Hierarchical models of simple mechanisms underlying confidence in decision making

Choice confidence is a central measure in psychological decision research, often being reported on a probabilistic scale. Simple mechanisms that describe the psychological processes underlying choice confidence, including those based on error and confirmation biases, have typically received support via fits to data averaged over subjects. While averaged data ease model development, they can also destroy important aspects of the confidence data distribution. In this paper, we develop a hierarchical model of raw confidence judgments using the beta distribution, and we implement two simple confidence mechanisms within it. We use Bayesian methods to fit the hierarchical model to data from a two-alternative confidence experiment, and we use a variety of Bayesian tools to diagnose shortcomings of the simple mechanisms that are overlooked when applied to averaged data. Bugs code for estimating the models is also supplied.     

多级评分模型下的题库结构对CAT的影响分析

在多级评分模型下,项目的难度参数或步骤参数有多个,在对多级评分模型进行选题时,通常对项目的多个难度参数用一个综合的指标来概括.当对每个项目的难度参数进行有效的综合后,综合后的难度参数分布发生了改变,这时如果增加适量的平均难度较难或较易的项目进入题库,测验的精度和项目的曝光率都有一定的改善.     

手机依赖的计算机化自适应测量及其效果评估

本文深入探讨了手机依赖的新的测量方式即计算机化自适应测量,并同时与原手机依赖的纸笔测验量表进行了比较,以探讨在相同测量长度下,新测量方式能在多大程度上提升对手机依赖的测量精度及测量信度。为此本文共进行了两项研究:研究1开发构建了手机依赖的计算机化自适应测量(CAT-MPD),并探讨了其测量的特征与性能。研究2通过对真实数据的模拟CAT测试,以CAT-MPD来源的纸笔测验量表为比较对象,考察CAT-MPD对原纸笔量表测量精度及测量信度的提升幅度。研究结果表明:CAT-MPD具有较理想的测量精度和信度,而且能有效减少被试所测项目量;同时,在同等条件下,CAT-MPD不论是在测量的精度还是测量的信度,均大幅优于手机依赖的纸笔测验量表。总之,本文为手机依赖的实际测量提供了一种新的技术支持。     

The animacy advantage for free-recall performance is not attributable to greater mental arousal

People often demonstrate better memory for animate concepts (e.g., lion and sailor) than for inanimate concepts (e.g., hammer and mountain). Researchers have attributed this effect to an adaptive memory mechanism that favours information relevant for survival, including information about living things. In the present experiment, we examined the hypothesis that people demonstrate better free-recall performance for animate than inanimate words because animate words tend to be associated with greater mental arousal than inanimate words, a factor that was not controlled for in previous experiments on this topic. To this end, we matched animate and inanimate word lists on mental arousal (and several other factors), and compared participants’ free-recall performance for the two word types. We were able to replicate past findings that participants’ free-recall of animate words exceeds their free-recall of inanimate words, but we found no support for the possibility that the effect stems from differences in mental arousal between animate and inanimate concepts, as this effect maintained even when the word lists were matched on mental arousal. The present results therefore indicate that mental arousal cannot explain the effects of animacy on free-recall performance.     

A Duet for one

This paper considers communication in terms of inference about the behaviour of others (and our own behaviour). It is based on the premise that our sensations are largely generated by other agents like ourselves. This means, we are trying to infer how our sensations are caused by others, while they are trying to infer our behaviour: for example, in the dialogue between two speakers. We suggest that the infinite regress induced by modelling another agent – who is modelling you – can be finessed if you both possess the same model. In other words, the sensations caused by others and oneself are generated by the same process. This leads to a view of communication based upon a narrative that is shared by agents who are exchanging sensory signals. Crucially, this narrative transcends agency – and simply involves intermittently attending to and attenuating sensory input. Attending to sensations enables the shared narrative to predict the sensations generated by another (i.e. to listen), while attenuating sensory input enables one to articulate the narrative (i.e. to speak). This produces a reciprocal exchange of sensory signals that, formally, induces a generalised synchrony between internal (neuronal) brain states generating predictions in both agents. We develop the arguments behind this perspective, using an active (Bayesian) inference framework and offer some simulations (of birdsong) as proof of principle.     

自我感神经心理模型与人格同一性

如何解释“自我”是认知神经科学要面对的一个难题。临床研究发现,人脑右半球的联想区可将源自身体的感知和心智的理知整合成统一体验,即“自我感”,这是理解主观经验“我性”的一种新模型。这种新模型将神经层次的自我感与临床上对自我障碍症状研究相结合,为自我感的神经心理过程提供了一个统一解释框架,以说明人的自我认知特征和感知经验的神经心理过程。这种自我感的神经心理过程可被视为适应性表征过程,这为哲学上的人格同一性问题提供了临床经验解释,表明了神经心理过程可整合到统一经验中,从而形成一个统一的自我主观经验。