Flexible conceptual projection of time onto spatial frames of reference

Flexibility in conceptual projection constitutes one of the most challenging issues in the embodiment and conceptual metaphor literatures. We sketch a theoretical proposal that places the burden of the explanation on attentional dynamics in interaction with mental models in working memory that are constrained to be maximally coherent. A test of this theory is provided in the context of the conceptual projection of time onto the domain of space. Participants categorized words presented at different spatial locations (back–front, left–right) as referring to the past or to the future. Responses were faster when the irrelevant word location was congruent with the back–past, front–future metaphoric mapping. Moreover, when a new highly task-relevant spatial frame of reference was introduced, it changed the projection of past and future onto space in a way that was congruent with the new frame (past was now projected to left space and future to right space), as predicted by the theory. This study shows that there is substantial flexibility in conceptual projection and opens a venue to study metaphoric variation across tasks, individuals, and cultures as the result of attentional dynamics.     

Dissociable parietal systems for primacy and subsequent memory effects

The frequently observed superior memory for the first items on a list is referred to as primacy. The aetiology of this effect in terms of cognitive processes and their neural substrate is subject to an ongoing debate. However, the brain areas generally involved in successful encoding are well described by subsequent memory studies in which activity during encoding is correlated with memory performance. We employed an object-location association paradigm to differentiate the neural correlate of the primacy from the subsequent memory effect. Activity in the intraparietal sulcus predicted memory performance across all encoding positions. Increased activity in the inferior parietal lobe and angular gyrus resulted exclusively in a more efficient encoding of the first item presented. These areas are part of the ventral frontoparietal network involved in stimulus driven attention. Our results implicate the relatively elevated attention to the first item probably due to its contextual distinctiveness, as a major contributor to the primacy effect.     

A presentation of Attentional Semantics

The paper presents the two main assumptions of Attentional Semantics—(A) and (B), and its main aim (C). (A) Conscious experience is determined by attention: there cannot be consciousness without attention. Consciousness is explained as the product of attentional activity. Attentional activity can be performed thanks to a special kind of energy: nervous energy. This energy is supplied by the organ of attention. When we perform attentional activity, we use our nervous energy. This activity directly affects the organ of attention, causing a variation in the state of the nervous energy. This variation constitutes the phenomenal aspect of consciousness. (B) Words are tools to pilot attention. The meanings of words isolate, de-contextualize, “freeze” and classify in an articulated system the ever-changing and multiform stream of our conscious experiences. Each meaning is composed of the sequence of invariable elements that, independently of any individual occurrence of a given conscious experience, are responsible for the production of any instance of that conscious experience. The elements composing the meanings of words are attentional operations: each word conveys the condensed instructions on the attentional operations one has to perform if one wants to consciously experience what is expressed through and by it. (C) Attentional Semantics aims at finding the attentional instruction conveyed by the meanings of words. To achieve this goal, it tries: (1) to identify the sequence of the elementary conscious experiences that invariably accompany, and are prompted by, the use of the word being analyzed; (2) to describe these conscious experiences in terms of the attentional operations that are responsible for their production; and (3) to identify the unconscious and non-conscious operations that, directly or indirectly, serve either as the support that makes it possible for the attentional operations to take place, be completed, and occur in a certain way, or as the necessary complement that makes it possible to execute and implement the activities determined and triggered by the conscious experiences. The origins of Attentional Semantics are also presented, and the methodological problems researchers encounter when analyzing meanings in attentional terms are discussed. Finally, a brief comparison with the other kinds of semantics is made.     

The role of context specificity in learning: the effects of training context on explosives detection in dogs

Various experiments revealed that if an animal learns a stimulus–response–reinforcer relationship in one context and is then tested in another context there is usually a lessening of stimulus control, and the same discriminative stimuli that reliably controlled the behavior in the first context will have less effect in the new context. This reduction in performance is known as the context shift effect. The effect of changing context on the probability of detecting explosives was investigated in seven highly trained explosives detection dogs (EDDs). In experiment 1 the dogs were trained alternately on path A, which always had five hidden explosives, and on a very similar path B, which never had any explosives. Within a few sessions the dogs showed a significant decrease in search behavior on path B, but not on path A. In experiment 2 the same dogs were trained only on path B with a target density of one explosive hidden every 4th day. The probability of the dogs now detecting the explosive was found to be significantly lower than in experiment 1. In experiment 3 the effect of the low target density as used in experiment 2 was investigated on a new but very similar path C. Both the detection probability for the one explosive every 4th day on the new path and the motivation to search were significantly higher than found in experiment 2. Finally, in experiment 4, an attempt was made to recondition the dogs to search on path B. Although trained for 12 daily sessions with one explosive hidden every session, the dogs failed to regain the normal levels of motivation they had shown on both new paths and on the paths that they knew usually contained explosives. The findings reveal that even a very intensively trained EDD will rapidly learn that a specific stretch of path does not contain explosives. The dog will then be less motivated to search and will miss newly placed targets. This learning is specific to the formerly always-clean path and is to some extent irreversible. However, the dog will search and detect normally on new paths even if they are very similar to the always-clean path. The data are discussed in terms of variables affecting renewal. The results suggest that following training designed to make a behavior context independent, any extinction training will not generalize beyond that specific context used during the extinction training. In addition, if the behavior is extinguished in a specific context, it will be very difficult to restore that behavior in that context. These conclusions should be considered by anyone attempting to extinguish well-established trans-context behaviors.This research reports portions of a doctoral dissertation submitted by Irit Gazit to Tel Aviv University.     

Dynamic shifts of pigeon local/global attention

It has previously been shown that pigeons can shift attention between parts and wholes of complex stimuli composed of larger, "global" characters constructed from smaller, "local" characters. The base-rate procedure used biased target level within any condition at either the local or global level; targets were more likely at one level than at the other. Biasing of target level in this manner demonstrated shifts of local/global attention over a time span consisting of several days with a fixed base rate. Experiment 1 examined the possibility that pigeons can shift attention between local and global levels of perceptual analysis in seconds rather than days. The experiment used priming cues the color of which predicted on a trial-by-trial basis targets at different perceptual levels. The results confirmed that pigeons, like humans, can display highly dynamic stimulus-driven shifts of local/global attention. Experiment 2 changed spatial relations between features of priming cues and features of targets within a task otherwise similar to that used in experiment 1. It was predicted that this change in cues might affect asymmetry but not the occurrence of a priming effect. A priming effect was again obtained, thereby providing generality to the claim that pigeons can learn that trial-by-trial primes predict targets at different levels of perceptual analysis. Pigeons can display perceptual, stimulus-driven priming of a highly dynamic nature. Electronic Publication     

Attentional bias for performance-related words in individuals with narcissism

In this study, dot probe tasks were employed to present performance-related or interpersonal-related words paired with neutral words, we examined the attentional bias of narcissists as well as its mechanism. Results showed that the narcissistic individuals demonstrated significant attentional bias for performance words. Specifically, they were highly vigilant to failure words and had difficulty disengaging from success words, and there was no such bias for the category of interpersonal ones. Non-narcissists, on the other hand, exhibited significant difficulty disengaging from negative words, including failure words and rejection words. From this data, it would appear that attentional bias may be a built-in cognitive attribute of narcissism. The limitations of the present study and future research directions are also discussed.     

An experimental investigation of daytime monitoring for sleep-related threat in primary insomnia

An experimental manipulation was conducted to test the hypothesis that monitoring for sleep-related threat during the day triggers a cycle of cognitive processes that includes increased negative thinking, increased use of safety behaviours, increased perceived impairment in functioning, and increased self-reported sleepiness. Forty-seven individuals with primary insomnia were randomly assigned to a monitoring group (instructed to monitor their body sensations), a no-monitoring group (instructed to distract from their body sensations), or a no-instruction group. The manipulations to monitor or not monitor were administered immediately on waking and participants were asked to continue the manipulation throughout the experimental day. The monitoring group reported more negative thoughts, the use of more safety behaviours, and more sleepiness during the day relative to the no-instruction group. These findings offer support to a recent cognitive model, which identifies daytime monitoring for sleep-related threat as a key factor in the maintenance of the daytime distress and difficulty functioning in chronic insomnia.     

The role of consciousness in attentional control differences in trait anxiety

Trait anxiety has long been associated with impaired selective attention to task-irrelevant threat stimuli, both when threat is presented consciously and outside of awareness. However recent research has suggested broader deficits in selective attention, with poorer ability to ignore supraliminal non-emotional information in anxiety. Here, we investigated whether anxiety could equally be associated with poorer selective attention for non-emotional stimuli in a subliminal context. Participants performed a simple arrow discrimination task, where prior incompatible or compatible response primes were presented before targets either unmasked (supraliminal) or masked (subliminal). While distractor interference was evident in both conditions, trait anxiety was associated with increased task-irrelevant processing only in the supraliminal condition; group effects were eliminated when primes were masked. Our findings are in line with traditional accounts suggesting that differences in selective attention and cognitive control solely modulate conscious distractor processing.     

Attending to the fear in your eyes: Facilitated orienting and delayed disengagement

Fearful facial expressions convey threat-related information and automatically elicit modulations in spatial attention. The eye-region appears to be a particularly important feature for recognising and responding to fearful faces. However, it is unknown as to whether or not fearful eyes initiate modulations in spatial attention. In the current study, three dot-probe experiments with fearful and neutral eye stimuli were performed. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that fearful eyes capture spatial attention through facilitated attentional orienting to threat and delayed attentional disengagement from threat. In Experiments 2 and 3, these attentional effects were replicated, while ruling out the influence of overall size/shape and brightness differences between fearful and neutral eyes, respectively. Thus, fearful eye-whites appear to be a salient feature of fearful facial expressions that elicit modulations in spatial attention.     

Affective states leak into movement execution: Automatic avoidance of threatening stimuli in fear of spider is visible in reach trajectories

Several studies have shown that the attentional blink (AB; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992) is diminished for highly arousing T2 stimuli (e.g., Anderson, 2005). Whereas this effect is most often interpreted as evidence for a more efficient processing of arousing information, it could be due also to a bias to report more arousing stimuli than neutral stimuli. We introduce a paradigm that allows one to control for such a response bias. Using this paradigm, we obtained evidence that the diminished AB for taboo words cannot be explained by a response bias. This supports the idea that the emotional modulation of the AB is caused by attentional processes.