Student characteristics and motivational and process factors in relation to styles of career development

In this study student background characteristics and certain personological characteristics, including motivations for schooling and types of learning strategies employed, are investigated in relation to affective and cognitive aspects of adolescent career development. A Career Development Inventory, Learning Process Questionnaire, Word Knowledge test and General Information Questionnaire (addressing demographic and career decision-making topics) were administered to national random samples of 14-year-old and grade 11 students. Canonical correlation analyses distinguished at least three styles of career development (possibly four), and associations with student characteristics suggested the motives and strategies that might plausibly enter into the various modes.     

Causes of young children's confusion of same and different

Three experiments are reported that explore 3-year-olds' and adults' understanding of the words, same and different. In the first, 3-year-olds selected a bead that was “the same color as” or “a different color from” a target bead. In the second, 3-year-olds selected a bead that was “the same in some way as” or “different in some way from” a target bead. Contrary to results reported previously, the majority of consistent responders chose a bead identical with the target in response to the different instruction in both experiments. The rates of both incorrect different responding and incorrect same responding were greater in Experiment II than in Experiment I. In Experiment III, adults chose objects that were “the same as” or “different from” a target; unlike the children, they never chose a target-identical object in response to different instructions. It is argued that children and adults treat same and different differently, and that children's task performance is influenced by three factors: semantic, pragmatic, and nonlinguistic.     

The fantasy-reality distinction in televised violence: Modifying influences on children's aggression

Fifth-grade and kindergarten boys and girls were exposed to a violent televised episode that was introduced as a fictional portrayal (fantasy condition) or as a news broadcast (reality condition). Additional groups were given no information (no-instructional-set condition) about the violent stimulus or were not exposed to the violent episode (no-TV condition). Aggressive responses and helping responses were recorded immediately following exposure. Boys were most aggressive in the reality and no-TV conditions. They were less aggressive in the noinstructional-set condition and least aggressive in the fantasy condition. In almost direct contrast, girls were most aggressive in the fantasy and no-instructional-set conditions and least aggressive in the reality and no-TV conditions. A posteriori analyses of this interaction effect revealed that girls were less aggressive than boys in the no-TV condition and in the reality condition, but not in the fantasy condition nor the no-instructional-set condition. These effects held for both older and younger children.     

Methodological pitfalls in predicting counseling success

Prediction models employing multiple linear regression of raw scores, multiple linear regression of factor scores, the single best predictor, and a nine-point decision rule index were compared. The subjects were 296 clients undergoing vocational counseling and evaluation. Predictor variables included performance ratings, demographic variables, and WAIS subtest scores; the criterion was employment status upon program completion. The least statistically sophisticated model, employing the single best predictor, was the most successful approach. Considerable shrinkage in power of prediction was demonstrated upon cross-validation particularly for multiple linear regression of raw scores model, indicating the necessity of cross-validating prediction schemes. Additional suggestions are made to those designing prediction studies.     

Helplessness,stress level,and the coronary-prone behavior pattern

Two experiments were conducted to examine the relationship between stress level and learned helplessness in human subjects. Experiment I subjected subjects to loud or moderate noise in order to induce differential stress. Half of the subjects within each stress group were unable to escape from a series of noise bursts, whereas the other half could terminate each burst by manipulating appropriate switches. After the pretreatment series, the same noise was again delivered to subjects, all of whom could now escape or avoid noise by making an appropriate response on a shuttle box. Inescapable (helplessness) pretreatment interfered with escape learning in the second (test) phase of the study under both levels of stress. Experiment II was a partial replication of the first study using only loud noise. The interference effect during test trials was greater than in the first study. In addition to these findings, measures of a coronary-prone behavior pattern were related to differential susceptibility to the interference effect under both high stress and moderate stress conditions. These results were interpreted in terms of differing perceptions of threat imposed by lack of environmental control.     

Learned safety and the CS-US delay gradient in taste-aversion learning

Decrements in taste-aversion learning produced by extensions of the interval between the CS flavor and poisoning (the US) may be attributed to decay of the CS trace during long CS-US intervals. Kalat and Rozin (1973) alternatively proposed that such decrements occur because during extended CS-US intervals subjects learn that the CS is safe. They sought to show that trace decay is not responsible for the CS-US delay gradient by demonstrating that learning is disrupted even if the CS is reintroduced during extended CS-US intervals. The present experiments show that such a second CS presentation during conditioning may (1) enhance subsequent intakes of the CS solution whether or not subjects are poisoned, and/or (2) facilitate aversion learning, the facilitation being greater the closer the second CS exposure is to poisoning. These results question the adequacy of previous evidence for the contribution of learned safety to the CS-US delay gradient and suggest that some other process is also involved.     

Imitation as a function of response commonality,serial order,and vicarious punishment

The effects of response commonality, serial order of modeled responses, and vicarious punishment on young boys' recall and acceptance of 20 commodity prefereces of an adult were examined in a 2 (common dimension vs no-common dimension) × 2 (vicarious punishment vs no-vicarious consequences) × 2 (recall or acceptance test) × 5 (response-block) factorial experiment. As predicted, the presence of a common dimension resulted in improved recall of the modeled responses, vicarious punishment was more effective under common dimension than no-common dimension conditions, and a serial order effect for recall of the modeled responses was obtained. The overall pattern of results is discussed in terms of the conceptualization that imitation requires both that the observer (1) has acquired and retained the model's responses and (2) has been placed in circumstances which favor activating this learning into overt performance.     

Selective exposure to self

Male undergraduates received either an accepting or unaccepting communication from a coed. Then each subject had the opportunity to listen to his own voice or the voice of another male, and it was found that preference for listening to one's own voice was higher among subjects who had received positive feedback from the coed. There was also evidence that this pattern of selective exposure is weakened when feedback is less impactful. The results were interpreted through a theory of objective self awareness.     

Reciprocal cooperation in dyads

This study investigated the conditions that promote long-term social exchange when the immediate payoff for social participation is equal to or less than for individual responding. The 10 subjects, from a special education unit and ranging between 10 and 16 years of age, comprised five dyads to participate in daily 20-min sessions. During the first experiment, the subjects sat beside each other and in front of an automated apparatus which automatically distributed points (representing money) to self, to partner, or to the group. During baseline conditions, the subjects could earn reinforcers from all three modes. During the dependency conditions, which alternated between subjects at 3-day intervals, one subject could earn reinforcers from all three modes while a partner could earn reinforcers only from the mode requiring subject's assistance. Four of the five dyads increased their levels of cooperative responding during the several reversals in which first one and then the other subject was dependent upon the partner for reinforcement. This pattern maintained when the method of distributing reinforcers was changed to a manual procedure requiring the experimenter to record point distributions by transferring beads on an abacus. This suggested that the distribution modes rather than the experimental apparatus were important in promoting the cooperative pattern. In the second experiment all subjects continued to cooperate with partner, even when they could have earned more by working alone. Eventually a value for the self mode was reached where the subjects discontinued their cooperation to work for self.     

Must we measure what we mean?

This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the status of statements about ‘what we say’. On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary language philosophy argued that statements about ‘what we say’ should be evaluated as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers were not entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to statements about what we would say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language. In this paper, I defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had in a way that doesn’t require empirical observation, and I argue that ordinary language philosophers are (at least sometimes) engaged in a different project than linguists or empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions of success.