Human Self-Domestication and the Evolution of Pragmatics

As proposed for the emergence of modern languages, we argue that modern uses of languages (pragmatics) also evolved gradually in our species under the effects of human self-domestication, with three key aspects involved in a complex feedback loop: (a) a reduction in reactive aggression, (b) the sophistication of language structure (with emerging grammars initially facilitating the transition from physical aggression to verbal aggression); and (c) the potentiation of pragmatic principles governing conversation, including, but not limited to, turn-taking and inferential abilities. Our core hypothesis is that the reduction in reactive aggression, one of the key factors in self-domestication processes, enabled us to fully exploit our cognitive and interactional potential as applied to linguistic exchanges, and ultimately to evolve a specific form of communication governed by persuasive reciprocity—a trait of human conversation characterized by both competition and cooperation. In turn, both early crude forms of language, well suited for verbal aggression/insult, and later more sophisticated forms of language, well suited for persuasive reciprocity, significantly contributed to the resolution and reduction of (physical) aggression, thus having a return effect on the self-domestication processes. Supporting evidence for our proposal, as well as grounds for further testing, comes mainly from the consideration of cognitive disorders, which typically simultaneously present abnormal features of self-domestication (including aggressive behavior) and problems with pragmatics and social functioning. While various approaches to language evolution typically reduce it to a single factor, our approach considers language evolution as a multifactorial process, with each player acting upon the other, engaging in an intense mutually reinforcing feedback loop. Moreover, we see language evolution as a gradual process, continuous with the pre-linguistic cognitive abilities, which were engaged in a positive feedback loop with linguistic innovations, and where gene-culture co-evolution and cultural niche construction were the main driving forces.     

Socially Situated Transmission: The Bias to Transmit Negative Information is Moderated by the Social Context

Cultural evolutionary theory has identified a range of cognitive biases that guide human social learning. Naturalistic and experimental studies indicate transmission biases favoring negative and positive information. To address these conflicting findings, the present study takes a socially situated view of information transmission, which predicts that bias expression will depend on the social context. We report a large-scale experiment (N = 425) that manipulated the social context and examined its effect on the transmission of the positive and negative information contained in a narrative text. In each social context, information was progressively lost as it was transmitted from person to person, but negative information survived better than positive information, supporting a negative transmission bias. Importantly, the negative transmission bias was moderated by the social context: Higher social connectivity weakened the bias to transmit negative information, supporting a socially situated account of information transmission. Our findings indicate that our evolved cognitive preferences can be moderated by our social goals.     

Empirical Evidence for Extended Cognitive Systems

We present an empirically supported theoretical and methodological framework for quantifying the system-level properties of person-plus-tool interactions in order to answer the question: “Are person-plus-tool-systems extended cognitive systems?” Nineteen participants provided perceptual judgments regarding their ability to pass through apertures of various widths while using visual information, blindfolded wielding a rod, or blindfolded wielding an Enactive Torch—a vibrotactile sensory-substitution device for detecting distance. Monofractal, multifractal, and recurrence quantification analyses were conducted to assess features of person-plus-tool movement dynamics. Trials where people utilized the rod or Enactive Torch demonstrated stable “self-similarity,” or indices of healthy and adaptive single systems, regardless of aperture width, trial order, features of the participants’ judgments, and participant characteristics. Enactive Torch trials exhibited a somewhat greater range of dynamic fluctuations than the rod trials, as well as less movement recurrence, suggesting that the Enactive Torch allowed for more exploratory movements. Findings provide support for the notion that person-plus-tool systems can be classified as extended cognitive systems and a framework for quantifying system-level properties of these systems. Implications concerning future research on extended cognition are discussed.     

Dynamics Versus Development in Numerosity Estimation: A Computational Model Accurately Predicts a Developmental Reversal

Perceptual judgments result from a dynamic process, but little is known about the dynamics of number-line estimation. A recent study proposed a computational model that combined a model of trial-to-trial changes with a model for the internal scaling of discrete numbers. Here, we tested a surprising prediction of the model—a situation in which children's estimates of numerosity would be better than those of adults. Consistent with the model simulations, task contexts led to a clear developmental reversal: children made more adult-like, linear estimates when to-be-estimated numbers were descending over trials (i.e., backward condition), whereas adults became more like children with logarithmic estimates when numbers were ascending (i.e., forward condition). In addition, adults’ estimates were subject to inter-trial differences regardless of stimulus order. In contrast, children were not able to use the trial-to-trial dynamics unless stimuli varied systematically, indicating the limited cognitive capacity for dynamic updates. Together, the model adequately predicts both developmental and trial-to-trial changes in number-line tasks.     

Active or Inert? An Experimental Comparison of Creative Ideation across Incubation Periods

The primary objective of this study was to contribute to the growing research discipline investigating the effects of physical exercise on divergent thinking creativity performance. Thirty‐two students participated in this two‐visit, within‐subject intervention. Individuals consented to participate in two randomized, and counterbalanced, experimental conditions, consisting of 15 min of active treadmill walking and an inert, seated control incubation period. Creativity was assessed at baseline and post‐exercise (and control) via the Instances Creativity Task (ICT). Creativity scores for changes in fluency (F(1, 31) = 2.90, p = .10) were not statistically significant across the experimental conditions. Originality scores were higher at baseline and follow‐up when compared to the exercise condition (F(1, 31) = 6.82, p = .01). However, there was no statistically significant condition × time interaction effect (F(1, 31) = 1.78, p = .19). Further analyses demonstrated that there was no statistically significant difference between the experimental conditions on recall score (F(1, 31) = 1.04, p = .32). All models indicated statistically significant main effects for time: fluency (F(1, 31) = 131.17, p < .001); originality (F(1, 31) = 36.54, p < .001); and recall (F(1, 31) = 51.75, p < .001). These findings suggest that both active and inert creative incubation periods may similarly enhance subsequent divergent thinking performance.     

替代性创伤与具身情绪

具身情绪是在近年来大热的具身认知领域影响下提出的便于研究情绪的理论,主要表现为情绪是由生理反应及情境等共同作用影响的; 而替代性创伤是用以描述心理工作者因长期接触创伤后患者对其进行危机干预,而出现类似的创伤反应和身心不良症状的概念。这两者在形成结构上存在相似之处。本文对这两个概念进行介绍,从具身的视角描述了替代性创伤的成因,最后结合实际对未来研究探讨与展望。     

忘我问卷的编制及其信效度检验

通过文献分析和访谈,阐明忘我的概念与结构,并编制了忘我问卷。采用现场发放和网络问卷的方式对607名被试进行忘我问卷的初测。接着,对357名被试施测正式问卷,进行信度、效度检验。探索性因素分析显示,忘我问卷由3个因子构成; 验证性因素分析表明该量表拟合良好(RMSEA=0.07,NFI=0.95,CFI=0.95,GFI=0.92,AGFI=0.89)。问卷总体一致性系数为0.89,3个因子的内部一致性系数在0.84-0.88之间。问卷总体得分与效标问卷特质焦虑得分呈负相关(-0.51),与安适幸福感、正念觉知的得分呈正相关(分别为0.36、0.31)。忘我问卷具有良好的信度和效度,可在后续的相关研究和实践中作为测量问卷或评估工具使用。     

Theory and Effects in Consumer Psychology

Drawing on Calder, Brendl, Tybout, and Sternthal’s (2021) discussion of constructs and variables, I suggest that the verification approach’s focus on variables fosters a plethora of disconnected “effects” and a dearth of integrative theorizing in consumer behavior research. I discuss how publication practices and incentive structures are likely to contribute to these phenomena.     

I did not expect to be dreaming: Explaining realization in lucid dreams with a Bayesian framework

The commonsense view is that a lucid dream starts when the dreamer realizes that they are currently dreaming. The notion of realization, however, has been accepted at face value, with little consideration of whether the dreamer realizes that they are dreaming in the sense of actual reasoning, or if it is a mere epiphenomenon of lucid dream initiation. This article offers a solution to this problem by, first, arguing that the transition to lucidity can occur as a result of successful reasoning, and second, building a model of this reasoning in terms of probabilistic reasoning. The established Bayesian model explains realization in lucid dreams taking under consideration two factors: the beliefs that the dreamer holds on what is generally probable and improbable, and the dreamer’s admissibility of being in a dream. Defended against important objections, the model offers an explanation of lucid dream initiation, relevant for future research on dreaming.     

Direct social perception of others’ subjective time

In this paper, I deploy Gallagher et al.’s theory of Direct Social Perception (DSP) to help explain how we perceive others’ subjective time. This process of second-person temporal perception plays an important role in interpersonal interaction, yet is often glossed over in discussions of intersubjectivity. Using A.D. Craig (2009) ‘awareness’ model of subjective time to unify converging evidence that subjective time is embodied, affective, and situated, I argue that subjective time cannot be considered as a hidden or invisible aspect of a private mind, but is partially externally visible through our gestures, expressions, and other behaviours as they unfold within a particular context. My central thesis is that, in face to face interactions, we are able to directly perceive these visible components of other people’s subjective time. This is made possible by our “enculturated” (Menary, 2015) and enactive perceptual faculties. The process of social perception is not a passive, unidirectional affair where static information about one person’s subjective time is transmitted to the other, but rather inextricably linked with action (both at the personal and subpersonal level) and interaction effects produced by a dynamic coupling between participants. Such an enactive perspective reveals how others’ subjective time can be perceived in everyday interactions.