32个科学发明创造问题为实验材料, 采用“学习8个原型-测试8个问题”的两阶段实验范式, 通过操纵原型学习条件(是否有标识或插图)考察了原型的知识表征对创造性问题解决的启发效应的影响, 结果发现：1)标识对原型的激活率在无插图水平上有显著影响, 有标识比无标识原型的激活率更高, 在有插图水平上无显著影响; 插图对原型的激活率有显著影响, 有插图比无插图原型的激活率更高。2)标识和插图都对问题解决的正确率有显著影响, 有标识比无标识正确率更高, 有插图比无插图正确率更高。3)标识和插图在原型激活率和问题解决正确率上都存在显著交互作用, 反映出原型启发的思维过程是复杂的, 表现出灵活性、经济性的特点。     

竞争与情绪对顿悟的原型启发效应的影响

以汉字字谜为材料, 采用“原型学习-问题测试”范式, 考察不同竞争水平(高、中、低竞争强度和无竞争)情境下诱发的情绪效价(积极、中性和消极)对顿悟中的原型启发的影响。结果发现：1)竞争水平对字谜问题解决中的原型启发有显著影响, 低强度竞争水平最有利于靶字谜问题的解决, 中等强度和高强度下效果次之, 无竞争条件下效果最差; 2)诱发情绪对靶字谜问题解决的原型启发也有显著影响, 消极情绪和中性情绪下比积极情绪下靶字谜的正确率更高; 3)有无竞争与情绪效价之间的交互作用显著, 体现了竞争和情绪这两种动力相关因素在原型启发中的动力作用不是独立的。     

System JLZ – rational default reasoning by minimal ranking constructions

We present a powerful quasi-probabilistic default formalism for graded defaults based on a well-motivated canonical ranking construction procedure, System JLZ. It implements the minimal construction paradigm and verifies the major inference principles and inheritance desiderata, including rational monotony for propositions and structured cumulativity for default conditionals. With help from a structured ranking semantics for defaults, it also avoids some drawbacks of semi-qualitative entropy maximization and other competing accounts.     

Beliefs do not come in degrees

Philosophers commonly say that beliefs come in degrees (or that beliefs are graded or that there are partial beliefs). Drawing from the literature, I make precise three arguments for this claim: an argument from degrees of confidence, an argument from degrees of firmness, and an argument from natural language. I show that they all fail. I also advance three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees: an argument from natural language, an argument from intuition, and an argument from the metaphysics of degrees. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that beliefs do not come in degrees.     

Justice organisationnelle et croyance en un monde juste : perceptions et réactions des dirigeants d’entreprise vis-à-vis de leurs managers (in)justes

Introduction and objectivesFew studies analyzed the reactions of a company head according to the degree of organizational justice adopted by his managers towards their subordinates. Similarly, the links between organizational justice and belief in a just world have rarely been studied. The aim of this research is to examine whether the three dimensions of organizational justice implemented by a manager have role of supervisor who had to value a manager who adopted, on each of the three dimensions of organizational justice, a just vs. unjust conduct. Participants were also asked about their belief in a just world an impact on the perceptions and reactions of the supervisor of the manager, and if the degree of belief in a just world mediates these perceptions and reactions.MethodIn terms of method, 410 men and women with a professional activity held the role of supervisor who had to value a manager who adopted, on each of the three dimensions of organizational justice, a just vs. unjust conduct. Participants were also asked about their belief in a just world, with a differentiation between personal belief in a just world versus belief in a just world to others.ResultsThe results show main effects and interaction effects between the three forms of justice on the manager's perception score, intends to award him a bonus, and the amount of assigned bonus. The results also indicate an influence of the degree of personal just world belief on the evaluation of the manager, but without interaction between just world belief and the dimensions of organizational justice.ConclusionsThe conclusion summarizes the main findings, examines their limits and deals with their theoretical and practical implications.     

The effect of perspective-taking on reasoning about strong and weak belief-relevant arguments

This study investigated whether perspective-taking reduces belief bias independently of argument strength. Belief bias occurs when individuals evaluate belief-consistent arguments more favourably than belief-inconsistent arguments. Undergraduates (n = 93) read arguments that varied with respect to belief-consistency (i.e., belief-consistent or belief-inconsistent) and strength (i.e., strong or weak) about the topic of climate change. After participants read each argument, those in the perspective-taking condition rated the argument's strength from a perspective of a climate scientist and then from their own perspectives, whereas those in the no perspective-taking condition only rated the arguments from their own perspectives. Perspective-taking eliminated belief bias for weak arguments, but not for strong arguments. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed, and directions for future research are provided.     

Modeling ratings of in-vehicle alerts to pedestrian by leveraging field operational tests data in a controlled laboratory study

We show how to leverage expensive field operational tests (FOT) data in a controlled laboratory study when defining an in-vehicle algorithm that alerts drivers to pedestrians. We used an empirical approach that quantifies the relative level with which drivers are likely to accept alerts to pedestrians. The approach was used in two studies to investigate a range of contextual factors known to influence driver ratings of alerts to pedestrians issued by a driver-assistance system. Regression analysis shows that four factors consisting of combinations of pedestrian location and motion relative to the road ahead of the vehicle explain 85% of the variability in drivers’ ratings of alerts. Adding two factors related to the uncertainty of the pedestrians’ future path improves the model slightly. These findings suggest that drivers’ assessment of the danger associated with pedestrians derives largely from the possibility that they might move into the vehicle’s path, even when the vehicle is not on a collision course with the pedestrians. The less probable such an event seems, the less accepted an alert will be. Time to arrival (TTA) improved the regression model only when restricted to pedestrians in clear need of an alert, but was also found to have an effect in alert timing. This finding suggests that four contextual factors largely define the perceptual cues that drivers use to rate alerts to pedestrians.