It's Fascinating Research: The Cognition of Verbal Irony

ABSTRACT— Verbal irony is nonliteral language that makes salient a discrepancy between expectations and reality. For researchers who study verbal irony, a critical question is: How do we grasp the meaning of ironic language? The parallel-constraint-satisfaction approach holds promise as an answer to this question. By this account, multiple cues to ironic intent, such as tone of voice, incongruity, and knowledge of the speaker, are processed rapidly and in parallel and this information is coordinated with the utterance itself in order to construct a coherent interpretation that is the best fit for the activated information. Recently, research with individuals who struggle with irony comprehension (typically developing children, individuals with autism-spectrum disorder, individuals with brain injury) has provided new clues about the complex process by which ironic meaning is inferred.     

The roles of thought suppression and metacognitive beliefs in proneness to auditory verbal hallucinations in a non-clinical sample

In a non-clinical sample (N = 751), we investigated relations among two subscales (self-reported intrusiveness of unwanted thoughts and thought suppression) of the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI), metacognitive beliefs, and proneness to auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs). Both subscales of the WBSI were found to be related to AVH-proneness and strongly positively related to metacognitive beliefs about the uncontrollability and danger of thoughts. Regression analyses were used to test models of the relations among AVH-proneness and a range of metacognitive beliefs. When the WBSI subscale relating to the self-reported intrusiveness of unwanted thoughts was controlled for, the metacognitive style that was the strongest predictor of AVH-proneness was cognitive self-consciousness. Cognitive confidence and beliefs about the uncontrollability of thoughts were also significant predictors of AVH-proneness. These findings are used to revise existing models of the relations between metacognitive beliefs and AVHs. Implications for the management of AVHs are discussed.     

The relation between scores on the Buss–Perry Aggression Questionnaire and aggressive acts,impulsiveness, competitiveness,dominance, and sexual jealousy

This paper examines the relation of the four subscales (physical, verbal, anger and hostility) of the Buss–Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ) to act‐based aggression questionnaires (involving same‐sex or partners as opponents, and direct or indirect aggression) and evolutionarily based predictors of aggression, using an online student sample. All aggression measures were moderately correlated with one another. The BPAQ physical and verbal scales were most closely related to act‐based measures of direct aggression to a same‐sex other and the hostility scale to indirect aggression to a same‐sex other. The evolutionary variables were less closely related to the BPAQ than were the act‐based measures. Dominance and sexual jealousy were predictors of BPAQ physical, verbal and anger, and impulsiveness was a significant predictor of anger. Aggr. Behav. 32:1–10, 2006. © 2006 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Audiovisual beat induction in complex auditory rhythms: Point-light figure movement as an effective visual beat

This study investigated whether explicit beat induction in the auditory, visual, and audiovisual (bimodal) modalities aided the perception of weakly metrical auditory rhythms, and whether it reinforced attentional entrainment to the beat of these rhythms. The visual beat-inducer was a periodically bouncing point-light figure, which aimed to examine whether an observed rhythmic human movement could induce a beat that would influence auditory rhythm perception. In two tasks, participants listened to three repetitions of an auditory rhythm that were preceded and accompanied by (1) an auditory beat, (2) a bouncing point-light figure, (3) a combination of (1) and (2) synchronously, or (4) a combination of (1) and (2), with the figure moving in anti-phase to the auditory beat. Participants reproduced the auditory rhythm subsequently (Experiment 1), or detected a possible temporal change in the third repetition (Experiment 2). While an explicit beat did not improve rhythm reproduction, possibly due to the syncopated rhythms when a beat was imposed, bimodal beat induction yielded greater sensitivity to a temporal deviant in on-beat than in off-beat positions. Moreover, the beat phase of the figure movement determined where on-beat accents were perceived during bimodal induction. Results are discussed with regard to constrained beat induction in complex auditory rhythms, visual modulation of auditory beat perception, and possible mechanisms underlying the preferred visual beat consisting of rhythmic human motions.     

The psychological processes underlying symptoms of thought interference in psychosis

Morrison and colleagues have proposed that auditory hallucinations are the result of cognitive intrusions being misattributed to an external source due to such thoughts being inconsistent with the person's beliefs about his or her own mental processes (metacognitive beliefs). The aim of this study was to investigate the applicability of this model to psychotic symptoms of thought interference. Fifty psychotic patients with and without thought interference were compared on (i) frequency of cognitive intrusions, (ii) metacognitive beliefs, (iii) source monitoring and (iv) appraisals of an unrelated anomalous event (a card trick). As predicted, individuals with thought interference had an increased frequency of cognitive intrusions and of maladaptive metacognitive appraisals, lower perceived cognitive control, and were more likely to endorse appraisals regarding 'permeability' of the mind, on the card trick task, in comparison to individuals without thought interference. No significant differences were found on any measure when the patient group was divided into hallucinators and non-hallucinators, once other variables were controlled for. These findings suggest that Morrison's model may be more parsimonious for symptoms of thought interference than for auditory hallucinations.     

Much Ado About Nothing? Some Comments on B. F. Skinner's Definition of Verbal Behavior

Some have suggested that the definition of verbal behavior offered by B. F. Skinner (1957) fails to capture the essence of language insofar as it is too broad and not functional. In this paper, I argue that the ambiguities of Skinner's definition are not an indictment of it, and that suggestions to the contrary are problematic because they suffer a critical error of scientific reasoning. Specifically, I argue that (a) no clear definition of verbal behavior is possible because there is no natural distinction between verbal and nonverbal behavior; (b) attempts at an immutable definition are essentialistic; and (c) Skinner's functional taxonomy of language is in no way affected by the particulars of any definition of verbal behavior.     

Religion as schedule-induced behavior

In this article, I argue that a class of religious behaviors exists that is induced, for prepared organisms, by specific stimuli that are experienced according to a response-independent schedule. Like other schedule-induced behaviors, the members of this class serve as minimal units out of which functional behavior may arise. In this way, there exist two classes of religious behavior: nonoperant schedule-induced behaviors and operant behaviors. This dichotomy is consistent with the distinction insisted upon by religious scholars and philosophers between "graceful" and "effortful" religious behaviors. Embracing the distinction allows an explanation of many aspects of religious experience and behavior that have been overlooked or disregarded by other scientific approaches to religion.     

Interference by process, not content, determines semantic auditory distraction

Distraction by irrelevant background sound of visually-based cognitive tasks illustrates the vulnerability of attentional selectivity across modalities. Four experiments centred on auditory distraction during tests of memory for visually-presented semantic information. Meaningful irrelevant speech disrupted the free recall of semantic category-exemplars more than meaningless irrelevant sound (Experiment 1). This effect was exacerbated when the irrelevant speech was semantically related to the to-be-remembered material (Experiment 2). Importantly, however, these effects of meaningfulness and semantic relatedness were shown to arise only when instructions emphasized recall by category rather than by serial order (Experiments 3 and 4). The results favor a process-oriented, rather than a structural, approach to the breakdown of attentional selectivity and forgetting: performance is impaired by the similarity of process brought to bear on the relevant and irrelevant material, not the similarity in item content.     

REALISM WITHOUT TRUTH: A REVIEW OF GIERE'S SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVISM

An increasingly popular view among philosophers of science is that of science as action—as the collective activity of scientists working in socially‐coordinated communities. Scientists are seen not as dispassionate pursuers of Truth, but as active participants in a social enterprise, and science is viewed on a continuum with other human activities. When taken to an extreme, the science‐as‐social‐process view can be taken to imply that science is no different from any other human activity, and therefore can make no privileged claims about its knowledge of the world. Such extreme views are normally contrasted with equally extreme views of classical science, as uncovering Universal Truth. In Science Without Laws and Scientific Perspectivism, Giere outlines an approach to understanding science that finds a middle ground between these extremes. He acknowledges that science occurs in a social and historical context, and that scientific models are constructions designed and created to serve human ends. At the same time, however, scientific models correspond to parts of the world in ways that can legitimately be termed objective. Giere's position, perspectival realism, shares important common ground with Skinner's writings on science, some of which are explored in this review. Perhaps most fundamentally, Giere shares with Skinner the view that science itself is amenable to scientific inquiry: scientific principles can and should be brought to bear on the process of science. The two approaches offer different but complementary perspectives on the nature of science, both of which are needed in a comprehensive understanding of science.