Word Meanings Evolve to Selectively Preserve Distinctions on Salient Dimensions

Words refer to objects in the world, but this correspondence is not one‐to‐one: Each word has a range of referents that share features on some dimensions but differ on others. This property of language is called underspecification. Parts of the lexicon have characteristic patterns of underspecification; for example, artifact nouns tend to specify shape, but not color, whereas substance nouns specify material but not shape. These regularities in the lexicon enable learners to generalize new words appropriately. How does the lexicon come to have these helpful regularities? We test the hypothesis that systematic backgrounding of some dimensions during learning and use causes language to gradually change, over repeated episodes of transmission, to produce a lexicon with strong patterns of underspecification across these less salient dimensions. This offers a cultural evolutionary mechanism linking individual word learning and generalization to the origin of regularities in the lexicon that help learners generalize words appropriately.     

Reset a task set after five minutes of mindfulness practice

This study aimed to evaluate the impact of a brief mindfulness practice on reducing the carryover effect caused by a previous task set and to determine the mechanism for its effectiveness. Experiment 1 showed that a memorized color interfered with subsequent visual search as a singleton distractor only when color was a defining feature for the search target. In Experiment 2, three interventions (scene-viewing, distraction, and mindfulness practice) were implemented across three groups for five minutes between two blocks; color was relevant to search in the first block and irrelevant in the second. Only the mindfulness group showed a non-significant carryover effect. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the scene-viewing participants continued adopting a suppressive mode of attentional control on a previously distracting color during letter judgment. In contrast, mindfulness practice could reset a task set. Mindfulness practice could enhance concentration in the present moment via reconfiguring the mode of attentional control.     

The modulation of reward priority by top-down knowledge

Reward-associated features capture attention automatically and continue to do so even when the reward contingencies are removed. This profile has led to the hypothesis that rewards belong to a separate class of attentional biases that is neither typically top-down nor bottom-up. The goal of these experiments was to understand the degree to which top-down knowledge can modulate value-driven attentional capture within (a) the timecourse of a single trial and (b) when the reward contingencies change explicitly over trials. The results suggested that top-down knowledge does not affect the size of value-driven attentional capture within a single trial. There were clear top-down modulations in the magnitude of value-driven capture when reward contingencies explicitly changed, but the original reward associations continued to have a persistent bias on attention. These results contribute to a growing body of evidence that reward associations bias attention through mechanisms separate from other top-down and bottom-up attentional biases.     

Affective stimuli capture attention regardless of categorical distinctiveness: An emotion-induced blindness study

Affective stimuli capture attention, whether their affective value stems from emotional content or a history of reward. The uniqueness of such stimuli within their experimental contexts might imbue them with an enhanced categorical distinctiveness that accounts for their impact on attention. Indeed, in emotion-induced blindness, categorically distinctive neutral pictures disrupt target perception, albeit to a lesser degree than do emotional pictures. Here, we manipulated the categorical distinctiveness of distractors in an emotion-induced blindness task. Participants searched within RSVP streams for a target that followed an emotional or a neutral distractor picture. In a categorically homogenous condition, all non-distractor items were exemplars from a uniform category, thus enhancing the distractor's categorical distinctiveness. In a categorically heterogeneous condition, each non-distractor item represented a distinct category. Neutral distractors disrupted target perception only in the homogenous condition, but emotional distractors did so regardless of their categorical distinctiveness.     

Decreased approach motivation in depression

The present study examined relations between choice preference and reaction time to emotionally valenced words, dysphoric symptoms (BDI), and dysfunctional attitudes (DAS) in clinically depressed (CD; n= 61), previously depressed (PD; n= 42), and never depressed controls (ND; n= 46). The results showed: (1) NDs and PDs exhibited a choice preference for the relatively more positive words and differed significantly from CDs; (2) PDs and CDs exhibited longer reaction time and differed significantly from NDs; and (3) BDI and DAS were positively associated with reaction time to positively valenced words, whereas no associations were found for reaction time to negatively valenced words. The increased reaction time, in PDs and CDs, is discussed as a possible vulnerability factor to depression, which may be related to decreased approach motivation.     

The effect of attention modification with explicit vs. minimal instructions on worry

In this experiment we investigated the effect of different instructions on the modification of attentional biases, and subsequently on worry persistence. Participants without excessive worry completed a modified dot-probe task, designed to train attention either to threat or neutral words. Half of each group was given explicit instructions regarding the relationship between word valence and target location, and half were given the more usual minimal instructions. Impact on worry persistence was assessed by categorizing the valence of thought intrusions before and after a period of instructed worry. Response latencies to test items on the dot-probe task showed that attention had been successfully manipulated in the expected direction, and explicit instructions led to more effective attention modification. Moreover, participants in the attend-threat group who received explicit instructions reported significantly more negative thought intrusions following instructed worry, as rated by an assessor, whereas participants in the attend-neutral group did not. These findings suggest that an attentional bias towards threatening information plays a role in worry persistence, and that explicit instructions may be helpful in modifying this bias.     

A Question of Foot Dominance

It is suggested that the popular definition of foot dominance (i.e., the limb preferred to execute a manipulative or mobilizing action while the other [nondominant] foot provides stabilizing support, e.g., kicking a ball) be reconsidered in light of understanding the functional characteristics of footedness and selected theoretical explanations. Relevance to future research designs and assessment methodology is discussed.     

Cognitive biases and alcohol use in adolescence and young adulthood: The moderating role of gender,attentional control and inhibitory control

The present study investigated the cross-sectional associations between cognitive biases (i.e., attentional bias and approach bias) and alcohol use and investigated the moderating role of gender, attentional control and inhibitory control. The sample consisted of 94 adolescents and young adults (52.1% boys) between 15.3 and 20.8 years old (M_age = 18.0, SD = 1.1) who reported drinking alcohol in the past three months. A stronger approach bias was related to higher alcohol use, albeit only among boys. Furthermore, the association between attentional bias and alcohol use was moderated by attentional control; the lowest alcohol use was found in adolescents with low attentional bias and high attentional control, suggesting protective effects of both variables. The present study replicates and extends the results of studies on cognitive biases and addiction in adolescence and young adulthood.     

The deliberate control of emotional experience through control of expressions

Recent research suggests that deliberate manipulation of expressive behaviours might self-regulate emotional experiences. Eighty people were first induced to adopt emotional expressions in a successfully disguised procedure that identified whether their feelings were affected by their expressive behaviour when they were unaware of the nature and purpose of that behaviour. They then deliberately attempted to change emotional feelings by adopting or inhibiting emotional behaviours, or by focusing on or being distracted from situational cues for emotion. Participants more responsive to their own behaviour in the disguised procedure felt more intensely when they adopted emotional behaviours, and less intensely when they inhibited those behaviours. In contrast, people identified as unresponsive to their own emotional behaviour were most affected by deliberate focus on or distraction from emotional thoughts. The effectiveness of techniques for emotional self-regulation depends on a match with characteristics of the person.     

Components of working memory predict symptoms of distress

Working memory (WM) is a cognitive system that allows us to select, organise, and integrate perceptual information with memories and current goal-directed intentions. As such, this system is central to day-to-day functioning and would be expected to be especially important in decision making and problem solving. We hypothesised that to the extent that individuals differ in WM capacity they would also be differentially vulnerable to the experience of depression and anxiety. Undergraduate students completed a computerised change detection task in which storage capacity and filtering efficiency measures were obtained. It was found that low WM storage and poor filtering efficiency interacted to predict higher levels of emotional distress as measured by self-reported depressive symptoms, ruminative coping, and state anxiety. It was suggested that low capacity and a poor ability to ignore task-irrelevant information may lead to poorer problem solving, more extreme judgements of oneself and circumstances, increased rumination, and poorer emotional regulation.