The more your mind wanders,the smaller your attentional blink: An individual differences study

The present studies investigate the hypothesis that individuals who frequently report experiencing episodes of mind wandering do so because they under-invest attentional/executive resources in the external environment. Here we examined whether self-reported instances of mind wandering predict the magnitude of the “attentional blink” (AB) in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task, since a prominent view is that the AB derives from an over-investment of attention in the information stream. Study 1 demonstrates that subjective reports of mind wandering in a sustained attention task have a negative predictive relation with respect to the magnitude of the AB measured in a subsequent RSVP task. In addition, using the Spontaneous and Deliberate Mind Wandering Questionnaire in Study 2, we were again able to show that trait-level mind wandering in everyday life negatively predicts AB magnitude. We suggest that mind wandering may be the behavioural outcome of an adaptive cognitive style intended to maximize the efficient processing of dynamic and temporally unpredictable events.     

A slow component of classic Stroop interference

The interference in colour naming may extend beyond critical Stroop trials. This “slow” effect was first discovered in emotional Stroop tasks, but is extended here to classical Stroop. In two experiments, meaningless coloured letter strings followed a colour word or neutral word. Student participants (Experiment 1), and 18 stroke patients and 18 matched controls (Experiment 2) showed substantial interference by incongruent colour words, both in the word trial (fast component) and in the subsequent string trial (slow component). Different patient subgroups emerged from the comparison of Stroop performance with the controls. An association of fast and slow components was only found in one subgroup. Exploratory analyses revealed no clear differences in damage location between subgroups. Fast interference caused by colour-meaning conflict may be specific for classical Stroop, but the broader occurrence of slow effects suggests a more generalised process of disengagement from attention-demanding stimuli.     

Consciousness isn’t all-or-none: Evidence for partial awareness during the attentional blink

Alternative views of the nature of consciousness posit that awareness of an object is either an all-or-none phenomenon or that awareness can be partial, occurring independently for different levels of representation. The all-or-none hypothesis predicts that when one feature of an object is identified, all other features should be consciously accessible. The partial awareness hypothesis predicts that one feature may reach consciousness while others do not. These competing predictions were tested in two experiments that presented two targets within a central stream of letters. We used the attentional blink evoked by the first target to assess consciousness for two different features of the second target. The results provide evidence that there can be a severe impairment in conscious access to one feature even when another feature is accurately reported. This behavioral evidence supports the partial awareness hypothesis, showing that consciousness of different features of the same object can be dissociated.     

Individual differences in higher-level cognitive abilities do not predict overconfidence in complex task performance

Even when people perform tasks poorly, they often report unrealistically positive estimates of their own abilities in these situations. To better understand the origins of such overconfidence, we investigated whether it could be predicted by individual differences in working memory, attentional control, and self-reported trait impulsivity. Overconfidence was estimated by contrasting objective and subjective measures of situation awareness (the ability to perceive and understand task-relevant information in the environment), acquired during a challenging air traffic control simulation. We found no significant relationships between overconfidence and either working memory or attentional control. However, increased impulsivity significantly predicted greater overconfidence. In addition, overall levels of overconfidence were lower in our complex task than in previous studies that used less-complex lab-based tasks. Our results suggest that overconfidence may not be linked to high-level cognitive abilities, but that dynamic tasks with frequent opportunities for performance feedback may reduce misconceptions about personal performance.     

Context-specific attentional sampling: Intentional control as a pre-requisite for contextual control

Recent work suggests that environmental cues associated with previous attentional control settings can rapidly and involuntarily adjust attentional priorities. The current study tests predictions from adaptive-learning and memory-based theories of contextual control about the role of intentions for setting attentional priorities. To extend the empirical boundaries of contextual control phenomena, and to determine whether theoretical principles of contextual control are generalizable we used a novel bi-dimensional stimulus sampling task. Subjects viewed briefly presented arrays of letters and colors presented above or below fixation, and identified specific stimuli according to a dimensional (letter or color) and positional cue. Location was predictive of the cued dimension, but not the position or identity. In contrast to previous findings, contextual control failed to develop through automatic, adaptive-learning processes. Instead, previous experience with intentionally changing attentional sampling priorities between different contexts was required for contextual control to develop.     

Eye movements reveal mechanisms underlying attentional biases towards threat

Mechanisms underlying attentional biases towards threat (ABTs), such as attentional avoidance and difficulty of disengagement, are still unclear. To address this issue, we recorded participants' eye movements during a dot detection task in which threatening or neutral stimuli served as peripheral cues. We evaluated response times (RTs) in trials where participants looked at the central fixation cross (not at the cues), as they were required, and number and duration of (unwanted) fixations towards threatening or neutral cues; in all analyses trait anxiety was treated as a covariate. Difficulty in attentional disengagement (longer RTs) was found when peripheral threatening stimuli were presented for 100?ms. Moreover, we observed significantly shorter (unwanted) fixations on threatening than on neutral peripheral stimuli, compatible with an avoidance bias, for longer presentation times. These findings demonstrate that, independent of trait anxiety levels, disengagement bias occurs without eye movements, whereas eye movements are implied in threat avoidance.     

The interaction between social saliency and perceptual saliency

The ability to select visual targets in hierarchical stimuli can be affected by both perceptual saliency and social saliency. However, the functional relations between the effects are not understood. Here we examined whether these two factors interact or combine in an additive way. Participants first learnt to associate geometric shapes with three people (e.g., triangle–self, square–stranger). After learning the associations, participants were presented with compound stimuli (e.g., a global triangle formed by a set of local squares) and had to select a target at the global or local level. In Experiment 1 the task was to identify the person associated with the local or global shape. In Experiment 2 the task was simply to identify the shape. We manipulated perceptual saliency by blurring local elements to form perceptually global salient stimuli or by contrasting the colours of neighbouring local elements (red vs. white) to form perceptually local salient stimuli. In Experiment 1 (person discrimination) there was a strong effect of saliency on local targets (there were faster and more accurate responses to high than to low saliency targets) when social and perceptual saliency occurred at same level. However, both perceptual and social saliency effects were eliminated when the effect of saliency at one level competed with that at the other level. In Experiment 2 (shape discrimination), there were only effects of perceptual saliency. The data indicate that social saliency interacts with perceptual saliency when explicit social categorizations are made, consistent with both factors modulating a common process of visual selection.     

Relevance drives attention: Attentional bias for gain- and loss-related stimuli is driven by delayed disengagement

Attentional bias to gain- and loss-related stimuli was investigated in a dot-probe task. We used coloured stimuli that had acquired their valence during the experiment by signalling the chance to either win or lose points in a game task. Replicating previous findings with the additional singleton paradigm, we found attentional bias effects for both gain- and loss-related colours. The effects were due to delayed disengagement from valent stimuli, especially if they were positive, and could not be explained by nonattentional processes like behavioural freezing. Our findings suggest that stimuli signalling opportunities and dangers hold attention, supporting a general motivational relevance principle of the orienting of attention.     

Trait anxiety, defensiveness and selective processing of threat: an investigation using two measures of attentional bias

Attentional biases for threat were examined in a non-clinical sample (N=60), with each participant tested on both the modified Stroop colour-naming and dot probe tasks. Three groups were selected on the basis of trait anxiety and social desirability scale (SDS) scores: “low anxiety” (LA: low trait, low SDS), “repressor” (REP: low trait, high SDS) and “high anxiety” (HA: high trait, low SDS). Results from the colour-naming task suggested that high levels of defensiveness (in combination with low trait anxiety) were associated with greater avoidance of threat. The REP group showed less interference in colour-naming threat than neutral words; whereas the HA group showed increased interference due to threat words. On the dot probe task, there was a general tendency for this non-clinical sample as a whole to show avoidance of social threat relative to neutral words, but there was no bias for physical threat words. Avoidance of social threat was significant only within the REP group. No relationships were found between the measures of cognitive bias from the two tasks, suggesting different underlying mechanisms. Results are discussed in relation to previous findings and theoretical views of the effects of anxiety and defensiveness on the processing of threat.     

Attention to faces and gaze-following in social anxiety: preliminary evidence from a naturalistic eye-tracking investigation

Social attentional biases are a core component of social anxiety disorder, but research has not yet determined their direction due to methodological limitations. Here we present preliminary findings from a novel, dynamic eye-tracking paradigm allowing spatial–temporal measurement of attention and gaze-following, a mechanism previously unexplored in social anxiety. 105 participants took part, with those high (N?=?27) and low (N?=?25) in social anxiety traits (HSA and LSA respectively) entered into the analyses. Participants watched a video of an emotionally-neutral social scene, where two actors periodically shifted their gaze towards the periphery. HSA participants looked more at the actors’ faces during the initial 2s than the LSA group but there were no group differences in proportion of first fixations to the face or latency to first fixate the face, although HSA individuals’ first fixations to the face were shorter. No further differences in eye movements were found, nor in gaze-following behaviour, although these null effects could potentially result from the relatively small sample. Findings suggest attention is biased towards faces in HSA individuals during initial scene inspection, but that overt gaze-following may be impervious to individual differences in social anxiety. Future research should seek to replicate these effects.