Measurement foundations for multiattribute psychophysical theories based on first order polynomials

The class of first order polynomial measurement representations is defined, and a method for proving the existence of such representations is described. The method is used to prove the existence of first order polynomial generalizations of expected utility theory, difference measurement, and additive conjoint measurement. It is then argued that first order polynomial representations provide a deep and far reaching characterization of psychological invariance for subjective magnitudes of multiattributed stimuli. To substantiate this point, two applications of first order polynomial representation theory to the foundations of psychophysics are described. First, Relation theory, a theory of subjective magnitude proposed by Shepard (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1981, 24, 21–57) and Krantz (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 168–199), is generalized to a theory of magnitude for multiattributed stimuli. The generalization is based on a postulate of context invariance for the constituent uniattribute magnitudes of a multiattribute magnitude. Second, the power law for subjective magnitude is generalized to a multiattribute version of the power law. Finally, it is argued that a common logical pattern underlies multiattribute generalizations of psychological theories to first order polynomial representations. This abstract pattern suggests a strategy for theory construction in multiattribute psychophysics.     

The freezing and unfreezing of lay-inferences: Effects on impressional primacy,ethnic stereotyping,and numerical anchoring

Three experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that primacy effects, ethnic stereotyping, and numerical anchoring all represent “epistemic freezing” in which the lay-knower becomes less aware of plausible alternative hypotheses and/or inconsistent bits of evidence competing with a given judgment. It was hypothesized that epistemic freezing would increase with an increase in time pressure on the lay-knower to make a judgment and decrease with the layknower's fear that his/her judgment will be evaluated and possibly be in error. Accordingly, it was predicted that primacy effects, ethnic stereotyping, and anchoring phenomena would increase in magnitude with an increase in time pressure and decrease in magnitude with an increase in evaluation apprehension. Finally, the time-pressure variations were expected to have greater impact upon “freezing” when the evaluation apprehension is high as opposed to low. All hypotheses were supported in each of the presently executed studies.     

Protection motivation and self-efficacy: A revised theory of fear appeals and attitude change

The effects of fear appeals on persuasion were investigated in a factorial experiment that was designed to test a combined model of protection motivation theory and self-efficacy theory. As predicted, the probability of a threat's occurrence and the effectiveness of a coping response both had positive main effects on intentions to adopt a recommended preventive health behavior. More importantly, the findings provided support for self-efficacy expectancy as a fourth component of protection motivation theory: Self-efficacy had a direct influence on intentions and interacted with two other variables of protection motivation theory. The interaction effect was interpreted in terms of two new decision-making strategies that people use when confronted with a fear appeal: a precaution strategy and a hyperdefensiveness strategy. In addition, the results replicated previous findings on the relationship between self-efficacy expectancy and outcome expectancy. A model incorporating protection motivation theory and self-efficacy theory is presented as a possible general model of attitude change.     

Tracing memory-structure activation during person judgments

The purpose of the reported research was twofold: (a) to introduce a procedure for measuring concept activation during memory-based decisions and (b) to employ the procedure to investigate memory-activation processes in social judgments. Recent research has focused on subjects' reliance on memory for earlier inferred categorizations as the basis for judgments about persons. However, subjects have also been shown to rely on memory for factual information when making such decisions. To more fully understand how social judgments are made, methods are needed that are capable of tracing concept activation during the judgment process. The present study introduces a procedure that relies on probe recognition speed as a measure of concept activation. The procedure is used to examine alternative models of how subjects activate categorical and event memory when making contemplative impression judgments (i.e., judgments that they have to justify). The results favor a dependent memory-activation model that hypothesizes subjects activate both facts and earlier categorizations that they have made about a person when making subsequent memory-based judgments. Memory-structure activation was dependent in that facts relevant to forming the early categorizations were more likely to be activated in the service of a judgment than category-irrelevant facts. Advantages and limitations of the probe procedure as a measure of memory-structure activation during decisions are discussed.     

On the consequences of priming: Assimilation and contrast effects

Two experiments investigated the effects of priming (activation of a category by unobtrusive exposure to exemplars of that category) on subsequent judgments in an unrelated task. Subjects were primed with one of four levels of ferocity (size) in the course of a “color perception” experiment, and were later asked to judge the ferocity (size) of real (unambiguous) and unreal (ambiguous) animals. An interaction between ambiguity of judged stimuli (real vs unreal animals) and extremity of primed exemplars (moderate vs extreme levels of ferocity or size) was revealed. Assimilation effects (judgments consistent with the primed category) occurred only when moderate exemplars were primed and ambiguous stimuli judged. Contrast effects occurred when extreme exemplars were primed and ambiguous stimuli judged and, irrespective of extremity of the primed exemplar, when unambiguous stimuli were judged. The results are interpreted in terms of an integration of social judgment and social cognition perspectives.     

Abstract and concrete data in the perseverance of social theories: When weak data lead to unshakeable beliefs

The perseverance effect—the finding that people cling to their initial beliefs more strongly than appears warranted—has been demonstrated in a wide variety of settings. The existing explanation of the effect implies that beliefs based on concrete data should be more resistant to challenges than beliefs based on abstract data. The present studies compared the amount of belief perseverance when the beliefs were initially based on either abstract or concrete data. Subjects examined either two case histories (concrete data) or a statistical summary (abstract data) suggestive of either a positive or a negative relationship between fire fighter trainees' level of preference for high risk and their subsequent success as firefighters. These data sets were equated for the initial strength of beliefs they induced. Subjects were the thoroughly debriefed about the fictitious nature of their initial data. Subsequent assessments of subjects' personal beliefs about the true relationship revealed (a) significant levels of theory perseverance both immediately and 1 week later; (b) significantly more perseverance in the concrete data conditions, both immediately and 1 week later. Experiment 2 revealed that subjects frequently engage in causal processing spontaneously, especially when examining concrete data. Overall, the data suggested that memory for initial data did not contribute to the abstract/concrete effects, but that the generation of general, causal explanations did contribute to the stronger perseverance of theories in the concrete conditions.     

The causal structure of situations: The generation of plausible causal attributions as a function of type of event situation

The causal structures for each of four types of situations—interpersonal failure, noninterpersonal failure, interpersonal success, and noninterpersonal success—were explored and compared. A first group of subjects generated plausible causes for five specific situations in each of the four general types of situations. A second group of subjects provided similarity data on these causes, which were used in a cluster analysis of the causes. A third group of subjects rated the generated causes on each of six dimensions reported in the attribution literature: changeability, locus, stability, intentionality, globality, and controllability. Analyses of the clusters of causes and the ratings revealed (a) different types of causes were generated for different types of situations, (b) different types of situations led people to generate causes that differ in dimensional location, (c) the various causal dimensions were highly intercorrelated. These findings were applied to A. W. Kruglanski's (Psychological Review, 1980, 87) model of attribution processes. In addition, implications for the study of interpersonal situations and for the cognition-motivation debate over “self-serving” bias in attribution were discussed. Finally, several methodological issues were examined.     

Causal ambiguity and heterosexual affiliation

A male's decision to approach a physically attractive female stranger may be fraught with ambivalence. He is drawn by her beauty but he may fear rejection. The conflict lessens, however, if approach can occur under the guise of a motive other than desire to be with the attractive woman. This is because keeping one's true approach motive ambiguous may make direct personal rejection less likely. The effect of ambiguity on males' tendencies to approach females was explored in two experiments. In the first study, presented to subjects as a movie rating exercise, an excuse to sit with an attractive female confederate (a movie preference) was available to some subjects but not to others. As predicted, males only sat with the confederate when a reason for their affiliative behavior, other than her attractiveness, was available. In the second study, male-female dyads were run through the film rating paradigm with the female subjects in the role played by the confederate in Study I. The results of Study I were replicated for the dyads which included attractive females, as expected. The relationships between fear of failure and attributional ambiguity in social and achievement settings are examined. The tendency to discount a person's physical appearance as a cause of social behavior is discussed.     

Human covariation judgment: Accuracy and strategy

Judgment strategy is proposed as a contributor to the variability of findings in past research on human covariation judgment. Mathematically sophisticated judgment strategies will accurately judge all event covariations. However, faulty judgment rules will also produce correct judgments of many event relationships. Several methods have been used in past research to identify subjects' strategies of covariation judgment. Each of these methods indicates that humans employ simplistic, error-prone rules to judge event relationships. Shifts in covariation strategy use are proposed as a source of past findings that judgment accuracy depends on the decision conditions.