“集体主义—个体主义”的差异:来自基因、大脑的证据

文章以"集体主义—个体主义"这一基本文化差异维度为基础,围绕文化、基因和大脑之间的关系,介绍了国内外最新研究进展。研究显示当人类执行各种文化任务时,那些为人类生存提供有力帮助的基因会被选择和保留下来;在自我表征,注意和知觉,决策、情绪和意向推断等心理状态或过程上的"集体主义—个体主义"文化差异都可追溯到脑功能的差异。研究者先后提出社会脑假设、文化—基因协同进化论、神经—文化交互作用模型等理论来解释基因、文化与大脑交互作用的现象。文章分析了当前研究中存在的问题,并对未来的研究进行了展望。     

Non‐Bayesian Noun Generalization in 3‐ to 5‐Year‐Old Children: Probing the Role of Prior Knowledge in the Suspicious Coincidence Effect

It is unclear how children learn labels for multiple overlapping categories such as “Labrador,” “dog,” and “animal.” Xu and Tenenbaum (2007a) suggested that learners infer correct meanings with the help of Bayesian inference. They instantiated these claims in a Bayesian model, which they tested with preschoolers and adults. Here, we report data testing a developmental prediction of the Bayesian model—that more knowledge should lead to narrower category inferences when presented with multiple subordinate exemplars. Two experiments did not support this prediction. Children with more category knowledge showed broader generalization when presented with multiple subordinate exemplars, compared to less knowledgeable children and adults. This implies a U‐shaped developmental trend. The Bayesian model was not able to account for these data, even with inputs that reflected the similarity judgments of children. We discuss implications for the Bayesian model, including a combined Bayesian/morphological knowledge account that could explain the demonstrated U‐shaped trend.     

Examining the association between psychological wellbeing with daily and intra-individual variation in subjective wellbeing

A number of studies identify distinct dimensions of psychological and subjective wellbeing. However, few investigations have examined how these distinctive wellbeing dimensions may be related over time. The present study aimed to contribute to this growing body of research by adopting a measurement burst design to examine the association between psychological functioning with daily and intra-individual variation in affect over a 14-day period, controlling for personality. Participants (N = 45) comprised a sample of Australian adults from Canberra, Australia who were observed on up to 14 days over a 2-week period (Mobs = 10.9 (SD = 3.1)). Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates from a multi-level structural equation model identified psychological functioning as only weakly associated with daily positive affect, and unrelated to daily levels of negative affect and intra-individual variation in both affect domains when adjusting for demographic, personality and daily stressors. Positive and negative daily events were most strongly associated with positive and negative feelings, respectively. Post-hoc analysis within a Bayesian context confirmed our ML results whilst a Monte Carlo simulation identified sufficient statistical power of significant parameters. Overall, evidence for an association between psychological functioning and daily affect was not identified.     

Do Bettors Correctly Perceive Odds? Three Studies of How Bettors Interpret Betting Odds as Probabilistic Information

This paper reports on three studies investigating how accurately bettors (=people who regularly bet on sports events) interpret the probabilistic information implied by betting odds. All studies were based on data collected by web surveys prompting a total of 186 experienced bettors to convert sets of representative odds into frequency judgments. Bayesian statistical methods were used to analyze the data. From the results, the following conclusions were made: (i) On the whole, the bettors produced well‐calibrated judgments, indicating that they have realistic perceptions of odds. (ii) Bettors were unable to consciously adjust judgments for different margins. (iii) Although their interval judgments often covered the estimates implied by the odds, the bettors tended to overestimate the variation of expected profitable bets between months. The results are consistent with prior research showing that people tend to make accurate probability judgments when faced with tasks characterized by constant and clear feedback. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A dissociation between selective attention and conscious awareness in the representation of temporal order information

Previous electrophysiological studies have shown that attentional selection processes are highly sensitive to the temporal order of task-relevant visual events. When two successively presented colour-defined target stimuli are separated by a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of only 10 ms, the onset latencies of N2pc components to these stimuli (which reflect their attentional selection) precisely match their objective temporal separation. We tested whether such small onset differences are accessible to conscious awareness by instructing participants to report the category (letter or digit) of the first of two target-colour items that were separated by an SOA of 10, 20, or 30 ms. Performance was at chance level for the 10 ms SOA, demonstrating that temporal order information which is available to attentional control processes cannot be utilized for conscious temporal order judgments. These results provide new evidence that selective attention and conscious awareness are functionally separable, and support the hypothesis that attention and awareness operate at different stages of cognitive processing.     

A Duet for one

This paper considers communication in terms of inference about the behaviour of others (and our own behaviour). It is based on the premise that our sensations are largely generated by other agents like ourselves. This means, we are trying to infer how our sensations are caused by others, while they are trying to infer our behaviour: for example, in the dialogue between two speakers. We suggest that the infinite regress induced by modelling another agent – who is modelling you – can be finessed if you both possess the same model. In other words, the sensations caused by others and oneself are generated by the same process. This leads to a view of communication based upon a narrative that is shared by agents who are exchanging sensory signals. Crucially, this narrative transcends agency – and simply involves intermittently attending to and attenuating sensory input. Attending to sensations enables the shared narrative to predict the sensations generated by another (i.e. to listen), while attenuating sensory input enables one to articulate the narrative (i.e. to speak). This produces a reciprocal exchange of sensory signals that, formally, induces a generalised synchrony between internal (neuronal) brain states generating predictions in both agents. We develop the arguments behind this perspective, using an active (Bayesian) inference framework and offer some simulations (of birdsong) as proof of principle.     

Identifying expectations about the strength of causal relationships

When we try to identify causal relationships, how strong do we expect that relationship to be? Bayesian models of causal induction rely on assumptions regarding people’s a priori beliefs about causal systems, with recent research focusing on people’s expectations about the strength of causes. These expectations are expressed in terms of prior probability distributions. While proposals about the form of such prior distributions have been made previously, many different distributions are possible, making it difficult to test such proposals exhaustively. In Experiment 1 we used iterated learning—a method in which participants make inferences about data generated based on their own responses in previous trials—to estimate participants’ prior beliefs about the strengths of causes. This method produced estimated prior distributions that were quite different from those previously proposed in the literature. Experiment 2 collected a large set of human judgments on the strength of causal relationships to be used as a benchmark for evaluating different models, using stimuli that cover a wider and more systematic set of contingencies than previous research. Using these judgments, we evaluated the predictions of various Bayesian models. The Bayesian model with priors estimated via iterated learning compared favorably against the others. Experiment 3 estimated participants’ prior beliefs concerning different causal systems, revealing key similarities in their expectations across diverse scenarios.     

Polytomous multilevel testlet models for testlet‐based assessments with complex sampling designs

A pplications of standard item response theory models assume local independence of items and persons. This paper presents polytomous multilevel testlet models for dual dependence due to item and person clustering in testlet‐based assessments with clustered samples. Simulation and survey data were analysed with a multilevel partial credit testlet model. This model was compared with three alternative models – a testlet partial credit model (PCM), multilevel PCM, and PCM – in terms of model parameter estimation. The results indicated that the deviance information criterion was the fit index that always correctly identified the true multilevel testlet model based on the quantified evidence in model selection, while the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria could not identify the true model. In general, the estimation model and the magnitude of item and person clustering impacted the estimation accuracy of ability parameters, while only the estimation model and the magnitude of item clustering affected the item parameter estimation accuracy. Furthermore, ignoring item clustering effects produced higher total errors in item parameter estimates but did not have much impact on the accuracy of ability parameter estimates, while ignoring person clustering effects yielded higher total errors in ability parameter estimates but did not have much effect on the accuracy of item parameter estimates. When both clustering effects were ignored in the PCM, item and ability parameter estimation accuracy was reduced.