The role of robotic modelling in cognitive science

From the perspective of cognitive robotics, this paper presents a modern interpretation of Newell’s (1973) reasoning and suggestions for why and how cognitive psychologists should develop models of cognitive phenomena. We argue that the shortcomings of current cognitive modelling approaches are due in significant part to a lack of exactly the kind of integration required for the development of embodied autonomous robotics. Moreover we suggest that considerations of embodiment, situatedness, and autonomy, intrinsic to cognitive robotics, provide an appropriate basis for the integration and theoretic cumulation that Newell argued was necessary for psychology to mature. From this perspective we analyse the role of embodiment and modes of situatedness in terms of integration, cognition, emotion, and autonomy. Four complementary perspectives on embodied and situated cognitive science are considered in terms of their potential to contribute to cognitive robotics, cognitive science, and psychological theorizing: minimal cognition and organization, enactive perception and sensorimotor contingency, homeostasis and emotion, and social embedding. In combination these perspectives provide a framework for cognitive robotics, not only wholly compatible with the original aims of cognitive modelling, but as a more appropriate methodology than those currently in common use within psychology.     

Reply to Wilkinson

In his review of my book Whose Body is It Anyway, Wilkinson criticises the view (which I defend) that confiscating live body parts for the sake of the needy is (under some circumstances) a requirement of justice. Wilkinson makes the following three points: (a) the confiscation thesis is problematic on its own terms; (b) there is a way to justify coercive resource transfers without being committed to it; (c) the thesis rests on a highly questionable approach to the status of the body. Wilkinson’s paper is challenging, and some of his points are well taken. On the whole, however, it does not constitute an insurmountable challenge for my thesis.

Student perceptions and motivation in the classroom: exploring relatedness and value

According to Self-Determination Theory, feelings of relatedness and value of a behavior are critical factors that affect internalization and integration. The purpose of the current study was to identify factors that influence relatedness and value in an academic setting. Specifically, the study investigated the effects of autonomy, mastery goals, performance-approach goals, and performance-avoidance goals, on two dependent variables: relatedness to the professor and value of the course. Participants were 222 undergraduate students (90 males) enrolled in introductory psychology classes. Linear regression analyses showed a statistically significant effect of mastery goals and autonomy on relatedness such that higher scores were associated with greater relatedness. A similar pattern emerged for value. Neither performance-approach nor performance-avoidance goals were significantly associated with relatedness or value. Theoretical and practical contributions are discussed.

What is it for a Life to go Well (or Badly)?: Some Critical Comments on Wayne Sumner’s Theory of Welfare

In an effort to construct a plausible theory of experience-based welfare, Wayne Sumner imposes two requirements on the relevant kind of experience: the information requirement and the autonomy requirement. I argue that both requirements are problematic. First, I argue (very briefly) that a well-know case like ‘the deceived businessman’ need not support the information requirement as Sumner believes. Second, I introduce a case designed to cast further doubt on the information requirement. Third, I attend to a shortcoming in Sumner’s theory of welfare, namely that it is unclear which of later and informed assessments are to be treated as authoritative when it comes to the evaluation of a person’s welfare. Finally, I suggest that, in combination with ‘welfarism’ (to which Sumner subscribes, and which has it that welfare is all that matters from a moral viewpoint), the information requirement entail morally troublesome conclusions: e.g. the conclusion that, from a moral point of view, we should, other things being equal, only to be concerned with the alternative that makes one person slightly better off in respect of welfare instead of also being morally concerned with the alternative that makes one person very happy.     

Extended Life

This paper reformulates some of the questions raised by extended mind theorists from an enactive, life/mind continuity perspective. Because of its reliance on concepts such as autopoiesis, the enactive approach has been deemed internalist and thus incompatible with the extended mind hypothesis. This paper answers this criticism by showing (1) that the relation between organism and cogniser is not one of co-extension, (2) that cognition is a relational phenomenon and thereby has no location, and (3) that the individuality of a cogniser is inevitably linked with the question of its autonomy, a question ignored by the extended mind hypothesis but for which the enactive approach proposes a precise, operational, albeit non-functionalist answer. The paper raises a pespective of embedded and intersecting forms of autonomous identity generation, some of which correspond to the canonical cases discussed in the extended mind literature, but on the whole of wider generality. In addressing these issues, this paper proposes unbiased, non-species specific definitions of cognition, agency and mediation, thus filling in gaps in the extended mind debates that have led to paradoxical situations and a problematic over-reliance on intutions about what counts as cognitive.

Life, death and (inter)subjectivity: realism and recognition in continental feminism

I begin with the assumption that a philosophically significant tension exists today in feminist philosophy of religion between those subjects who seek to become divine and those who seek their identity in mutual recognition. My critical engagement with the ambiguous assertions of Luce Irigaray seeks to demonstrate, on the one hand, that a woman needs to recognize her own identity but, on the other hand, that each subject whether male or female must struggle in relation to the other in order to maintain realism about life and death. No one can avoid the recognition that we are each given life but each of us also dies. In addition, I raise a more general, philosophical problem for analytic philosophers who attempt to read Continental philosophy of religion: how should philosophers interpret deliberately ambiguous assertions? For example, what does Irigaray mean in asserting, ‘Divinity is what we need to become free, autonomous, sovereign’? To find an answer, I turn to the distinctively French readings of the Hegelian struggle for recognition which have preoccupied Continental philosophers especially since the first half of the last century. I explore the struggle for mutual recognition between women and men who must face the reality of life and death in order to avoid the projection of their fear of mortality onto the other sex. This includes a critical look at Irigaray’s account of subjectivity and divinity. I turn to the French philosopher Michèle Le Doeuff in order to shift the focus from divinity to intersubjectivity. I conclude that taking seriously the struggle for mutual recognition between subjects forces contemporary philosophers of religion to be realist in their living and dying. With this in mind, the lesson from the Continent for philosophy of religion is that we must not stop yearning for recognition. Indeed, we must even risk our autonomy/divinity in seeking to recognize intersubjectivity.     

心理疗法在针灸治疗中的应用

随着疾病谱和死亡谱的改变,生物医学模式逐渐地不能满足医学发展的需要,取而代之的是生物心理社会医学模式。现代医学模式全方位探求影响人类健康与疾病的因果关系,认为生物学、心理学及社会学因素是人类致病共同的重要因素。针灸是中国传统医学同时也是西方辅助与替代医学的重要内容。针灸医护人员应大力宣传针灸知识,应用生物心理社会医学模式去对待每一位患者。本文试述心理疗法如支持性心理治疗、认知行为疗法、放松疗法在针灸临床的应用,展现针灸心身同治的诊疗特点。     

Self-controlled practice: Autonomy protects perceptions of competence and enhances motor learning

ObjectiveIn previous self-controlled feedback studies, it was observed that participants who could control their own feedback schedules usually use a strategy of choosing feedback after successful trials, and present superior motor learning when compared with participants who were not allowed to choose. Yoked participants of these studies, however, were thwarted not only regarding autonomy but also, presumably, regarding perceived competence, as their feedback schedules were provided randomly, regarding good or bad trials. The purpose of the present study was to examine whether self-controlled feedback schedules would have differential effects on learning if yoked participants are provided with feedback after good trials at the same rate as their self-controlled counterparts.DesignExperimental study with two groups. Timing accuracy was assessed in two different experimental phases, supplemented by questionnaire data.MethodParticipants practiced a coincident-anticipation timing task with a self-controlled or yoked feedback schedule during practice. Participants of the self-controlled group were able to ask for feedback for two trials, after each of five 6-trial practice blocks. Yoked participants received a feedback schedule matching the self-control group schedule, according to accuracy.ResultsParticipants asked for (self-controlled group) and received (yoked group) feedback, mainly after relatively good trials. However, participants of the self-controlled group reported greater self-efficacy at the end of practice, and performed with greater accuracy one day later, on the retention test, than the yoked group.ConclusionsThe findings indicate that the autonomy provided by self-controlled feedback protocols can raise learners' perceptions of competence, with positive consequences on motor learning.     

Dynamical agents: Consciousness, causation, and two specters of epiphenomenalism

The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology of the brain and body.

Prospective relations between maternal autonomy support and child executive functioning: investigating the mediating role of child language ability

Although emerging evidence suggests that parental behavior is related to the development of child executive functioning (EF), the mechanisms through which parenting affects child EF have yet to be investigated. The goal of this study was to examine the potential mediating role of child language in the prospective relation between maternal autonomy support and child EF. A total of 53 mother–infant dyads took part in three home visits at 15 months, 2 years, and 3 years, allowing for the assessment of maternal autonomy support (T1), child expressive vocabulary (T2), and child EF (T3). The results suggested that child language played a mediating role in the relation between maternal autonomy support and child performance on EF tasks entailing a strong impulse control component above and beyond child previous EF and family socioeconomic status (SES). In contrast, no such mediating role of language was found with EF tasks tapping mostly into working memory and set shifting. Thus, this study highlights one pathway through which parenting can affect child executive control.