Causal cognitive architecture 1: Integration of connectionist elements into a navigation-based framework

The brain-inspired Causal Cognitive Architecture 1 (CCA1) tightly integrates the sensory processing capabilities found in neural networks with many of the causal abilities found in human cognition. Causality emerges not from a central controlling stored program but directly from the architecture. Sensory input vectors are processed by robust association circuitry and then propagated to a navigational temporary map. Instinctive and learned objects and procedures are applied to the same temporary map, with a resultant navigation signal obtained. Navigation can similarly be for the physical world as well as for a landscape of higher cognitive concepts. There is good explainability for causal decisions. A simulation of the CCA1 controlling a search and rescue robot is presented with the goal of finding and rescuing a lost hiker within a grid world. A simulation of the CCA1 controlling a repair robot is presented that can predict the movement of a series of gears.     

Intelligence artificielle et médecine : quelles règles éthiques et juridiques pour une IA responsable ?

Combining AI and medicine means talking about the medicine of the future, but even more about improving the quality of care. Its fields of application: predictive medicine, precision medicine, decision support, prevention, computer-assisted surgery, robotic support for the elderly, etc. are all related concerns: the possibility of maintaining human contact with the patient, the explicability of the algorithm - the collection of health data - and the improvement of the health care system. AI applications are already improving the quality of care. Its deployment at the heart of the medicine of the future is in constant evolution. To be acceptable and legitimate, the decisions of any algorithm must be understood and therefore explained. Only a good understanding of the diagnoses and therapies proposed by the AI application will allow doctors to discuss with their patients and to explain the possible alternatives. In the opposite case, the doctor risks to dismiss the use of algorithms because he will not be able to justify the decisions which will pose problems in terms of liability research in particular.     

Where to from here? On the future development of autonomous vehicles from a cognitive systems perspective

Self-driving cars not only solve the problem of navigating safely from location A to location B; they also have to deal with an abundance of (sometimes unpredictable) factors, such as traffic rules, weather conditions, and interactions with humans. Over the last decades, different approaches have been proposed to design intelligent driving systems for self-driving cars that can deal with an uncontrolled environment. Some of them are derived from computationalist paradigms, formulating mathematical models that define the driving agent, while other approaches take inspiration from biological cognition. However, despite the extensive work in the field of self-driving cars, many open questions remain. Here, we discuss the different approaches for implementing driving systems for self-driving cars, as well as the computational paradigms from which they originate. In doing so, we highlight two key messages: First, further progress in the field might depend on adapting new paradigms as opposed to pushing technical innovations in those currently used. Specifically, we discuss how paradigms from cognitive systems research can be a source of inspiration for further development in modelling driving systems, highlighting emergent approaches as a possible starting point. Second, self-driving cars can themselves be considered cognitive systems in a meaningful sense, and are therefore a relevant, yet underutilized resource in the study of cognitive mechanisms. Overall, we argue for a stronger synergy between the fields of cognitive systems and self-driving vehicles.     

What is it like to trust a rock? A functionalist perspective on trust and trustworthiness in artificial intelligence

The trustworthiness (or otherwise) of AI has been much in discussion of late, not least because of the recent publication of the EU Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. Discussions range from how we might make people trust AI to AI being not possible to trust, with many points inbetween. In this article, we question whether or not these discussions somewhat miss the point, which is that people are going ahead and basically doing their own thing anyway, and that we should probably help them. Acknowledging that trust is a heuristic that is widely used by humans in a range of situations, we lean on the literature concerning how humans make trust decisions, to arrive at a general model of how people might consider trust in AI (and other artefacts) for specific purposes in a human world. We then use a series of thought experiments and observations of trust and trustworthiness, to illustrate the use of the model in taking a functionalist perspective on trust decisions, including with machines. Our hope is that this forms a useful basis upon which to develop intelligent systems in a way that considers how and when people may trust them, and in doing so empowers people to make better trust decisions about AI.     

The Effect of Prosody on Distributional Learning in 12‐ to 13‐Month‐Old Infants

Distributional information is a potential cue for learning syntactic categories. Recent studies demonstrate a developmental trajectory in the level of abstraction of distributional learning in young infants. Here we investigate the effect of prosody on infants' learning of adjacent relations between words. Twelve‐ to thirteen‐month‐old infants were exposed to an artificial language comprised of 3‐word‐sentences of the form aXb and cYd, where X and Y words differed in the number of syllables. Training sentences contained a prosodic boundary between either the first and the second word or the second and the third word. Subsequently, infants were tested on novel test sentences that contained new X and Y words and also contained a flat prosody with no grouping cues. Infants successfully discriminated between novel grammatical and ungrammatical sentences, suggesting that the learned adjacent relations can be abstracted across words and prosodic conditions. Under the conditions tested, prosody may be only a weak constraint on syntactic categorization. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dissociable neural systems of sequence learning

Although current theories all point to distinct neural systems for sequence learning, no consensus has been reached on which factors crucially define this distinction. Dissociable judgment-linked versus motor-linked and implicit versus explicit neural systems have been proposed. This paper reviews these two distinctions, yet concludes that these traditional dichotomies prove insufficient to account for all data on sequence learning and its neural organization. Instead, a broader theoretical framework is necessary providing a more continuous means of dissociating sequence learning systems. We argue that a more recent theory, dissociating multidimensional versus unidimensional neural systems, might provide such framework, and we discuss this theory in relation to more general principles of associative learning and recent imaging findings.     

Mindfulness reduces habitual responding based on implicit knowledge: Evidence from artificial grammar learning

Participants were unknowingly exposed to complex regularities in a working memory task. The existence of implicit knowledge was subsequently inferred from a preference for stimuli with similar grammatical regularities. Several affective traits have been shown to influence AGL performance positively, many of which are related to a tendency for automatic responding. We therefore tested whether the mindfulness trait predicted a reduction of grammatically congruent preferences, and used emotional primes to explore the influence of affect. Mindfulness was shown to correlate negatively with grammatically congruent responses. Negative primes were shown to result in faster and more negative evaluations. We conclude that grammatically congruent preference ratings rely on habitual responses, and that our findings provide empirical evidence for the non-reactive disposition of the mindfulness trait.     

Spiritual robots: Religion and our scientific view of the natural world

Religion plays a powerful role in the formation of scientific theories. By comparing the goals and practice of robotics and artificial intelligence in the US and Japan, differences between the two countries can be traced to their religious environments. Christian expectations of cosmic purpose and hope for salvation in purified, unearthly bodies leads to US researchers' preference for artificial intelligence over humanoid robots, a desire to see cosmic meaning in the development of that intelligence, and salvation of human minds in virtual, non-biological bodies. In Japan, robots, which have been the subjects of ritual consecrations and religious transcendence, participate in a fundamental sanctity of the natural world. A positive outlook on being human promotes a preference for humanoid robots and a future in which robots serve human beings, who do not forsake their bodies for virtual lives. Divergent scientific strategies cannot be separated from the religious worlds of their practitioners.