Subtle activation of a social categorization triggers group-level emotions

Previous research [Smith, E. R., Seger, C. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2007). Can emotions be truly group-level? Evidence regarding four conceptual criteria. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 431-446] has demonstrated that when people are explicitly asked about the emotions they experience as members of a particular group, their reported emotions converge toward a profile typical for that group. Two studies demonstrate that the same type of convergence occurs when a group identity is made situationally salient through priming, without an explicit request to report group-level emotions. People who identify more strongly with the group converge more, and show more similarity between their group-primed emotions and explicitly reported group-level emotions. This research confirms that activating a social identity produces convergence for emotions as well as for attitudes and behaviors. It also suggests that some previous emotion research may have tapped group rather than individual-level emotions, potentially requiring some reconceptualization.     

Effects of stimulus duration and choice delay on visual categorization in pigeons

We [Lazareva, O. F., Freiburger, K. L., & Wasserman, E. A. (2004). Pigeons concurrently categorize photographs at both basic and superordinate levels. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 11, 1111-1117] previously trained four pigeons to classify color photographs into their basic-level categories (cars, chairs, flowers, or people) or into their superordinate-level categories (natural or artificial). Here, we found that brief stimulus durations had the most detrimental effect on the basic-level discrimination of natural stimuli by the same pigeons. Increasing the delay between stimulus presentation and choice responding had greater detrimental effect on the basic-level discrimination than the superordinate-level discrimination. These results suggest that basic-level discriminations required longer stimulus durations and were more subject to forgetting than were superordinate-level discriminations. Additionally, categorization of natural stimuli required longer stimulus durations than categorization of artificial stimuli, but only at the basic level. Together, these findings suggest that basic-level categorization may not always be superior to superordinate-level categorization and provide additional evidence of a dissociation between natural and artificial stimuli in pigeons’ categorization.     

Effects of past language experience and present language context on the shape bias in Spanish–English bilingual children

English‐monolingual children develop a shape bias early in language acquisition, such that they more often generalize a novel label based on shape than other features. Spanish‐monolingual children, however, do not show this bias to the same extent (Hahn & Cantrell, 2012). Studying children who are simultaneously learning both Spanish and English presents a unique opportunity to further investigate how this word‐learning bias develops. Thus, we asked how Spanish–English bilingual children (M_age = 21.31 months) perform in a novel‐noun generalization (NNG) task, specifically examining how past language experience (i.e. language exposure and vocabulary size) and present language context (i.e. whether the NNG task was conducted in Spanish or English) influence the strength of the shape bias. Participants completed the NNG task either entirely in English (N = 16) or entirely in Spanish (N = 16), as well as language understanding tasks in both English and Spanish to ensure that they understood what the experimenter was asking them to do. Parents completed a language exposure survey and vocabulary checklists in Spanish and English. There was a significant interaction between condition and choice type: Bilingual children in the English condition showed a shape bias in the NNG task, but bilingual children in the Spanish condition showed no reliable biases. No measures of past language experience were related to NNG task performance. These results suggest that when learning new words, bilingual children are attuned to the regularities of the present language context, and prior language experiences may play a more secondary role.     

义符在中文名词和动词分类中的作用

通过3个实验,考察了义符在中文名词和动词分类中的作用。实验1表明,义符提供了重要的语法种类信息,在中文名词和动词分类中有重要作用。当义符与词类一致时分类快,与词类相反时对分类起干扰作用。实验2表明,高频词分类时间短,错误率亦低。义符和词频有显著的交互作用,义符对低频词分类作用更大。实验3表明,具体性高的词分类时间短,错误率亦低。义符和具体性之间无显著的交互作用。整个研究表明,义符不仅是结构的“块”,也是语义的“块”,还是语法的“块”。所以如此,与中文名词和动词的结构特点有关。中文名词大多用义符标记事物的物质组成,动词大多用义符标记动作发出的器官或完成动作的工具。义符的语法意义的发现丰富了中文和中文认知的理论,对中文教学也有重要启示     

The Impact of Stimuli Color in Lexical Decision and Semantic Word Categorization Tasks

In two experiments, we examined the impact of color on cognitive performance by asking participants to categorize stimuli presented in three different colors: red, green, and gray (baseline). Participants were either asked to categorize the meaning of words as related to the concepts of “go” or “stop” (Experiment 1) or to indicate if a neutral verbal stimulus was a word or not (lexical decision task, Experiment 2). Overall, we observed performance facilitation in response to go stimuli presented in green (vs. red or gray) and performance inhibition in response to go stimuli presented in red. The opposite pattern was observed for stop‐related stimuli. Importantly, results also indicated that color might also be used to categorize neutral stimuli. Overall, these findings provide support to the green‐go and red‐stop color associations and test the potential functional autonomy acquired by these colors and the boundary conditions to their effects on stimuli categorization.     

Crossed-categorization, evaluation, and face recognition

We investigated the relationship between evaluative intergroup bias and biased errors in intergroup face recognition after crossed-categorization (the combination of two social categories in defining a target of perception). Although evaluative bias and recognition bias often operate in parallel, we draw on two previously unconnected literatures to predict a divergence between these two processes after crossed-categorization. We tested this hypothesis by assessing participants’ evaluations of and recognition of targets who shared two ingroups with participants, targets who shared only one ingroup with participants, and targets who shared neither ingroup. Consistent with predictions, targets’ shared and unshared group memberships combined additively to affect evaluation, but targets who shared two ingroup memberships were better recognized than all other category combinations. These results document the relationship between evaluative bias and recognition bias after crossed-categorization and indicate that crossed-categorization affects evaluative bias and recognition bias in different ways.     

Categorization Deficit in Old Age: Reality or Artefact?

When categorization behaviour is compared between young and elderly adults, results usually show a decrease in taxonomic choices along with an increase in thematic choices. This can be interpreted in two ways: a decline in the ability to perceive and use taxonomic relations, or a modification of conceptual preferences with aging related to a bias stemming from material which favours young adults. We evaluated the second hypothesis by studying whether the salience of categorical associations could explain the differences generally observed between young and elderly adults. This hypothesis was tested on 25 young subjects (M = 45.3 years, SD =5.6 years) and 30 elderly subjects (M = 71.5 years, SD = 7.1 years) using a matching task: individual judgments were used to build triads in which a target was presented along with a strong and a weak associate. In line with our hypothesis, both age groups were influenced by associative strength and type of relation in the same way. Results are interpreted with Baltes’s [1987, Developmental Psychology, 23, 611–626] model.     

Anxiety, Attributional Thinking, and the Primary Process

In earlier publications, experimental evidence was provided for the existence of the primary vs. secondary process mental organization posited by Freud. A well-established cognitive categorization test based on attributional and relational similarity was found to map on to primary and secondary principles of mental organization respectively, thus offering the opportunity to test hypotheses drawn from psychoanalytic theory independent of the clinical situation. In prior work, primary process shifts occurred under three different conditions-all predicted by psychoanalytic theory: (1) when stimuli were (subliminal) unconscious; (2) when participants were 3-5 years of age; and (3) when tasks were implicit. In the current study, a fourth condition is examined dealing with the relationship of conscious anxiety to primary and secondary processes. In a naturalistic study, 120 patients waiting in medical center waiting rooms rated how anxious they felt on a 10-point scale and then completed a version of the categorization test alluded to above. Those who reported any anxiety at all showed a signifi cant shift toward primary process categorization over those participants who rated themselves as calm. The implications of this fourth fi nding are discussed with respect to signal anxiety and symptom formation.     

Information Processing and Dynamics in Minimally Cognitive Agents

There has been considerable debate in the literature about the relative merits of information processing versus dynamical approaches to understanding cognitive processes. In this article, we explore the relationship between these two styles of explanation using a model agent evolved to solve a relational categorization task. Specifically, we separately analyze the operation of this agent using the mathematical tools of information theory and dynamical systems theory. Information‐theoretic analysis reveals how task‐relevant information flows through the system to be combined into a categorization decision. Dynamical analysis reveals the key geometrical and temporal interrelationships underlying the categorization decision. Finally, we propose a framework for directly relating these two different styles of explanation and discuss the possible implications of our analysis for some of the ongoing debates in cognitive science.