What’s “inattentional” about inattentional blindness?

In a recent commentary, Memmert critiqued claims that attentional misdirection is directly analogous to inattentional blindness (IB) and cautioned against assuming too close a similarity between the two phenomena. One important difference highlighted in his analysis is that most lab-based inductions of IB rely on the taxing of attention through a demanding primary task, whereas attentional misdirection typically involves simply the orchestration of spatial attention. The present commentary argues that, rather than reflecting a complete dissociation between IB and attentional misdirection, this difference highlights potential grounds for delineating mechanistically distinct forms of IB: spatial inattentional blindness, which stems from the covert misallocation of spatial attention, and central inattentional blindness, which stems from disruption or preoccupation of perceptual mechanisms that interface with higher-level processes such as working memory. Recognition of such distinctions can help situate theoretical understanding of IB more firmly within the context of the broader attention literature.     

Processing efficiency in anxiety: Evidence from eye-movements during visual search

It is generally held that anxiety is characterized by an attentional bias for threatening information. In recent years there has been an important debate whether these biases reside at the level of attentional selection (threat detection) or attentional processing after threat detection (attentional disengagement). In a visual search task containing emotional facial expressions, eye-movements were examined before and after threat detection in high and low trait anxious individuals to further elucidate the temporal unfolding of attentional bias. Results indicated that high-anxious individuals neither showed facilitated orienting to threat nor impaired disengagement of visual attention from threat. Interestingly, the presence of threat in the visual search display was associated with increased decision times in high-anxious individuals. These results challenge some of the current views on attentional bias to threat but indicate that emotional information reduces processing efficiency in anxiety.     

Attentional control as a prospective predictor of posttraumatic stress symptomatology

Attentional control may be used by trauma survivors to temporarily disengage and shift attention from threat salient information, allowing individuals to remain in, and habituate to, trauma-relevant contexts rather than using less adaptive regulatory strategies. Thus, greater attentional control abilities may be one factor that differentiates those who recover from trauma exposure from those who do not. In the present study, we examined attentional control as a prospective predictor of posttraumatic (PTS) symptoms over the course of two assessment sessions (T1 and T2). Consistent with the hypothesis that attentional control can be used to alleviate trauma-related distress, we predicted that an inverse relation between T1 attentional control and T2 PTS symptoms would be significantly stronger among participants who had experienced a traumatic event between time points (24% of the total sample: N = 85). Pre-T1 trauma history and T1 PTS symptoms served as covariates in regression analysis. Results revealed that T1 attentional control only predicted T2 PTS symptoms for participants who had experienced a traumatic event between time points. Thus, attentional control may be a protective factor against the development of PTS symptomatology in the aftermath of a traumatic event.     

Identifying words that emerge into consciousness: Effects of word valence and unconscious previewing

Words with negative valence capture attention and this increase in attentional resources typically enhances perceptual processing. Recently, data using continuous flash suppression (CFS) appear to contradict this. In prior research when Chinese words were unconsciously presented in CFS and contrast was raised until the word was identified, RTs to identify words with negative valence were slower than RTs to words with neutral valence. This result might be limited to situations where a logographic writing system is used and could reflect a type of cognitive aftereffect where previewing the word causes habituation. Data (N = 60) indicate that results generalize from a logographic (Chinese) to an orthographic writing system (English). In addition, when words were previewed in CFS RTs were slowed for words with negative valence relative to words with neutral valence and this was reversed when words were shown binocularly. Implications for theories of unconscious word processing and cognitive aftereffects are discussed.     

Are attentional resources a mediator for sex differences in memory?

The divided attention paradigm was used to investigate sex differences in encoding and retrieval processes of memory. Participants performed a memory and reaction time (RT) task under full attention and two divided attention conditions, that is, at encoding and retrieval. Results revealed that females recalled significantly more words than males under the full attention and divided attention at encoding conditions. Results further showed that secondary task costs were larger for males than females during divided attention at retrieval. Furthermore, regardless of sex, recall was best under full attention and worst under divided attention at encoding conditions. In relation to the RT task, RTs were shorter under full attention and longer under the divided attention at retrieval condition. Overall, these results show that females recall more words than males possibly due to a more severe effect of reduced attention during encoding than retrieval for males. The current findings thus suggest that a reduction in attentional resources may mediate sex‐related decreases in word recall.     

Questioning the goal-switching account of the AB: comment on Ferlazzo et al. (2007)

Identification of the second of two targets (T2) is impaired when presented less than about 500?ms after the first (T1; Attentional Blink: AB). Although the AB is known to be remarkably robust across many manipulations, [Ferlazzo, F., Lucido, S., Di Nocera, F., Fagioli, S., &; Sdoia, S. (2007). Switching between goals mediates the attentional blink effect. Experimental Psychology, 54, 89–98; Ferlazzo, F., Faglioli, S., Sdoia, S., &; Di Nocera, F. (2008). Goal-completion processes affect the attentional blink. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 20, 697–710] found it to be substantially attenuated when the observers were set to accomplish a single goal (e.g. reporting the sum of the T1 and T2 digits) instead of a dual goal (reporting T1 and T2 separately). The larger AB obtained with the dual-goal set was ascribed to the attentional switch necessitated by the goal-switch between T1 and T2. This conclusion is questionable on three grounds: non-equivalent scoring procedures across conditions, range of inter-target lags, and unreliability of the baseline level. These issues were addressed in the present study. Contrary to Ferlazzo et al.’s conclusions, we found no AB attenuation in the single-goal, relative to the dual-goal condition.     

Once the money is in sight: Distinctive effects of conscious and unconscious rewards on task performance

Monetary rewards facilitate performance on behavioral and cognitive tasks, even when these rewards are perceived without conscious awareness. Also, recent research suggests that consciously (vs. unconsciously) perceived rewards may prompt people to more strongly concentrate on task stimuli and details. Here we propose that the latter is sometimes dysfunctional, in that it prevents improvements in task performance. We used an Attentional Blink paradigm, in which such enhanced concentration on task stimuli is detrimental to performance. Participants were consciously (supraliminally) or unconsciously (subliminally) exposed to a high-value or low-value coin that they could earn by performing well on an Attentional Blink trial. As hypothesized, high-value rewards increased performance when they were presented subliminally, while this performance benefit vanished when high-value rewards were presented consciously. We discuss this finding in the context of recent research on unconscious goal pursuit.     

Attentional set-shifting in fragile X syndrome

The ability to flexibly adapt to the changing demands of the environment is often reported as a core deficit in fragile X syndrome (FXS). However, the cognitive processes that determine this attentional set-shifting deficit remain elusive. The present study investigated attentional set-shifting ability in fragile X syndrome males with the well-validated intra/extra dimensional set-shifting paradigm (IED) which offers detailed assessment of rule learning, reversal learning, and attentional set-shifting ability within and between stimulus dimensions. A novel scoring method for IED stage errors was employed to interpret set-shifting failure in terms of repetitive decision-making, distraction to irrelevance, and set-maintenance failure. Performance of FXS males was compared to typically developing children matched on mental age, adults matched on chronological age, and individuals with Down syndrome matched on both mental and chronological age. Results revealed that a significant proportion of FXS males already failed prior to the intra-dimensional set-shift stage, whereas all control participants successfully completed the stages up to the crucial extra-dimensional set-shift. FXS males showed a specific weakness in reversal learning, which was characterized by repetitive decision-making during the reversal of newly acquired stimulus-response associations in the face of simple stimulus configurations. In contrast, when stimulus configurations became more complex, FXS males displayed increased distraction to irrelevant stimuli. These findings are interpreted in terms of the cognitive demands imposed by the stages of the IED in relation to the alleged neural deficits in FXS.     

Valence-specific laterality effects in vocal emotion: interactions with stimulus type, blocking and sex

Valence-specific laterality effects have been frequently obtained in facial emotion perception but not in vocal emotion perception. We report a dichotic listening study further examining whether valence-specific laterality effects generalise to vocal emotions. Based on previous literature, we tested whether valence-specific laterality effects were dependent on blocked presentation of the emotion conditions, on the naturalness of the emotional stimuli, or on listener sex. We presented happy and sad sentences, paired with neutral counterparts, dichotically in an emotion localisation task, with vocal stimuli being preceded by verbal labels indicating target emotions. The measure was accuracy. When stimuli of the same emotion were presented as a block, a valence-specific laterality effect was demonstrated, but only in original stimuli and not morphed stimuli. There was a separate interaction with listener sex. We interpret our findings as suggesting that the valence-specific laterality hypothesis is supported only in certain circumstances. We discuss modulating factors, and we consider whether the mechanisms underlying those factors may be attentional or experiential in nature.