On using what we know about ourselves in thinking about others: Not so fast

Abstract

We argue that the frequently assumed privileged role of the self as a habitual reference point in social judgments is often hindered by the fact that, unlike other persons, the self is typically represented primarily in terms of internal, unobservable characteristics. This idiosyncratic feature of self-representations may render them incompatible with many other social representations. Yet, such limitations are not universal. In particular, incompatibility is less of a problem when (1) the judgment target is someone psychologically close; (2) accessible self-representations involve distant (rather than recent) self-memories; (3) accessible self-representations are relatively abstract, (semanticized) rather than event-specific; or, (4) social judgements concern not a specific other person but more abstract social concepts such as traits.     

The effect of self‐identity alongside perceived importance within the theory of planned behaviour

Self‐identity often predicts behavioural intentions after standard theory of planned behaviour (TPB) components are accounted for. However, it has been claimed this is due to conceptual similarity between self‐identity and perceived importance of the behaviour. We examined this claim within the context of recycling food waste. Participants (N = 113) completed questionnaires assessing intentions, attitude, perceived behavioural control, perceived norms, perceived importance, self‐identity, and past behaviour. Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that self‐identity and perceived importance were distinct constructs. Further, after accounting for TPB components and perceived importance, self‐identity explained a significant amount of additional variance in intentions. The present findings therefore do not support this particular argument against the predictive utility of self‐identity.     

Self‐reported inner speech use in university students

Remarkably little is known regarding what people talk to themselves about (inner speech use) in their everyday lives. Existing self‐directed speech measures (e.g., thought sampling and questionnaires) either uniquely capture inner speech frequency and neglect its content or classify self‐reported thoughts instances in overly simplistic categories determined by the researchers. In the current study, we describe an open‐format thought listing procedure as well as a refined coding scheme and present detailed inner speech content self‐generated by 76 university students. The most frequently self‐reported inner speech activities were self‐regulation (e.g., planning and problem solving), self‐reflection (e.g., emotions, self‐motivation, appearance, behavior/performance, and autobiography), critical thinking (e.g., evaluating, judging, and criticizing), people in general, education, and current events. Inner speech occurred most commonly while studying and driving. These results are consistent with the self‐regulatory and self‐referential functions of inner speech often emphasized in the literature. Future research avenues using the open‐format inner speech listing procedure and coding scheme are proposed.     

Inference and the taking condition

It has recently been argued that inference essentially involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of this fact. However, this Taking Condition has also been criticized: If taking is interpreted as believing, it seems to lead to a vicious regress and to overintellectualize the act of inferring. In this paper, I examine and reject various attempts to salvage the Taking Condition, either by interpreting inferring as a kind of rule‐following, or by finding an innocuous role for the taking‐belief. Finally, I propose an alternative account of taking, according to which it is not a separate belief, but rather an aspect of the attitude of believing: Believing that p implies not only taking p to be true and taking oneself to believe that p, but also taking one's reasons q to support p, when the belief in question is held on account of an inference.     

Effects of analytical (abstract) versus experiential (concrete) induced rumination of negative self defining memories on schizotypic symptoms

Repetitive thought may have adaptive and functional consequences, depending on, among other things, the interpretation of the content: analytical or abstract (general and decontextualized) and experiential or concrete (specific, contextual and incidental). Studies experimentally manipulating repetitive thought have shown both the constructive consequences of the experiential mode and the dysfunctional consequences of the analytical mode. The aim of the current study is to observe the effect of analytical and experiential rumination of negative self‐defining memories on schizotypic symptoms. A sample of 111 university students were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions of induced rumination, “analytical” or “experimental.” The participants completed a series of questionnaires (anomalous perception of reality, preoccupation and depression) and a negative self‐defining memory was obtained to be used as the content of the induced rumination. Following the rumination induction, participants in the experiential condition significantly decreased their scores on anomalous perception of reality compared with those in the analytical condition. We also observed that post‐induction scores on self‐reported sadness significantly increased in both experimental conditions while scores on self‐reported happiness decreased. Our results show that the concrete/experiential rumination, focused here on negative self‐defining memories, have positive consequences on schizotypic symptoms, such as decreased anomalous perception of reality.