A collective unconscious reconsidered: Jung's archetypal imagination in the light of contemporary psychology and social science

A needed rapprochement between Jung and the contemporary human sciences may rest less on the much debated relevance of a biologistic collective unconscious than on a re-inscribing of an archetypal imagination, as the phenomenological and empirical core of Jungian psychology. The most promising approaches in this regard in terms of theory and research in psychology come from combining the cognitive psychology of metaphor and synaesthesia, individual differences in imaginative absorption and openness to numinous experience and spirituality as a form of symbolic intelligence. On the socio-cultural side, this cognitive psychology of archetypal imagination is also congruent with Lévi-Strauss on the metaphoric roots of mythological thinking, and Durkheim on a sociology of collective consciousness. This conjoined perspective, while validating the cross cultural commonality of physical metaphor intuited by Jung and Hillman on alchemy, also shows Jung's Red Book, considered as the expressive source for his more formal psychology, to be far closer in spirit to a socio-cultural collective consciousness, based on metaphoric imagination, than to a phylogenetic or evolutionary unconscious. A mutual re-inscribing of Jung into congruent areas of contemporary psychology, anthropology, sociology, and vice versa, can help to further validate Jung's key observations and is fully consistent with Jung's own early efforts at synthesis within the human sciences.     

Trait emotional intelligence and mental distress: The mediating role of positive and negative affect

Over the past decade, emotional intelligence (EI) has received much attention in the literature. Previous studies indicated that higher trait or ability EI was associated with greater mental distress. The present study focused on mediating effects of positive and negative affect on the association between trait EI and mental distress in a sample of Chinese adults. The participants were 726 Chinese adults (384 females) with an age range of 18–60 years. Data were collected by using the Wong Law Emotional Intelligence Scale, the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scale, and the General Health Questionnaire. Hierarchical regression analysis showed that EI was a significant predictor of positive affect, negative affect and mental distress. Further mediation analysis showed that positive and negative affect acted as partial mediators of the relationship between EI and mental distress. Furthermore, effect contrasts showed that there was no significant difference between the specific indirect effects through positive affect and through negative affect. This result indicated that positive affect and negative affect played an equally important function in the association between EI and distress. The significance and limitations of the results are discussed.     

Emotional Intelligence and Interpersonal Relations

Abstract

In 7 studies, the authors examined the link between emotional intelligence and interpersonal relations. In Studies 1 and 2, the participants with higher scores for emotional intelligence had higher scores for empathic perspective taking and self-monitoring in social situations. In Study 3, the participants with higher scores for emotional intelligence had higher scores for social skills. In Study 4, the participants with higher scores for emotional intelligence displayed more cooperative responses toward partners. In Study 5, the participants with higher scores for emotional intelligence had higher scores for close and affectionate relationships. In Study 6, the participants' scores for marital satisfaction were higher when they rated their marital partners higher for emotional intelligence. In Study 7, the participants anticipated greater satisfaction in relationships with partners described as having emotional intelligence.     

Fluid insight moderates the relationship between psychoticism and crystallized intelligence

To elucidate potential relationships between personality and intelligence it is necessary to move beyond the ad hoc reporting of correlation coefficients and focus instead on testing deductions from well-established theories. To this end the present paper references Eysenck’s (1995) theoretical work linking the dimension of psychoticism to both psychosis and creative genius. Drawing on this theory it was argued that the relationship between psychoticism and crystallized ability will be conditional on the level of fluid intelligence. Participants (N = 100) completed the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-Revised (EPQ-R) and the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (K-BIT). Moderated multiple regression revealed a significant interaction effect. Crystallized ability (K-BIT vocabulary) was negatively related to psychoticism at low levels of fluid ability (K-BIT matrices) and positively related to psychoticism at high levels of fluid ability. These findings highlight the potential importance of psychoticism within GfGc investment theory.     

Sensitive but not sentimental: Emotionally intelligent people can put their emotions aside when necessary

Are emotionally intelligent people sentimental? Does their greater sensitivity handicap them or are they able, as theory would expect, to experience and regulate emotions flexibly, depending on their goals? We examined this issue in organizational settings. Good managers are indeed expected to be both attuned to feelings (theirs as well as their subordinates’) and able to put them aside when needed to take tough (but necessary) decisions. Our results show that emotionally intelligent managers do make better managers, as reflected by greater managerial competencies, higher team efficiency and less stressed subordinates. Moreover, and most importantly, emotionally intelligent managers are not just nicer managers. As our results show, emotional intelligence has nothing to do with sentimentality. Actually, it is managers with low EI who have the greatest difficulties to put their emotions aside and not let them interfere when inappropriate.     

A Bayesian Model of Biases in Artificial Language Learning: The Case of a Word‐Order Universal

In this article, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian model of learning in a general type of artificial language‐learning experiment in which learners are exposed to a mixture of grammars representing the variation present in real learners’ input, particularly at times of language change. The modeling goal is to formalize and quantify hypothesized learning biases. The test case is an experiment ( Culbertson, Smolensky, & Legendre, 2012 ) targeting the learning of word‐order patterns in the nominal domain. The model identifies internal biases of the experimental participants, providing evidence that learners impose (possibly arbitrary) properties on the grammars they learn, potentially resulting in the cross‐linguistic regularities known as typological universals. Learners exposed to mixtures of artificial grammars tended to shift those mixtures in certain ways rather than others; the model reveals how learners’ inferences are systematically affected by specific prior biases. These biases are in line with a typological generalization—Greenberg's Universal 18—which bans a particular word‐order pattern relating nouns, adjectives, and numerals.     

Discrepancies Between Implicit and Explicit Self‐concepts of Intelligence Predict Performance on Tests of Intelligence

Three studies investigated the correspondence between implicit and explicit self‐concepts of intelligence and how that correspondence is related to performance on different intelligence tests. Configurations of these two self‐concepts were found to be consistently related to performance on intelligence tests in all three studies. For individuals who self‐reported high intelligence (high explicit self‐concept), a negative implicit self‐concept (measured with the Implicit Association Test) led to a decrease in performance on intelligence tests. For participants whose self‐report indicated a low self‐concept of intelligence, positive automatic associations between the self and intelligence had a similar effect. In line with a stress hypothesis, the results indicate that any discrepant configuration of self‐concepts will impair performance. Importantly, the prediction of performance on intelligence tests by the self‐concept of intelligence was shown to be independent of self‐esteem (Study 3). Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The General Factor of Personality and general intelligence: Testing hypotheses from Differential-K,Life History Theory,and strategic differentiation–integration effort

Life history as applied to human psychology has progressed on different levels of analysis including between racial groups (Differential-K) and between individuals (Life History Theory). While the approaches at each level have garnered significant research support, some findings at the level of individual differences are inconsistent with findings from the level of group differences. The association between the General Factor of Personality and general intelligence was examined across and within racial groups to investigate the inconsistency. The results were in line with predictions derived from strategic differentiation–integration effort (SD–IE), the proposition that aggregation amongst variables decreases as life history strategy slows. The results suggest SD–IE may be a useful tool in reconciling the apparent contradictions across the levels of analysis.     

Gender and task confidence as predictors of the Domain-Masculine Intelligence Type (DMIQ)

This study investigated the relationship between gender, ability tests and task confidence as predictors of self-estimated intelligence. Participants estimated their mathematical and spatial intelligence before and after completing various ability tests which they also rated for their probable success. Males rated their intelligence higher than females on both before and after measures, as well on their task estimated probably success. There was no sex difference on the ability test. Gender and actual task success scores were predictors of self-estimates, with the former being twice as powerful as the latter. The results are discussed in terms of gender differences in confidence and expectations when approaching ability tests and their effect on self-estimated intelligence.     

Does integral affect influence intentions to use artificial intelligence for skin cancer screening? A test of the affect heuristic

Objective: This study investigated how affect influences people’s processing of messages about risks and benefits of using autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) technology to screen for skin cancer. We examined integral affect (emotion derived during decision making) separately from incidental affect (extraneous mood states).

Design: Using the affect heuristic framework, we randomly assigned 273 participants to conditions featuring risk (high, low, uncertain) or benefit (high, low, uncertain) messages about AI. Following ‘affect-as-spotlight’, we also explored whether people’s integral affect towards skin cancer moderated the relationship between risk/benefit messages and AI screening intentions.

Outcomes: Perceived risk, perceived benefit, positive and negative affect toward AI, intention to use AI screening.

Results: After controlling for incidental affect and risk perceptions, we found that compared to low risk messages, uncertain risk messages increased participants’ negative affect toward AI, decreased positive affect toward AI, increased AI risk evaluations and reduced AI benefit evaluations. Perceptual variables significantly mediated participants’ intentions to use AI for risk messages but not benefit messages. No moderation effects were found.

Conclusions: Results suggest extending the affect heuristic framework to include uncertain risk conditions. Integral AI affect influenced people’s interpretation of messages, which then impacted likelihood to use AI technology for health.