Attentional biases to threat in social anxiety disorder: time to focus our attention elsewhere?

Background: Cognitive models propose that attentional biases to threat contribute to the maintenance of social anxiety disorder (SAD). However, the specific characteristics of such biases are still object to debate.

Objectives: The current study aimed to disentangle effects of trait and state social anxiety on attention allocation towards social stimuli.

Methods: Participants with SAD (n?=?67) and healthy controls (n?=?62) completed three visual search tasks while their eye movements were recorded. Half of the participants in each group were randomly assigned to a state anxiety induction.

Results: Contrary to our predictions, neither trait nor state social anxiety was associated with a facilitated attention to or a delayed disengagement from threat. However, participants with SAD did show reduced fixation durations for threatening stimuli, indicating an avoidance of threat. Induction of state anxiety led to an increased distractibility by threat.

Conclusions: We suggest that attention allocation in SAD is characterized by an avoidant rather than a vigilant attentional bias. Accordingly, our results contradict previous results that associate SAD with facilitated attention to threat and existing approaches to modify attentional biases, that aim to decrease attention towards threatening stimuli.     

Of guns and snakes: testing a modern threat superiority effect*

Previous studies suggest that ancient (i.e. evolutionary-based) threats capture attention because human beings possess an inborn module shaped by evolution and dedicated to their detection. An alternative account proposes that a key feature predicting whether a stimulus will capture attention is its relevance rather than its ontology (i.e. phylogenetic or ontogenetic threat). Within this framework, the present research deals with the attentional capture by threats commonly encountered in our urban environment. In two experiments, we investigate the attentional capture by modern threats (i.e. weapons). In Experiment 1, participants responded to a target preceded by a cue, which was a weapon or a non-threatening stimulus. We found a larger cuing effect (faster reaction times to valid vs. invalid trials) with weapons as compared with non-threatening cues. In Experiment 2, modern (e.g. weapons) and ancient threats (e.g. snakes) were pitted against one another as cues to determine which ones preferentially capture attention. Crucially, participants were faster to detect a target preceded by a modern as opposed to an ancient threat, providing initial evidence for a superiority of modern threat. Overall, the present findings appear more consistent with a relevance-based explanation rather than an evolutionary-based explanation of threat detection.     

In the grip of fear: Dissociations in attentional processing of animal fearful individuals

Using a modified attention paradigm we investigated specific attentional mechanisms in processing animal feared stimuli. In this paradigm arrays of four pictures were displayed and after its disappearance from view a probe (a letter, X or P) then followed unpredictably in the location of one of the four pictures. The results showed that discriminations of probes tended to be impeded by spider stimuli, compared to snake stimuli. This effect was potentiated by high anxiety but only for those individuals fearful of spiders, since no such effect was observed for snake fearful individuals. Moreover, the discrimination of the probes was not facilitated when presented after the feared stimuli. The implications of these findings are discussed as a function of the cognitive bias involved in specific fear.     

Word Meanings Evolve to Selectively Preserve Distinctions on Salient Dimensions

Words refer to objects in the world, but this correspondence is not one‐to‐one: Each word has a range of referents that share features on some dimensions but differ on others. This property of language is called underspecification. Parts of the lexicon have characteristic patterns of underspecification; for example, artifact nouns tend to specify shape, but not color, whereas substance nouns specify material but not shape. These regularities in the lexicon enable learners to generalize new words appropriately. How does the lexicon come to have these helpful regularities? We test the hypothesis that systematic backgrounding of some dimensions during learning and use causes language to gradually change, over repeated episodes of transmission, to produce a lexicon with strong patterns of underspecification across these less salient dimensions. This offers a cultural evolutionary mechanism linking individual word learning and generalization to the origin of regularities in the lexicon that help learners generalize words appropriately.     

Reset a task set after five minutes of mindfulness practice

This study aimed to evaluate the impact of a brief mindfulness practice on reducing the carryover effect caused by a previous task set and to determine the mechanism for its effectiveness. Experiment 1 showed that a memorized color interfered with subsequent visual search as a singleton distractor only when color was a defining feature for the search target. In Experiment 2, three interventions (scene-viewing, distraction, and mindfulness practice) were implemented across three groups for five minutes between two blocks; color was relevant to search in the first block and irrelevant in the second. Only the mindfulness group showed a non-significant carryover effect. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the scene-viewing participants continued adopting a suppressive mode of attentional control on a previously distracting color during letter judgment. In contrast, mindfulness practice could reset a task set. Mindfulness practice could enhance concentration in the present moment via reconfiguring the mode of attentional control.     

The modulation of reward priority by top-down knowledge

Reward-associated features capture attention automatically and continue to do so even when the reward contingencies are removed. This profile has led to the hypothesis that rewards belong to a separate class of attentional biases that is neither typically top-down nor bottom-up. The goal of these experiments was to understand the degree to which top-down knowledge can modulate value-driven attentional capture within (a) the timecourse of a single trial and (b) when the reward contingencies change explicitly over trials. The results suggested that top-down knowledge does not affect the size of value-driven attentional capture within a single trial. There were clear top-down modulations in the magnitude of value-driven capture when reward contingencies explicitly changed, but the original reward associations continued to have a persistent bias on attention. These results contribute to a growing body of evidence that reward associations bias attention through mechanisms separate from other top-down and bottom-up attentional biases.     

Affective stimuli capture attention regardless of categorical distinctiveness: An emotion-induced blindness study

Affective stimuli capture attention, whether their affective value stems from emotional content or a history of reward. The uniqueness of such stimuli within their experimental contexts might imbue them with an enhanced categorical distinctiveness that accounts for their impact on attention. Indeed, in emotion-induced blindness, categorically distinctive neutral pictures disrupt target perception, albeit to a lesser degree than do emotional pictures. Here, we manipulated the categorical distinctiveness of distractors in an emotion-induced blindness task. Participants searched within RSVP streams for a target that followed an emotional or a neutral distractor picture. In a categorically homogenous condition, all non-distractor items were exemplars from a uniform category, thus enhancing the distractor's categorical distinctiveness. In a categorically heterogeneous condition, each non-distractor item represented a distinct category. Neutral distractors disrupted target perception only in the homogenous condition, but emotional distractors did so regardless of their categorical distinctiveness.     

Decreased approach motivation in depression

The present study examined relations between choice preference and reaction time to emotionally valenced words, dysphoric symptoms (BDI), and dysfunctional attitudes (DAS) in clinically depressed (CD; n= 61), previously depressed (PD; n= 42), and never depressed controls (ND; n= 46). The results showed: (1) NDs and PDs exhibited a choice preference for the relatively more positive words and differed significantly from CDs; (2) PDs and CDs exhibited longer reaction time and differed significantly from NDs; and (3) BDI and DAS were positively associated with reaction time to positively valenced words, whereas no associations were found for reaction time to negatively valenced words. The increased reaction time, in PDs and CDs, is discussed as a possible vulnerability factor to depression, which may be related to decreased approach motivation.     

The effect of attention modification with explicit vs. minimal instructions on worry

In this experiment we investigated the effect of different instructions on the modification of attentional biases, and subsequently on worry persistence. Participants without excessive worry completed a modified dot-probe task, designed to train attention either to threat or neutral words. Half of each group was given explicit instructions regarding the relationship between word valence and target location, and half were given the more usual minimal instructions. Impact on worry persistence was assessed by categorizing the valence of thought intrusions before and after a period of instructed worry. Response latencies to test items on the dot-probe task showed that attention had been successfully manipulated in the expected direction, and explicit instructions led to more effective attention modification. Moreover, participants in the attend-threat group who received explicit instructions reported significantly more negative thought intrusions following instructed worry, as rated by an assessor, whereas participants in the attend-neutral group did not. These findings suggest that an attentional bias towards threatening information plays a role in worry persistence, and that explicit instructions may be helpful in modifying this bias.     

Cognitive biases and alcohol use in adolescence and young adulthood: The moderating role of gender,attentional control and inhibitory control

The present study investigated the cross-sectional associations between cognitive biases (i.e., attentional bias and approach bias) and alcohol use and investigated the moderating role of gender, attentional control and inhibitory control. The sample consisted of 94 adolescents and young adults (52.1% boys) between 15.3 and 20.8 years old (M_age = 18.0, SD = 1.1) who reported drinking alcohol in the past three months. A stronger approach bias was related to higher alcohol use, albeit only among boys. Furthermore, the association between attentional bias and alcohol use was moderated by attentional control; the lowest alcohol use was found in adolescents with low attentional bias and high attentional control, suggesting protective effects of both variables. The present study replicates and extends the results of studies on cognitive biases and addiction in adolescence and young adulthood.