Promoting aggression and violence at Abu Ghraib: The U.S. military's transformation of ordinary people into torturers

The torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib has been characterized as an isolated incident and blamed on a few “bad apples.” However, as similar reports of war crimes throughout Iraq continue to surface, it seems increasingly apparent that in the anxious post-9/11 context, the low-level agents who carried out such violence were designed to function in this way. This paper suggests that the U.S. military transformed ordinary soldiers into the cruel and ruthless guards at Abu Ghraib through the use of basic recruitment and training strategies, general authorizations for increased aggression and violence after 9/11, specific authorizations for more aggressive interrogations, a range of pressures and protections, and the dehumanization of prisoners. While the legitimate needs of an effective Army must be preserved, this paper offers several specific ways we might reform the U.S. military and prevent such abuses in the future.     

Casualties of war and sunk costs: Implications for attitude change and persuasion

The purpose of the present research was to gain greater insight into how people's support for an ongoing war might be influenced by providing information about recent casualties of war. On intuitive grounds, one might expect that such information might often decrease support for the war, especially when the war in question is relatively unpopular. However, research and theory on the “sunk cost effect” suggests, somewhat paradoxically, that highlighting such losses could actually increase, not decrease, support for the war, as driven by the goal to avoid wasting valuable resources. Across two experiments (one focusing on the war in Iraq, another focusing on the war in Afghanistan), we found that the effects of the war casualty information on attitudes were moderated by a recent use and activation of the relevant “don't waste” goal, which had been previously primed in a non-political context. The implications of our findings for theory and research on attitude change, as well as the judgment and decision making area, are discussed.     

Ideology is related to basic cognitive processes involved in attitude formation

Ideological orientation shapes the perception of the social world and conservatism is associated to an increased weighting of negative over positive information. In the present work we explored how this ideology-based difference is also related to basic cognitive processes involved in attitude formation. In particular, we hypothesized that conservatives, as compared to liberals, would show stronger illusory correlation effects when negative information is relatively infrequent. In Study 1 we employed the typical illusory correlation paradigm (Hamilton & Gifford, 1976) and results confirmed the hypothesis: conservatives developed more negative impressions toward the minority group and showed consistent memory biases. In Study 2, positive information represented the infrequent dimension and in this case no ideology-based difference was observed. Overall, findings indicate that when exposed to numerically different novel groups and negative behaviors are infrequent, illusory correlation effects are accentuated among individuals embracing conservative rather than liberal views of the world. This result may help to understand why conservatives tend to form more negative attitudes toward social minorities.     

The accuracy with which adults who do not stutter predict stuttering-related communication attitudes

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which adults who do not stutter can predict communication-related attitudes of adults who do stutter. 40 participants (mean age of 22.5 years) evaluated speech samples from an adult with mild stuttering and an adult with severe stuttering via audio-only (n = 20) or audio-visual (n = 20) modes to predict how the adults had responded on the S24 scale of communication attitudes. Participants correctly predicted which speaker had the more favorable S24 score, and the predicted scores were significantly different between the severity conditions. Across the four subgroups, predicted S24 scores differed from actual scores by 4–9 points. Predicted values were greater than the actual values for 3 of 4 subgroups, but still relatively positive in relation to the S24 norm sample. Stimulus presentation mode interacted with stuttering severity to affect prediction accuracy. The participants predicted the speakers’ negative self-attributions more accurately than their positive self-attributions. Findings suggest that adults who do not stutter estimate the communication-related attitudes of specific adults who stutter in a manner that is generally accurate, though, in some conditions, somewhat less favorable than the speaker's actual ratings. At a group level, adults who do not stutter demonstrate the ability to discern minimal versus average levels of attitudinal impact for speakers who stutter. The participants’ complex prediction patterns are discussed in relation to stereotype accuracy and classic views of negative stereotyping.Educational objectives: The reader will be able to (a) summarize main findings on research related to listeners’ attitudes toward people who stutter, (b) describe the extent to which people who do not stutter can predict the communication attitudes of people who do stutter; and (c) discuss how findings from the present study relate to previous findings on stereotypes about people who stutter.     

The deautomatization of accessible attitudes

The attitudinal effects of repeatedly encountering an object in a setting where an attitude was unneeded were investigated. In three experiments, participants repeatedly recognized words with strong evaluative connotations. A priming task was subsequently performed in which the repeatedly recognized words or control words served as primes. As expected, the attitudinal priming effects of the attitudes toward the repeated words were attenuated relative to the control words. This reduction in automatic attitude activation was observed even a day after the repeated recognition task, suggesting that attitudinal deautomatization is a relatively enduring effect that is not limited to the immediate context. The likelihood of automatic attitude activation was not diminished by the repeated evaluation of an object, indicating that the effect was not due to semantic satiation or fatigue of the attitude-object connection. A number of additional potential mediators of the deautomatization of attitudes were ruled out by the results. The findings highlight the functional nature of attitudes. Attitudes facilitate the appraisal of objects and the making of decisions. However, when the need to evaluate an object in a context decreases, the automatic activation of attitudes diminishes.     

Appreciation of nature and appreciation of environmental protection: How stable are these attitudes and which comes first?

IntroductionAttitude toward nature and attitude toward environmental protection are two separate but correlated attitudes. Little is known about the two attitudes’ stability/volatility over time, despite the practical value of such knowledge.Objectives & methodUsing longitudinal survey data from 251 adults in a cross-lagged structural equation model, we assessed the degree of spontaneous (i.e., unprompted) change in the two attitudes. We also considered whether such change could provide evidence regarding causal direction; causation could go in either of two directions between the two attitudes, or it could even be bi-directional.ResultsWe corroborated the substantive connection between attitude toward nature and attitude toward environmental protection; however, the absence of change in the attitudes despite the passage of two years disallows reliable statements about causal direction.ConclusionIt is possible to protect the environment by encouraging appreciation of nature, but change in attitude toward nature and attitude toward environmental protection may be difficult to achieve with mature individuals.     

Me have a traffic accident? The effects of core self-evaluations on the perceived likelihood and perceived undesirability of traffic accidents

Problem: The aim of this article was to demonstrate the influence of “Core Self-Evaluations” (CSEs) on the perception which drivers have of the occurrence of a “traffic accident”, in particular the evaluation of its likelihood, of the personal control exercised and its undesirability (attitude). More generally, this article introduces the concept of CSE in the field of driver psychology and discusses its relevance. Method: 201 French drivers replied to a questionnaire measuring CSEs, the perceived likelihood of having an accident, attitude and perceived personal control. Results and discussion: The more positively drivers evaluated themselves, the more they judged that they were in control and that accidents were unlikely. Drivers with a negative self-evaluation had an attitude more negative than drivers with positive CSEs solely when they judged the accident as unlikely. This positive correlation between attitude and perceived likelihood for drivers with negative CSEs could be viewed as the result of “wishful thinking” or “rationalisation” modes of reasoning. For these drivers a positive relationship was also observed between driving experience and perceived personal control, the latter thus cancelling out the effect of CSEs. This result suggest that with experience self-evaluation as a driver becomes positive and compensates for the effect of a negative general self-evaluation on perceived personal control and perceived likelihood. Practical implications: Using and adapting the Experience-Based Analysis technique for each group of drivers (positive or negative CSEs) is recommended, as well as implementing interventions that triggers drivers’ awareness of CSEs influence and that promote their self-regulating skills.