Studies on time: a proposal on how to get out of circularity

The analysis of time is vitiated very often by circularity: several disciplines, such as psychology, linguistics, and neurosciences, analyze time by using concepts or terms which already contain in themselves, or are based, on the experience and notion of time (as when, for example, time is defined as “duration”, or when our ability to estimate durations is explained by resorting to the notion of an internal clock). Some detailed examples of circularity in the analysis of time are given here and examined. A way out of circularity is then given: it is represented by the proposal of attentional semantics (AS) of considering words and their meanings in terms of the aim they serve, and the means and processes developed and implemented in order to achieve that aim. According to AS, the main aim of words is that of indicating to, and eliciting in, the listener or reader a specific conscious experience: namely, the conscious experience referred to by their meanings. Words achieve their main aim by conveying the condensed instructions on the attentional operations one has to perform if one wants to consciously experience what is expressed through and by them. By describing the conscious experiences elicited by words in terms of the attentional operations that are responsible for the production of such conscious experiences, AS offers an a-linguistic counterpart to language, and therefore an effective way out of circularity. Following in footsteps of Mach (Contributions to the analysis of the sensations, 1890), but slightly revising his hypothesis, AS defines time-sensation as the perception of the effort made, or alternatively the nervous energy expended, by the organ of attention when performing a “temporal activity” (for instance, estimating duration), that is, when one’s own attention is focused in a continuous and incremental way on the conscious product of the (“non-temporal”) activity performed by means of another portion of one’s attention.

Implicit Motives Modulate Attentional Orienting to Facial Expressions of Emotion

We conducted two studies (Ns=52 and 60) to test the notion that the incentive salience of facial expressions of emotion (FEE) is a joint function of perceivers’ implicit needs for power and affiliation and the FEE’s meaning as a dominance or affiliation signal. We used a variant of the dot-probe task (Mogg & Bradley, 1999a) to measure attentional orienting. Joy, anger, surprise, and neutral FEEs were presented for 12, 116, and 231 ms with backward masking. Implicit motives were assessed with a Picture Story Exercise. We found that power-motivated individuals orient their attention towards faces signaling low dominance, but away from faces that signal high dominance, and (b) that affiliation-motivated individuals show vigilance for faces signaling low affiliation (rejection) and, to a lesser extent, orient attention towards faces signaling high affiliation (acceptance).     

负性情绪对注意促进效应的调节

近期研究发现,目标探测性质的注意分散并不会削弱,甚至会提高与之同时进行的记忆任务成绩,表现出注意促进效应（ABE）,但该效应可能会受到记忆材料独特性的调节。为了验证该假设,本文采用负性刺激为记忆材料,以目标探测任务为干扰任务,探讨负性情绪对ABE的调节。结果发现,与中性材料相比,负性材料的ABE有所减弱;而高唤醒的负性材料则没有表现出任何的ABE。可见目标探测所产生的促进作用会受到背景材料是否具有独特性的限制。     

Sad people are more accurate at face recognition than happy people

Mood has varied effects on cognitive performance including the accuracy of face recognition (Lundh & Ost, 1996). Three experiments are presented here that explored face recognition abilities in mood-induced participants. Experiment 1 demonstrated that happy-induced participants are less accurate and have a more conservative response bias than sad-induced participants in a face recognition task. Using a remember/know/guess procedure, Experiment 2 showed that sad-induced participants had more conscious recollections of faces than happy-induced participants. Additionally, sad-induced participants could recognise all faces accurately, whereas, happy- and neutral-induced participants recognised happy faces more accurately than sad faces. In Experiment 3, these effects were not observed when participants intentionally learnt the faces, rather than incidentally learnt the faces. It is suggested that happy-induced participants do not process faces as elaborately as sad-induced participants.     

Attention during visual secondary tasks in driving: Adaptation to the demands of the driving task

Visual attention in driving with visual secondary task is compared for two visual secondary tasks. N = 40 subjects completed a 1 h test drive in a motion-base driving simulator. During the drive, participants either solved an externally paced, highly demanding visual task or a self paced menu system task. The secondary tasks were offered in defined critical and non-critical driving situations. Eye movement behavior was analyzed and compared for both tasks. Before starting the secondary tasks, eye movement behavior shows a smaller standard deviation of gaze as well as longer fixation durations for both tasks. The comparison between the two tasks indicates that drivers use the possibilities the self paced task offers: during the secondary task, they monitor the driving scene with longer fixations and show a greater standard deviation of gaze position. Furthermore, independently of the type of secondary task, drivers adapt their eye movement behavior to the demands of the situation. In critical driving situations they direct a larger proportion of glance time to the driving task. Last, the relation between glance behavior and collisions is analyzed. Results indicate that collisions go together with an inadequate distribution of attention during distraction. The results are interpreted regarding the attentional processes involved in driving with visual secondary tasks. Based on the similarities and differences between the two secondary tasks, a cognitive approach is developed which assumes that the control of attention during distraction is based on a mental situational model of the driving situation.     

Actions modulate attentional capture

The purpose of the present study was to determine whether the action system plays a role in determining which stimulus characteristics capture attention by assessing the interference effects caused by dynamic discontinuities that have similar attention-capturing properties, but different action affordances. Results revealed that offset distractors caused significant interference when onset targets were presented in a keypress task, but did not increase reaction times when the same onset targets were presented in a goal-directed aiming task. In contrast, onset distractors caused interference when offset targets were presented in both keypress and aiming tasks. This pattern of results suggests that the attentional set, and thus the properties of stimuli that capture attention, is modulated by the interaction between stimulus and response expectations.     

Memory reloaded: Memory load effects in the attentional blink

When two targets are presented in rapid succession, identification of the first is nearly perfect, while identification of the second is impaired when it follows the first by less than about 700 ms. According to bottleneck models, this attentional blink (AB) occurs because the second target is unable to gain access to capacity-limited working memory processes already occupied by the first target. Evidence for this hypothesis, however, has been mixed, with recent reports suggesting that increasing working memory load does not affect the AB. The present paper explores possible reasons for failures to find a link between memory load and the AB and shows that a reliable effect of load can be obtained when the item directly after T1 (Target 1) is omitted. This finding provides initial evidence that working memory load can influence the AB and additional evidence for a link between T1 processing time and the AB predicted by bottleneck models.     

Investigating the nature and time-course of the modality shift effect between vision and touch

It is well known that stimuli grab attention to their location, but do they also grab attention to their sensory modality? The modality shift effect (MSE), the observation that responding to a stimulus leads to reaction time benefits for subsequent stimuli in the same modality, suggests that this may be the case. If noninformative cue stimuli, which do not require a response, also lead to benefits for their modality, this would suggest that the effect is automatic. We investigated the time-course of the visuotactile MSE and the difference between the effects of cues and targets. In Experiment 1, when visual and tactile tasks and stimulus locations were matched, uninformative cues did not lead to reaction time benefits for targets in the same modality. However, the modality of the previous target led to a significant MSE. Only stimuli that require a response, therefore, appear to lead to reaction time benefits for their modality. In Experiment 2, increasing attention to the cue stimuli attenuated the effect of the previous target, but the cues still did not lead to a MSE. In Experiment 3, a MSE was demonstrated between successive targets, and this effect decreased with increasing intertrial intervals. Overall, these studies demonstrate how cue- and target-induced effects interact and suggest that modalities do not automatically capture attention as locations do; rather, the MSE is more similar to other task repetition effects.     

Reward expectancy promotes generalized increases in attentional bias for rewarding stimuli

Expectations of drug availability increase the magnitude of attentional biases for drug-related cues. However, it is unknown whether these effects are outcome specific, or whether expectation of a specific reinforcer produces a general enhancement of attentional bias for other types of rewarding cues. In the present study, 31 social drinkers completed an eye-tracking task in which attentional bias for alcohol- and chocolate-related cues was assessed while the expectation of receiving alcohol and chocolate was manipulated on a trial-by-trial basis. Participants showed attentional bias for alcohol and chocolate cues (relative to neutral cues) overall. Importantly, these attentional biases for reward cues were magnified when participants expected to receive alcohol and chocolate, but effects were not outcome specific: The expectation of receiving either alcohol or chocolate increased attentional bias for both alcohol and chocolate cues. Results suggest that anticipation of reward produces a general rather than an outcome-specific enhancement of attentional bias for reward-related stimuli.     

Attentional sets influence perceptual load effects,but not dilution effects

Perceptual load theory [Lavie, N. (1995). Perceptual load as a necessary condition for selective attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21, 451–468.; Lavie, N., & Tsal, Y. (1994) Perceptual load as a major determinant of the locus of selection in visual attention. Perception & Psychophysics, 56, 183–197.] proposes that interference from distractors can only be avoided in situations of high perceptual load. This theory has been supported by blocked design manipulations separating low load (when the target appears alone) and high load (when the target is embedded among neutral letters). Tsal and Benoni [(2010a). Diluting the burden of load: Perceptual load effects are simply dilution effects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 36, 1645–1656.; Benoni, H., & Tsal, Y. (2010). Where have we gone wrong? Perceptual load does not affect selective attention. Vision Research, 50, 1292–1298.] have recently shown that these manipulations confound perceptual load with “dilution” (the mere presence of additional heterogeneous items in high-load situations). Theeuwes, Kramer, and Belopolsky [(2004). Attentional set interacts with perceptual load in visual search. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11, 697–702.] independently questioned load theory by suggesting that attentional sets might also affect distractor interference. When high load and low load were intermixed, and participants could not prepare for the presentation that followed, both the low-load and high-load trials showed distractor interference. This result may also challenge the dilution account, which proposes a stimulus-driven mechanism. In the current study, we presented subjects with both fixed and mixed blocks, including a mix of dilution trials with low-load trials and with high-load trials. We thus separated the effect of dilution from load and tested the influence of attentional sets on each component. The results revealed that whereas perceptual load effects are influenced by attentional sets, the dilution component is not. This strengthens the notion that dilution is a stimulus-driven mechanism, which enables effective selectivity.