Rich interpretation vs. deflationary accounts in cognitive development: the case of means-end skills in 7-month-old infants

Seven-month-old infants appear to learn means-end skills, such as pushing a button to retrieve a distant toy (Psychological Review 104 (1997) 686). The present studies tested whether such apparent means-end behaviors are genuine, or simply the repetition of trained behaviors under conditions of greatest arousal, as suggested by a dynamic systems reinterpretation. When infants were trained to repeat behaviors that did not serve as means to retrieving toys (pushing a button to light a set of distant lights), their button-pushing differed significantly from infants for whom button-pushing served as a means for retrieving toys. Further, infants demonstrated means-end skills with behaviors that they had not been trained to repeat. Implications for early means-end abilities and for debates surrounding the interpretation of infant behavior are discussed.     

Development of rules and strategies: balancing the old and the new

The experiments described in the lead articles replicate findings from previous studies of development of knowledge about balance scales, add several new findings, and raise four key questions: (a) How can rule use best be assessed? (b) How can we reconcile systematic use of rules with variable use of strategies? (c) When do children begin to use rules? and (d) How do children generate new rules? In this Reflection, we summarize current understanding of development of knowledge about balance scales and consider each of the four questions.     

Relating print and speech: the effects of letter names and word position on reading and spelling performance

From an early age, children can go beyond rote memorization to form links between print and speech that are based on letter names in the initial positions of words (Treiman & Rodriguez, 1999; Treiman, Sotak, & Bowman, 2001). For example, children's knowledge of the name of the letter t helps them learn that the novel word TM is pronounced as team. Four experiments were carried out to determine whether letter names at the ends of words are equally useful. Four- and five-year-olds derived little benefit from such information in reading (Experiments 1 and 3) or spelling (Experiment 2), although adults did (Experiment 4). For young children, word-final information appears to have less influence on reading and spelling performance than does word-initial information. The results help delineate the circumstances under which children can go beyond a logographic approach in learning about print.     

Developmental and content effects in reasoning with causal conditionals

Two predictions derived from Markovits and Barrouillet's (2001) developmental model of conditional reasoning were tested in a study in which 72 twelve-year-olds, 80 fifteen-year-olds, and 104 adults received a paper-and-pencil test of conditional reasoning with causal premises ("if cause P then effect Q"). First, we predicted that conditional premises would induce more correct uncertainty responses to the Affirmation of the consequent and Denial of the antecedent forms when the antecedent term is weakly associated to the consequent than when the two are strongly associated and that this effect would decrease with age. Second, uncertainty responding to the Denial of the antecedent form ("P is not true") should be easier when the formulation of the minor premise invites retrieval of alternate antecedents ("if something other than P is true"). The results were consistent with the hypotheses and indicate the importance of retrieval processes in understanding developmental patterns in conditional reasoning with familiar premises.     

Groups to Resolve Conflicts Between Groups: Diplomacy with a Therapeutic Dimension

The group self, an individual's self-perception as a member of a group, is distinguished from the group's self, a personification of the group as a person with a self. The perceived group's self of an opposing other group is often a repository for attributes group members are not ready to recognize in their own group's self. Theoretically, the need for an adversarial other to hold one's own group's unwanted attributes—and thus to complete one's own group's self—contributes, however unconsciously, to the apparent intractability of intergroup disputes. In dealing with these issues, I compare intergroup conflict resolution (ICR) groups with therapy groups, on the one hand, and advocacy groups on the other. All of this sets the stage for a presentation of two ICR projects and their analysis in group-developmental terms.